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INTRODUCTION
A key characteristic of markets is the interaction of demand and supply for goods
or services. Rules for the interaction, however, differ significantly across mar-
kets. Conventional markets such as those for cars and garments are typically
decentralized and price mechanisms are used to match demand and supply. In
contrast, markets for the provision of health care and education are two salient
examples of markets that are often partly centralized and subject to severe regu-
lations that particularly concern prices. For instance, schooling is compulsory and
free of charge in many countries. Typically, a significant number of schools are
government-owned and the state manages the distribution of school places with-
out using price mechanisms. Selling organs is prohibited almost everywhere in the
world. In most countries of the European Union health insurance is compulsory.
What is special about health and education such that its provision requires
intervention? The exceptional importance of the provision of health care and ed-
ucation is already emphasized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 as a right to health and a right to education.1 The state is considered to
be responsible for implementing these rights, which includes ensuring availability,
accessibility, acceptability, and quality.2 Therefore, as fairness and equality ob-
jectives may not be sufficiently reflected by free and decentralized markets, the
state is obliged to take action. Intervention on health and education markets may
furthermore be justified on efficiency grounds. Health and education entail pos-
itive externalities on society.3 Regulations can also be a tool to improve welfare
in view of information asymmetries which are due to the fact that it is difficult to
judge the quality of health and education services.
In all three chapters of this thesis I deal with topics and questions that are par-
ticularly relevant in markets for the provision of health care and education. Each
chapter is self-contained and contributes to the field of microeconomic theory.
Both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 address the broad problem of public provision
of scarce and indivisible goods. Therein, the role of wealth distribution and the
1Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), article 25 and article 26.
2General Comment No. 14 (2000) of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, article 12.
3Todaro and Smith (2003), for instance, describe the critical role of education and health
for growth and development of a state.
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impact wealth has on the assignment of the goods is of particular interest. In
both chapters I consider settings in which wealth has an impact on what a con-
sumer is willing to pay for a good and in which monetary transfers are allowed for
the assignments of goods. Many economic models on the provision of indivisible
goods do not reflect how wealth affects assignments since they either ban trans-
fers or assume that wealth has no impact on somebody’s willingness to pay. The
burgeoning literature on Matching Markets considers the problem of assigning
goods to consumers if monetary transfers must not be used for the assignment.
Prominent applications are the distribution of school places and kidney exchange
programs.4 From an economic point of view, it is important to understand why
banning monetary transfers might be desirable as it entails costs for society. Mon-
etary incentives can improve on supply shortages like those faced in the market for
organs. If consumers differ in their willingness to pay for a good, conditioning the
admission for consuming the good on the payment of a price can increase revenues
for funding or redistribution. On the downside, admitting monetary transfers for
the assignment of goods might lead to inequality in access: if the assignment
of goods conditions on the willingness to pay, inequalities in the distribution of
wealth across the population gain importance on the question of “who gets what”.
This concern is of relevance whenever the willingness or ability to pay depends on
wealth which is reflected by the settings of the first two chapters.
In contrast, Chapter 3 addresses quality concerns for the provision of health
services that occur if quality cannot be observed precisely and cannot be con-
tracted on. Therein, providers are in quality competition for patients and prices
do not play a role, e.g, due to health insurance.
In the remainder of this introduction I provide an overview of the models and
results of each chapter.
Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I address the question of how to optimally assign
an indivisible good of limited availability to a continuum of agents in a private
information setting. A key assumption is that an agent’s willingness to pay for
the good increases with his wealth. While the benefit from consuming the good
is the same for all consumers, the wealth level of some share of the agents is lower
than the wealth level of the other agents. The model allows for randomization in
the assignments, which implies that by assigning consumption probabilities to the
agents each unit of the indivisible good can be treated as a divisible good with a
supply of one.
4See, e.g. the work of Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) and Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver
(2004).
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I find that randomly assigning the good without transfers can be ex-post
Pareto-efficient and can ex-ante Pareto-dominate selling the good for a market
clearing price and redistributing the revenues. This explains the use of assign-
ments without money rather than selling the good for a market clearing price
in many real-world applications on grounds of efficiency. The main driver of the
result is the non-linearity in preferences of the agents: the compensation an agent
with low wealth is willing to accept for trading the good may exceed the willing-
ness to pay for the good of an agent with high wealth.
I furthermore study welfare maximizing assignments. Independent of the cur-
vature of the welfare function, neither the random assignment nor selling the
good for a market clearing price and redistributing the revenues are optimal as-
signments. In general, optimal assignments involve wealth-dependent lotteries for
the admission to consume the good and monetary transfers from agents with high
wealth to agents with low wealth. The probability of being assigned to the good
is lower for an agent with low wealth than it is for an agent with high wealth. The
intuition is that if the good is randomly assigned without transfers, agents with
low wealth have an incentive to sell at least a marginal share of their consumption
probability to agents with high wealth. I find that resources of the good may
be withheld by the social planner in order to increase redistribution from agents
with high wealth to agents with low wealth. The welfare gains from redistribution
then overcompensate the efficiency losses resulting from not assigning all available
resources.
The wide-spread use of mechanisms without monetary transfers suggests that
in certain markets social planners have other objectives than solely utilitarian
ones. Particularly for health and education markets, it seems to be a worry that
access to resources is linked to wealth if price mechanisms are used for provision.
In the setting of Chapter 1, the only incentive compatible assignment that fully
reflects the desire that consumption probabilities do not depend on endowments is
the income-independent random assignment which is never optimal. Nevertheless,
the welfare maximizing assignment might allow a greater number of low income
agents to consume the good than the assignment implied by a market clearing
price approach does.
Chapter 2. The model in Chapter 2 is joint work with Achim Wambach.5 In
contrast to Chapter 1, we impose an additional constraint on how to assign objects
and transfers. We require that a social choice function assigning objects and
5Chapter 2 is a modified version of Huesmann and Wambach (2015).
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transfers is discrimination-free, which is defined as the object somebody is assigned
to must not depend on his wealth endowment. This reflects the concern that
wealth inequalities lead to an unequal access to resources if money plays a role
for the assignment of goods. We consider a finite set of agents and a set of
heterogeneous objects. Agents are endowed with some wealth and, in analogy to
Chapter 1, wealth impacts on the willingness to pay.
We find that mechanisms that do not use transfers and that are only based
on ordinal preference information of the agents are already at the Pareto-frontier
of discrimination-free social choice functions. In a private information setting, we
furthermore find that requiring a social choice function to be discrimination-free
implies that an agent’s money assignment is independent of his preferences and
his object assignment must not be sensitive to cardinal information about his
preferences. In case the market designer is informed about wealth endowments,
the only exception that allows him to condition somebody’s object assignment
on information beyond object rankings is to make ex-post wealth independent of
endowments. Assigning objects without transfers can therefore be understood as
a tool to satisfy a desire for wealth independent access to certain goods when-
ever the mechanism does not (or cannot) eliminate potential wealth differences
in endowments. We furthermore find that even more restrictions than banning
transfers are needed, if money can be used to improve access to a good outside
the mechanisms. Examples include moving to a neighborhood of a popular school
or bribing somebody to donate a kidney.
Chapter 3. The model of Chapter 3 is joint work with Wanda Mimra.6 Therein,
quality concerns for the provision of multi-dimensional health services are central.
In contrast to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, we do not consider scarce resources
to assign but providers of health services are in competition for patients. It
is characteristic of our model that providers solely compete in quality and not
in prices. We analyze a setting where patients value quality differences in one
attribute more than quality differences in the other attribute but the quality signal
in the more important attribute is less precise. An example is the medical quality
of the service a hospital provides that is presumably more important for a patient
than the amenities a hospital offers, but also more difficult to measure. Providers’
investments are stochastic and they can shift resources to raise expected quality
in some attribute.
6Chapter 3 is based on Huesmann and Mimra (2015).
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We find that rational patients focus on less important attributes if the precision
of their quality signals is high compared to the more important attribute. We say
that a patient focuses on an attribute if a high quality signal in this attribute
drives his provider choice. This result explains the empirical finding of Goldman
and Romley (2008) that various measures of treatment quality of hospitals have
only a small effect on patient demand while improvements in amenities strongly
raise demand. Focusing of patients has implications for the provision of quality
and welfare. We find that if patients focus on less important attributes, any
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is inefficient. Furthermore, increasing signal
precision can reduce welfare as the positive effect of better provider selection
is overcompensated by a negative effect that a shift in patient focusing has on
provider quality choice. Empirical findings of Feng Lu (2012) suggest that the
shift in resources in dependence of signal precision is indeed relevant for real-
world applications.7 We finally discuss providers’ strategic reporting incentives
and reporting policies. In the case of optimal reporting, signals concerning the
important attribute are always published. However, banning reporting on less
important attributes might be necessary to enforce optimal reporting.
Our results are particularly relevant for applications since the availability of in-
formation on health services through feedback platforms as well as quality reports
has significantly increased over the past years. Implications on overall quality pro-
vision are still little understood and controversially discussed. With the analysis
in Chapter 3 we aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms
of providing information that only imprecisely reflects quality.
7Feng Lu (2012) finds that after the introduction of public reporting scores of quality mea-
sures improve along the reported dimensions, but significantly deteriorate along the unreported
ones.

chapter 1
PUBLIC PROVISION OF SCARCE RESOURCES WHEN
PREFERENCES ARE NON-LINEAR
Abstract
This paper considers the problem of assigning an indivisible good of lim-
ited availability to a continuum of agents who exhibit decreasing marginal
utility of income. All agents equally benefit from consuming the good but
may differ regarding their income. I find that randomly assigning the good
to the agents without transfers can be ex-post efficient. It can also ex-ante
Pareto-dominate selling the good for a market clearing price and redistribut-
ing the revenues. However, I also show that a random assignment without
transfers is never optimal under the objective of welfare maximization. The
unique second-best solution assigns income-dependent consumption prob-
abilities and monetary transfers from agents with high income to agents
with low income. Thereby, consumption probability of an agent with low
income is distorted downwards compared to first-best, where consumption
probabilities are independent of income. If income differences are large, the
optimal assignment might not distribute all resources of the good in order
to incentivize higher redistribution of income.
1.1 Introduction
Many goods and resources are not distributed to individuals via decentralized
markets but by the state. Examples include the distribution of land, houses, edu-
cation programs, and human organs. A common challenge is scarcity of resources
while many people benefit from consumption. The state then has to decide whom
to admit for consumption and what prices to charge. Real-world applications
show a huge variety in assignment procedures. It ranges from market mechanisms
where the good is sold for a market clearing price to non-market mechanisms
like randomly assigning the goods without transfers.1 Advocates of selling the
goods for market prices often emphasize efficiency properties of this approach.
1The homepage of the US government lists various government-owned items that are sold via
auctions in the US (https://www.usa.gov/auctions-and-sales, assessed on 16 December, 2015).
Roth (2015) gives an extensive overview of markets where goods are distributed without price
mechanisms.
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In certain markets, however, price mechanisms are criticized based on moral and
fairness concerns (see, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986, Sandel, 2012,
Satz, 2010).
Selling a good for a market clearing price assigns the good to those that have
the highest willingness to pay for the good. If somebody’s willingness to pay does
not depend on his income, it fully reflects his benefit from consuming the good.
However, if the willingness to pay increases with income, it is possible that selling
the good for a market clearing price does not assign the good to the individual
with the highest benefit from consumption but to the one with the highest income.
This paper demonstrates that a use of random assignments without transfers in-
stead of assignments via market prices can be explained on grounds of efficiency
when preferences are non-linear in income. It is particularly relevant in markets
where the benefit from consuming the good is high compared to income differ-
ences. I furthermore study assignments that maximize utilitarian welfare. I find
that optimal assignments serve individuals with consumption probabilities that
positively depend on income to gain revenues for redistribution. Therefore, utili-
tarian objectives alone cannot explain the wide-spread use of random assignments
without transfers.
More specifically, I study the problem of assigning an indivisible good of limited
availability to a continuum of agents when monetary transfers are possible. All
agents equally benefit from consuming the good but may differ in income. Each
indivisible good can be treated as a divisible good with a supply of one by assigning
consumption probabilities. Each agent is either a low income type or a high income
type. While the distribution of income is common knowledge, the realization of
incomes is private information to the agents. Preferences of the agents are non-
linear in income. In particular, utility of each agent with income e when consuming
the good and paying a transfer t is described by θ + h(e − t). θ represents the
benefit from consumption and h(·) is an increasing and strictly concave function
that describes how the agent evaluates income. Therefore, the preferences exhibit
decreasing marginal utility of income and the willingness to pay for the good
increases in income. I restrict attention to admissible mechanisms. These are
mechanisms that are feasible (i.e., resources availability is respected), incentive
compatible, and individually rational.
I first discuss two classical approaches to assign the good from a welfare per-
spective, a market price approach and a matching market approach. In the market
price approach the good is sold at a market clearing price and revenues generated
are redistributed. The matching market approach assigns the indivisible good un-
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der the constraint that no transfers occur. In this setting where only one type of
good exists and all agents benefit from the good in the same way, it corresponds to
assigning the good randomly to the agents. I then describe optimal assignments
if the objective is utilitarian welfare maximization. Non-linearities in preferences
have important implications for market design, which quasilinear preferences, a
typical assumption in the literature on the assignment of resources, cannot re-
flect.2 Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that consumers’ preferences
are not quasilinear since consumers might be risk averse, budget constrained or
exhibit income effects in their willingness to pay as our setting reflects.
The discussion in Section 1.4 about the market price approach and the match-
ing market approach gives an intuition of how non-linearity in preferences impacts
on the evaluation of assignment mechanisms. First, I find that random assign-
ments without transfers are ex-post Pareto-efficient if income differences are not
too large. This is because then, the compensation an agent with low income
demands for selling the good is larger than the sum an agent with high income
is willing to pay for the good.3 Secondly, I find that the matching market ap-
proach might ex-ante Pareto-dominate the market price approach. The key to
the problem is that an agent’s willingness to pay for receiving the good with
some probability pi is larger than pi times the willingness to pay for receiving
the good with probability one. Thereby, an agent may prefer a random assign-
ment to receiving revenue distribution from those buying the good for a market
clearing price. I find that in general neither of the two classical approaches is
ex-ante Pareto-efficient. The market approach can be Pareto-improved by selling
admission to lotteries instead of offering the good for a fixed price. A random as-
signment without monetary transfers where all agents consume the good with the
same probability can be Pareto-improved by shifting some marginal consumption
probability from the low income agents to those with high income in return for
positive monetary transfers.
In Section 1.5, I study a utilitarian mechanism design problem. Welfare is
assessed via a strictly concave welfare function that evaluates the agents’ ex-
2Baisa (2013) showed in a payoff environment similar to mine that mechanisms involving
probabilistic assignments might yield higher revenues than standard auctions. Che, Gale, and
Kim (2013) showed that from a welfare perspective, random assignments with resale might dom-
inate competitive markets if consumers are budget constrained. Roughly speaking, I combine
main aspects of both approaches by considering welfare maximizing assignments in a setting
where agents’ preferences are comparable to Baisa (2013).
3Knetsch and Sinden (1984), for instance, provide experimental evidence of a significant
difference in the willingness to pay for a good and the compensation demanded.
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pected utilities and thus reflects inequality aversion of the social planner.4 In a
first-best world, the social planner fully redistributes incomes and assigns income-
independent consumption probabilities. In a second-best world, these two desires
cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Generating revenues for redistribution requires
that consumption probabilities depend on income in order to prevent agents with
high income to mimic agents with low income. I find that there is a unique
solution to the utilitarian problem. It involves transfers and income-dependent
consumption probabilities. The consumption probabilities of low income agents
increase in their income but are strictly smaller than the one for a high income
type. If income differences are large, the optimal assignment may even not as-
sign all resources. This is because the welfare loss of not assigning some of the
resources is overcompensated by the welfare gain through increasing the revenues
for redistribution. Furthermore, I show that the more inequality averse the social
planner is, the more the consumption probabilities differ across agents with high
and low income in order to increase monetary transfers. If the benefit from con-
sumption becomes arbitrarily large, the difference in consumption probabilities
goes to zero. This is because the higher the benefit, the easier it is to generate
revenues.
Therefore, in a setting where differences in the willingness to pay are solely
due to income differences, non-market mechanisms like a random assignment can
be closer to welfare maximization than a market price approach is. However, the
wide-spread use of non-market mechanisms cannot be solely explained by classical
utilitarian objectives. Condorelli (2013) argues that a social planner might have
objectives that are not directly linked to consumers’ utilities. One potential desire
that justifies a matching market approach in this setting is an income indepen-
dent access to the resources. Compared to a market price approach, the welfare
maximizing assignment allows a higher share of low income types to consume the
good if income differences are small enough. For high income differences, however,
the market price approach might lead to a higher share of low income types con-
suming the good. This is the case if the optimal assignment withholds resources
in order to increase redistribution.
In the following section I discuss related literature. In Section 1.3, the setting and
the general assignment problem are presented. Then, the market price approach,
the matching market approach (Section 1.4) and welfare maximizing assignment
(Section 1.5) are worked out in detail and discussed. In Section 1.6 I conclude.
4Thereby, I consider a setting where equal opportunities are desired rather than distributive
justice.
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1.2 Related Literature
Broadly speaking, this work relates to the economic literature on assigning indi-
visible goods and monetary transfers. In the following I first refer to the literature
that shows analogies to how I treat the consumers’ preferences. Then, I outline the
literature on the objectives and constraints of a social planner that is especially
relevant for my work.
Non-Linear Consumer Preferences. The central idea of my setting is the
non-linearity of preferences expressed by a decreasing marginal utility for money.
The literature on mechanism design with non-linear preferences is scarce although
there are good reasons to assume that consumers exhibit non-linear preferences
and that they are relevant for the design of certain markets.5 There is some
work on how non-linearity in preferences impacts on auction design. Maskin and
Riley (1984) were among the first to consider auctions in a non-linear setting.
In a recent work Baisa (2013) analyzed a canonical auction market when bid-
ders are risk averse and their willingness to pay increases in income. He showed
that probabilistic allocations might Pareto-dominate the second price auction. In
contrast, I study welfare maximizing assignments in a large market and I am
interested in how wealth endowments impact on the assignment. However, the
attractiveness of randomizations when preferences are not linear in income is also
reflected in his setting. Che et al. (2013) considered a problem of assigning scarce
resources to a continuum of agents with quasilinear preferences but who might
be budget constrained. They showed that random assignments with resale might
dominate competitive markets. In their model, the value of income is the same
for all agents. Therefore, in contrast to our work, there is no desire for redistri-
bution. The work of Garratt and Pycia (2014) is an example of how dropping
the assumption of quasi-linearity might turn impossibility results into possibility
results. They showed that the efficient bilateral trade problem of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) is solvable in certain settings when preferences incorporate
positive wealth effects.
Utilitarian Mechanism Design. In the main part of this paper I study wel-
fare maximizing assignments of indivisible goods and monetary transfers in large
5The American Medical Association on distributing medical resources: ”At present, though,
the disparity among incomes across society distorts the accuracy of the market model as a fair
tool for distributing scarce medical resources, for the amount an individual can spend to gain
access to a needed treatment will often fall short of his or her actual valuation of it.” (American
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 1995)
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markets. Thereby, my research is related to the literature on optimal provision
of excludable public goods in large markets. Hellwig (2005) showed that for a
utilitarian social planner, excluding agents from consuming the good might be de-
sirable for redistribution. In my setting, access is restricted exogenously through
scarcity of resources. I also find that further restrictions in access might be desired
to increase redistribution. However, in my setting the reason for which increas-
ing redistribution through limiting access may be desired is not purely a matter
of inequality aversion and heterogeneity in consumption benefits but is further-
more due to income differences that lead to different marginal utilities in income.
Hellwig (2010) showed in setting similar to that of Hellwig (2005) that random-
ization in admissions can be desirable if inequality aversion is sufficiently high.
The goals and constraints for a social planner to distribute the goods in this work
are similar to the ones of Hellwig (2010) while the agents’ preferences differ. In
my setting, randomization in admission is attractive in general. This is driven by
the non-linearity of the preferences.
Non-Utilitarian Objectives. Condorelli (2013) studied optimal allocations
for quasi-linear preferences if a market designer has objectives other than util-
itarian welfare maximization but the allocation can only be conditioned on the
willingness to pay and observable characteristics. He showed that whether a mar-
ket allocation is optimal depends on how much the social planner’s goals and the
agents’ willingness to pay are linked. It relates to my work since it might not be
optimal either to allocate the good to the one with the highest willingness to pay.
In contrast to Condorelli (2013), it even holds if the social planner has utilitarian
objectives but is rather driven by the fact that the willingness to pay does not
reflect the benefit from consumption.
Mechanism Design under Constraints. The literature on Matching Markets
deals with the problem of how to assign indivisible goods to consumers if money
must not be used for the assignment. Popular applications are assignments of
school places, housing, or kidneys (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003, Roth et al., 2004). Several works discuss mo-
tivations behind prohibiting transfers (see, e.g., Roth, 2008, Sandel, 2012, Satz,
2010). However, concerns associated with prices are barely integrated in eco-
nomic models. Huesmann and Wambach (2015) consider a setting in which the
consumers’ willingness to pay increases in wealth and in which it is desired to
have income-independent access to resources. They show that then a price mech-
anism cannot be used to assign the good. In my setting, there is only one type of
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indivisible good. Therefore, a matching market approach is limited to assigning
the good randomly with a uniform distribution across the agents. The matching
market approach then reflects a desire of income independent access.
1.3 The General Assignment Problem
There is a continuum of agents with total mass equal to one. In the economy,
there is an indivisible good that is available with capacity Q < 1. Therefore, not
all agents can be provided with the indivisible good. Initially, nobody owns the
good but it is owned by the state. Each agent can at most receive one unit of
the indivisible good. Furthermore, each agent j initially owns an amount ej ∈ R
of money, his income. ej is distributed across agents according to a distribution
function G(·). I concentrate on the case that G(·) is a binary distribution. A share
GL ∈ (0, 1) of the agents is endowed with eL ∈ R (referred to as the low income
type or L-type) and a share GH = 1−GL of agents is endowed with eH > eL ∈ R
(referred to as the high income type or H-type).
An assignment (χ, t) = (χj, tj)j∈[0,1] determines for each agent j a transfer tj
of money and whether he consumes one unit of the indivisible good, denoted by
χj ∈ {0, 1}. χj = 1 corresponds to the agent being admitted to consuming the
good, χj = 0 corresponds to the agent not being admitted to consuming the good.
The payoff of an agent with individual assignment (χj, tj) and income ej is
θχj + h(ej − tj),
where θ ∈ R+ is a parameter that determines the benefit of consuming the indi-
visible good. Since I am interested in the impact of wealth differences on optimal
assignments rather than the impact of differences in benefits from consumption,
I concentrate on the case where all agents have the same benefit θ when consum-
ing the indivisible good. h(·) is three times differentiable with h′ > 0, h′′ < 0
and h′′′ > 0.6 Therefore, agents exhibit decreasing marginal utility of income
(h′′ < 0). This implies positive wealth effects in the sense that their willingness
to pay strictly increases for increasing income. Furthermore, since h′′′ > 0, agents
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion.7
For any given benefit parameter θ, the assignment (χj, tj) depends on agent j
only through the agent’s endowment ej and the realization rj of an exogenously
6I allow the agents to have negative levels of income. Restricting incomes level and, for
instance, considering h(e) = ln e for e ∈ R+ neither changes the proceeding of my analysis nor
the characteristics of the results.
7According to Kimball (1990), h′′′ > 0 can be interpreted as prudence in the sense that an
agent undertakes precautionary savings when facing uncertainty.
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given indicator variable r˜j. r˜j takes values in the unit interval and has a uniform
distribution denoted by ν that is the same for all agents. The introduction of the
indicator variable allows for randomization in the assignments.
An assignment can then be described by
(χL(r), χH(r), tL(r), tH(r)) = (χ(eL, r), χ(eH , r), t(eL, r), t(eH , r)) ,
with r ∈ [0, 1]. Any agent j with realization rj of the random variable r˜j is then
assigned to (χL(r
j), tL(r
j)) if his income is eL and to (χH(r
j), tH(r
j)) if his income
is eH . Furthermore, for i ∈ {L,H},
pii :=
∫
χi(r)dν(r)
denotes the probability that an agent with income ei is admitted to consume the
good.
vi := piiθ +
∫
h(ei − ti(r))dν(r) (1.1)
denotes an agent’s expected payoff if his endowment is ei with i ∈ {L,H}.
Endowments ej ∈ {eL, eH} are assumed to be the agents’ private information.
In analogy to Hellwig (2010), from the perspective of other agents and the market
designer, ej is the realization of a random variable e˜j that takes the values eL with
probability GL and eH with probability GH . Again like Hellwig (2010) I assume
a large-number effect such that with probability one, the joint distribution G× ν
is the cross-section distribution of the pair (ej, rj) in any nonnegligible subset of
the population. Based on the large economy effects, pii then corresponds to the
share of agents of type i that receive the indivisible good.
An assignment is admissible if it is feasible, incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational. Feasible assignments are those that respect resource availability.
Formally,
GL
∫
tL(r)dν(r) +GH
∫
tH(r)dν(r) ≥ 0, (1.2)
GLpiL +GHpiH ≤ Q. (1.3)
An assignment is incentive compatible, if truthful reporting is a weakly dominant
strategy for each agent. Therefore, for i, j ∈ {L,H} it has to hold that
vi ≥ θpij +
∫
h(ei − tj(r))dν(r) (1.4)
An assignment is individually rational if every agent weakly prefers his assignment
to not participating. Therefore, for any i ∈ {L,H}
vi ≥ h(ei). (1.5)
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The budget constraint for transfers reflects that the social planner does not need
to extract any money that is needed for funding the provision of goods.8
Implication of the Preferences on the Willingness to Pay. The assump-
tions that preferences in income can be expressed by a strictly concave function
h(·) and that consumption utility does not depend on income have some impor-
tant implications for the following analysis. First, the willingness to pay tp of an
agent with income e for an object is lower than the compensation ta he is willing
to accept in order to give up the object (i.e., his willingness to accept). Formally,
tp and ta are described by the equations
θ + h(e− tp) = h(e) and θ + h(e) = h(e+ ta)
These equations imply that h(e) = 1
2
(h(e+ ta)− h(e− tp)) which can only hold if
tp < ta since h(·) is strictly concave. A second implication of the specifications of
preferences is that an agent’s willingness to pay for attending a lottery that serves
him the good with probability pi is higher than pi times his willingness to pay tp for
receiving the good with probability one. To see this, note that strict concavity of
h(·) implies that h(e)−piθ < h(e−pitp). This is equivalent to piθ+h(e−pitp) > h(e)
which implies the desired.
1.4 Two Classical Approaches
In this section I discuss a classical market and a classical non-market approach
to assign resources and design transfers. Both are indeed widely used in real-
world applications for assignments of goods. The first one is a market price
approach where the indivisible good is offered for a market clearing price such
that supply equals demand. Revenues are redistributed to society. The second
one is a matching market approach that, in this setting, corresponds to a random
assignment of resources to agents.
1.4.1 Market Price Approach
Suppose the social planner announces a price for the indivisible good such that
supply equals demand. Revenues generated are redistributed to all agents. The
8If there is some cost K to cover, the budget constraint changes to total transfers being at
least K instead of zero. If K is small enough, nothing significant changes in the analysis that
follows. Then, revenues generated by the social planner are not completely redistributed but
also used for financing the cost of provision. If K is large, the participation constraint may not
be satisfied which implies that nothing is distributed.
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prices and the share of each type consuming the indivisible good depends on
the availability Q of the indivisible good.9 Whether the H-types or the L-types
determine the market clearing prices depends on the availability of the indivisible
good.
For Q ≤ GH market clearing prices are such that the H-type is just indifferent
between buying the good or not. Then, a share Q
GH
of the H-types consumes the
good. Everybody consuming the good pays a transfer tMP to those not consuming
the good such that
θ + h(eH − tMP ) = h(eH + Q
1−QtMP ).
For Q > GH market clearing prices are such the L-type is just indifferent
between buying the good or not. Then, all H-types consume the good and a
share Q−GH
GL
of the L-types consumes the good. The ones consuming the good pay
a transfer tMP such that
θ + h(eL − tMP ) = h(eL + Q
1−QtMP ).
The final assignment is ex-post efficient. Agents do not have any incentives to
trade the indivisible good after the assignment.
1.4.2 Matching Market Approach
Characteristic of a matching market approach is the exclusion of transfers. The
matching market literature for one-sided markets deals with the question of how to
assign indivisible goods to agents without using any transfers. For some real-world
markets, transfers often are even forbidden by law in the respective countries. For
instance, nearly everywhere in the world it is forbidden to sell organs.
This paper considers one indivisible good of limited availability and agents
benefit from consumption in the same way. Differences in the willingness to pay
are solely due to endowment differences. Then, requiring no transfers is equiva-
lent to requiring income independent access to resources if endowments are private
information to the agents. Therefore, an assignment of a matching market ap-
proach pools both income types: no transfers are made and all agents receive an
indivisible good with probability Q, independent of their endowment. A share Q
of L-types consumes the good and a share Q of H-types consumes the good.
9For Q = GH (i.e., availability corresponds exactly to the amount of H-types) the market
clearing price is not unique but several prices such that supply equals demand exist. Then select
the market clearing price that is the highest.
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In the following, I discuss the agents’ incentives to resell the good after the as-
signment (which is, in fact, forbidden in many markets). Because of the strict
concavity of h(·), an L-type agent that received the good through a random as-
signment may not be willing to sell the good to an H-type agent that did not
receive the good. Despite a lower endowment, the compensation that an L-type is
willing to accept might exceed the willingness to pay for the good of an H-type. It
occurs if income differences are small enough given any benefit θ from consump-
tion. Therefore, there exist parameters such that the matching market approach is
ex-post Pareto-efficient in the sense that no Pareto-improvements through trades
after the assignment is performed can be realized. If resale is permitted, the share
of L-types and H-types consuming the indivisible good then either corresponds
to the one of the matching market approach and is the same for both types or
it corresponds to the one that results by offering the good for a market clearing
price. This discussion also shows that the Coase theorem does not hold in this
setting since the initial allocation matters.
1.4.3 Market Price versus Matching Market Approach
An attractive feature of the market price approach is that no agent has an incentive
to trade the good after the assignment is performed. For non-linear preferences,
the matching market approach might be ex-post efficient as well as discussed
above. Therefore, a classical argument by opponents of non-market approaches
that random assignments lead to allocations where consumers wish to resell the
good therefore does not necessarily hold if preferences exhibit wealth effects.
There is even an efficiency argument in favor of the matching market approach
compared to the market price appraoch. The following proposition shows that
a random assignment without transfers can ex-ante Pareto-dominate the market
price approach.
Proposition 1.1. Fix θ, Q, and eH . There exists some e
c
L < eH such that for all
eL ∈ (ecL, eH) the assignment where each agent receives the indivisible good with
probability Q and no transfers are made ex-ante Pareto-dominates the assignment
where the good is sold for a market clearing price and revenues are redistributed.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for the result is once again based on the non-linearity in the
preferences. An agent’s willingness to pay for receiving a good with probability
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Q is higher than Q times the willingness to pay for receiving the good with prob-
ability one. On the one hand, this implies that the type that defines the market
clearing price (the H-type for Q ≤ GH and the L-type for Q > GH) prefers the
random assignment over the good being sold for a market clearing price for any
endowment values eL and eH . On the other hand, if eL and eH are close enough,
the valuation for the L-type and the H-type served by each mechanisms are arbi-
trarily close. This implies that for low income differences, both types prefer the
random assignment.
The analysis shows that for the L-type, the payment he receives when not
buying the object for a market clearing price, does not compensate the benefit
from attending a lottery with a chance ofQ for receiving the good whenever income
differences are low. If resources are such that more than only the H-types can be
served, the L-types’ preference for the random assignment is even independent of
eL and eH . Therefore, a Rawlsian planner that aims to find an assignment that
maximizes the valuation of the L-types prefers the random assignment over the
market price approach independent of eL and eH .
1.5 Welfare Maximizing Assignment
In the following I consider a utilitarian social planner that aims to maximize
welfare. The utilitarian problem is to find an assignment that maximizes welfare
W within the set of admissible assignments. Welfare is assessed through
W = GLW (vL) +GHW (vH) (1.6)
where W (·) is a welfare function and vi = θpii+
∫
h(ei−ti(r))dν(r) is the expected
payoff of an agent with income ei.
10 I consider welfare functions W (·) that are
strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. This
means that the social planner is inequality averse. For simplicity I assume that
the share of L-types equals the share of H-types,11 therefore
GL = GH =
1
2
.
Since χi(r) only enters the utilitarian problem through the valuation vi = θpii +∫
h(ei − ti(r))dν(r) with
∫
χi(r)dν(r) = pii, it implies that for solving the utili-
tarian problem it is sufficient to determine the optimal piL and piH . χi(r) is then
10Ex-post outcomes, i.e., outcomes after each lottery r˜j is conducted, do not enter the welfare
function. Therefore, I consider a situation where equal opportunities are desired rather than
distributive justice.
11Assuming different shares neither changes the procedure of the following analysis nor the
characteristics of the results.
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chosen such that
∫
χi(r)dν(r) = pii for i ∈ {L,H}. Therefore, in the following
any (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L(r), t
∗
H(r)) that maximizes welfare W within the set of admissible
assignments is called optimal or a solution to the utilitarian problem.
1.5.1 First-best Solutions
In a first-best world the social planner is informed about income levels and is
not restricted by incentive or participation constraints. Based on how agents
evaluate assignments and the shape of the welfare function, the social planner
aims at smoothing income levels as well at smoothing utility levels. In a first-best
world, she can choose the assignment such that income levels and consumption
probabilities of the good are equal for both types.
This is indeed the unique first-best solution. To see this, first note that it is
not desirable that transfers depend on randomization. This is because removing
an agent’s uncertainty regarding his transfers by assigning a transfer that equals
the expected transfer unambiguously increases welfare. Furthermore, utilities vL
and vH need to be equal in the first-best assignment. If vL 6= vH , either a shift in
consumption probabilities or a shift in income from the type that is better off to
the other type is a welfare improvement. This is because the shift can be chosen
such that inequality among the two types decreases while the sum of utilities is
at least the same. Therefore, for the first-best assignment it has to hold that
vL = vH . If this is achieved by different consumption probabilities for both types
it cannot be optimal. This is because due to the strict concavity of h(·), money
can be shifted from the type with the lower ex-post income to the other type in
turn for some consumption probability of the indivisible good such that nobody is
worse off but the sum of valuation increases. Therefore, the first-best assignment
is the unique assignment that equalizes income and assigns the same consumption
probabilities of the indivisible good to the consumers. The following proposition
summarizes the first-best case. Notably, the solution is independent of the welfare
function W (·).
Proposition 1.2 (First-best). Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . In the first-best assign-
ment each agent is admitted to consume the indivisible good with probability Q,
i.e., pi∗L = pi
∗
H = Q. Transfers satisfy t
∗
i = ei − Ee˜ with Ee˜ = 12(eL + eH). Payoffs
then are such that v∗L = v
∗
H = θQ+ h(Ee˜)
Proof. The preceding discussion directly implies the proposition.
It is straightforward to see that the first-best assignment is not incentive com-
patible and therefore cannot be implemented if income of the agents is unknown
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to the social planner. A high income type that imitates the low income type is
better off compared to admitting being the high income type. Later in this section
I will furthermore consider a setting where the social planner knows the agents’
endowments but has to ensure that the assignment is individual rational such that
all agents would like to participate.
1.5.2 Second-best Solutions
In the following, the incentive compatible constraints as well as the participation
constraints are active. I first show that any second-best assignment incorporates
transfers tL and tH that are independent of the randomization variable. The
utilitarian problem can then be reduced to maximize welfare within the set of ad-
missible consumption probabilities piL, piH ∈ [0, 1] and transfers tL, tH ∈ R. This
is an important insight when searching for solutions to the utilitarian problem. In
a first-best world it is straightforward to see that any assignment where transfers
depend on randomization is dominated by an assignment with constant trans-
fers. However, in a second-best world randomization does not only impact on the
objective function but also impacts on the incentive constraint.
Lemma 1.1. Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . Suppose (pi
∗
L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L(r), t
∗
H(r)) is a solution
to the utilitarian problem. Then, transfers are independent of the randomization
variable, i.e., t∗L(r) = t
∗
L ∈ R and t∗H(r) = t∗H ∈ R.
Proof. See appendix.
The lemma relies on several drivers. On the one hand, preferences of the
agents are such that they are risk neutral regarding their consumption of the
good but are, due to the concavity of h(·), risk averse with respect to uncertainty
in transfers. Therefore, uncertainties in transfers are worse for the agents than
receiving the respective expected transfer. However, since the assignment choice
is restricted by an incentive compatibility constraint, making the payments for
the L-type dependent of the lottery might help to generate higher payments from
the H-type without violating the incentive constraint of the H-type. To see the
mechanism behind, suppose the incentive constraint of the H-type is binding. By
introducing the lottery the assignment of the L-type is less worth for the H-type.
Therefore, he is willing to pay more for his assignment. Since there is decreasing
absolute risk aversion, the negative effect of the randomization for the L-type’
valuation, however, outweighs the positive effect of higher payments (compare
Hellwig, 2007). This implies that payments of the L-type are always independent
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of randomization. To prove that payments of the H-type are also independent of
randomization, I construct admissible and constant transfers that strictly improve
welfare.
Lemma 1.1 allows to limit attention to assignments with transfers that are inde-
pendent of randomization when searching for solutions to the utilitarian problem.
In the following, I present several characteristics of optimal assignments that help
to reduce the utilitarian problem to a maximization problem in one dimension.
In particular, it is useful to know which of the constraints are binding. A further
simplification of searching for a solution of the utilitarian problem is that the
participation constraint can be omitted. This is driven by the assumption that
no cost of provision has to be extracted from the mechanism.
Lemma 1.2. Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . Any assignment that maximizes welfare
within the set of feasible and incentive compatible assignments also satisfies indi-
vidual rationality. Suppose (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L, t
∗
H) is a solution to the utilitarian problem.
It implies
1. pi∗L ≤ pi∗H , t∗L ≤ t∗H , and v∗L < v∗H .
2. The incentive compatibility constraint for the H-Type is binding.
3. The feasibility constraint with respect to transfers is binding.
4. If the feasibility constraint with respect to the indivisible good is not binding,
it implies that pi∗H = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
By Lemma 1.2, for any solution to the utilitarian problem transfers satisfy
t∗L = −t∗H . Denote by
t∗ = t∗H = −t∗L ≥ 0
the money each H-type agent pays and each L-type agent receives in optimum.
The following discussion demonstrates that the utilitarian problem can be reduced
to a one-dimensional maximization problem without constraints that is about
finding the optimal transfer t∗. It will be summarized in Proposition 1.3. The main
idea is that if t∗ is the transfer of a solution to the utilitarian problem it uniquely
implies the optimal consumption probabilities pi∗L of the L-type. pi
∗
L, in turn,
uniquely implies the consumption probabilities pi∗H of the H-type. This allows to
limit the search for optimal assignments to searching for optimal transfers.
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Definition of piH(pi
∗
L). The insights of Lemma 1.2 about the feasibility con-
straint for the indivisible good imply that once pi∗L ∈ [0, Q] is part of a solution to
the utilitarian problem, it uniquely defines pi∗H . If pi
∗
L ≤ 2Q − 1, pi∗H = 1 cannot
be part of an optimal solution. This implies that the constraint is binding, and
therefore pi∗H = 2Q − pi∗L. This always holds for Q < 12 . If pi∗L > 2Q − 1, which
can only occur if Q > 1
2
, the constraint cannot be binding and, therefore, pi∗H = 1
holds. The relationship of pi∗H and pi
∗
L can be summarized by
pi∗H = piH(pi
∗
L) = min{2Q− pi∗L, 1} for all pi∗L ∈ [0, Q]. (1.7)
Definition of piL(t
∗). The insights of Lemma 1.2 about the binding characteris-
tics of the incentive compatibility constraint in combination with piH(pi
∗
L) implies
a bijection between the optimal probability pi∗L that an L-type agent is admitted
to consume the indivisible good and the optimal transfer t∗ that is assigned. A
binding incentive compatibility constraint of the H-type implies that
pi∗Lθ + h(eH + t
∗) = pi∗H(pi
∗
L)θ + h(eH − t∗) (1.8)
⇔ h(eH + t∗)− h(eH − t∗) = (min{2Q− pi∗L, 1} − pi∗L)θ (1.9)
Strict concavity implies that if the H-type is indifferent between the two assign-
ments, the incentive constraint for the L-type is satisfied as well. Furthermore,
the left hand side of the last equality is strictly increasing in t∗ and the right hand
side is strictly decreasing in pi∗L. Therefore, if for any pi
∗
L ∈ [0, Q] there exists some
t∗ such that the equation is satisfied, it has to be unique. Such a transfer t∗ exists,
because the right hand side is larger or equal to zero while the left hand side is
zero for t∗ = 0 and converges to infinity for t∗ →∞. In the following, let tM the
maximal transfer t∗ that can be demanded by the H-types without violating the
incentive constraint. t∗ = tM is optimal if the difference in consumption share of
the two types is maximal. This is the case for pi∗L = 0. Therefore, tM is uniquely
defined by
h(eH + tM)− h(eH − tM) = min{2Q, 1}θ.
Taken all together, there is a continuous bijection of optimal transfers t∗ ∈ [0, tM ]
and optimal consumption probabilities pi∗L ∈ [0, Q]. The discussed insights directly
lead to the following proposition that describes how to reduce the utilitarian
problem to a one-dimensional maximization problem.
Proposition 1.3 (Reduced Utilitarian Problem). Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH .
Let tM be defined by h(eH + tM)−h(eH− tM) = min{2Q, 1}θ. For any t ∈ [0, tM ],
let piL(t) be the unique piL ∈ [0, Q] with h(eH+t)−h(eH−t)=(min{2Q−piL, 1}−piL)θ.
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Any assignment (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L(r), t
∗
H(r)) is a solution to the utilitarian problem
if and only if t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] maximizes
W(t) = W (piL(t)θ + h(eL + t)) +W (piL(t)θ + h(eH + t)) (1.10)
and pi∗L = piL(t
∗), pi∗H = min{2Q− pi∗L, 1} as well as t∗H(r) = −t∗L(r) = t∗ hold.
Proof. The proof is implied by the analysis preceding the proposition. Note that
for the definition of the objective function W(t) it is already exploited that the
expected utility of the H-type, piHθ+ h(eH − t), equals piLθ+ h(eH + t) according
to the binding incentive constraint for the H-type.
By Proposition 1.3, the utilitarian problem is reduced to finding t∗ ∈ [0, tM ]
that maximizes W(t) according to equation (1.10). This problem is a straight
forward optimization problem without constraints.12 The monotonicity properties
of W(t) help to find a maximizer of expression (1.10). W(t) is continuous but it
is not necessarily differentiable on the whole interval [0, tM ]. This is because the
explicit functional form of piL(t) depends on whether the feasibility constraint
with respect to the indivisible good is binding or not. For Q ≤ 1
2
the feasibility
constraint is binding and the minimum function does not cause any kinks inW(t).
Then, min{2Q− piL(t), 1} = 2Q− piL(t). This implies
piL(t) = Q− 1
2θ
[h(eH + t)− h(eH − t)] for t ∈ [0, tM ]. (1.11)
For Q > 1
2
, W(t) exhibits a kink at t = t1 where t1 is the unique transfer such
that piL(t1) = 2Q− 1. Therefore, t1 is uniquely defined by
h(eH + t1)− h(eH − t1) = (1−Q)2θ (1.12)
The reason for the kink is that as long as pi∗L < 2Q− 1, the feasibility constraint
with respect to the indivisible good is binding, and therefore pi∗H is strictly de-
creasing in pi∗L. For pi
∗
L ≥ 2Q − 1, the constraint is not binding and pi∗H = 1
holds independent of pi∗L. Therefore, the function form of piL(t) changes at t = t1.
Formally,
piL(t) = piL(t) = Q−
1
2θ
[h(eH + t)− h(eH − t)] for t ∈ [0, t1], and (1.13)
piL(t) = piL(t) = 1− 1
θ
[h(eH + t)− h(eH − t)] for t ∈ (t1, tM ] (1.14)
12In the same manner equation (1.10) is expressed in dependence of t. One could write the
equation in dependence of piL based on the bijection developed above. However, the notation in
dependence of t is more convenient for the following calculations.
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W(t) is therefore twice differentiable on [0, t1] as well as on (t1, tM ]. The first
and second derivatives W ′(t) and W ′′(t) can be meaningful defined on [0, tM ] as
the left derivatives. For all t ∈ [0, tM ] except for t1 it then holds that the left
derivative equals the right derivative. W ′(t) and W ′′(t) are then not continuous
since they have a point of discontinuity at t = t1.
The following proposition reveals that solutions to the utilitarian problem are
unique and, also, how to find the optimal transfer by evaluating the first derivative
of W(t).
Proposition 1.4 (Optimal Assignments). Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . There exists
(up to modifications on a null-set) a unique solution to the utilitarian problem.
The solution entails a monetary transfer t∗ > 0 such that each H-type agent
pays t∗ and each L-type agent receives t∗. t∗ is the unique t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] such that
W ′(t) ≥ 0 if and only if t ≤ t∗. The share of L-type agents consuming the good is
strictly lower than the share of H-type agents consuming the good.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition is proved by showing thatW ′(t) is strictly decreasing and that
W ′(0) > 0. An implication of the proposition is that ifW ′(t) attains zero at some
t ∈ [0, tM ], this transfer is optimal. For Q ≤ 12 , W ′(t) is continuous. Therefore, if
no root exists on [0, tM ], t
∗ = tM is optimal. For Q > 12 , W ′(t) is discontinuous
at t = t1. Therefore, if no root of W ′(t) on [0, tM ] exists, t∗ = tM is optimal if
W ′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, tM ]. t∗ = t1 is optimal if W ′(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, t1] and
W ′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ (t1, tM ]. Note that if Q > 12 and t∗ = tM resources are not
exhausted since pi∗L = 0 and pi
∗
H = 1. In section 1.5.3 when studying the impact
of eL on optimal assignments I discuss in which settings a transfer tM is optimal.
An important corollary of the proposition is that conducting a symmetric
lottery for the goods among the two types is never optimal. This is a direct
consequence of W ′(0) > 0.
Corollary 1.1. Any assignment that assigns the same probabilities of consuming
the indivisible good to both types is not a solution to the utilitarian problem.
The corollary has an intuition that does not rely on the technical results of
Proposition 1.4. Consider any assignment where all agents consume the indivisi-
ble good with the same probability. If it was part of a solution of the utilitarian
problem, transfers are zero. Since the L-type’s marginal utility of money is larger
than the one of the H-type, the L-type has an incentive to sell a marginal proba-
bility share of consuming the good to the H-type. This holds despite the L-type
1.5. WELFARE MAXIMIZING ASSIGNMENT 25
may not be willing to sell the whole good to the H-type. The resulting assign-
ment is admissible and dominates the original one such that assigning the same
probabilities to both types cannot be optimal.
Comparison of second-best with first-best. The first-best assignment in-
volves a symmetric lottery among both types and income equalization. The
second-best assignment exhibits a downward distortion in the share of the L-
types consuming the indivisible good and an upward distortion in the share of the
H-types consuming the indivisible good. If more than the share of H-types can
be served (i.e., Q > 1
2
), resources of the indivisible good might not be exhausted
and withheld in order to generate higher transfers. The distortion in consumption
shares holds despite there exists an admissible assignment with no distortion in
consumption with respect to first-best.
1.5.3 Comparative Statics
In this section I discuss how the optimal assignments depend on the income eL of
the L-type, on the degree of inequality aversion, and on the benefit parameter θ.
Varying the low type income eL. In the following fix the parameters θ and
eH . Focus of interest is how optimal consumption shares depend on the income
eL of the L-types.
Proposition 1.5 (Dependence on eL). Fix θ, Q, and eL. Let pi
∗
L(eL) denote
the optimal share of L-types consuming the good in dependence of eL. pi
∗
L(eL) is
weakly increasing in eL. Furthermore, pi
∗
L(eL)→ Q for eL → eH .
Proof. See appendix.
To raise money for redistribution from the H-type, consumption shares of the
L-type and the H-type need to differ. The larger the difference, the more money
can be demanded from the H-type. The Proposition reflects the intuition that
the lower the income of the L-type, the more he might be willing to sacrifice from
his consumption utility in order to increase the monetary transfer. If his income
is close to the H-type, marginal utilities in money are close for both types and
the optimal transfer can already be reached by small differences in consumption
probabilities. If, on the other hand, income differences are large, not all resources
of the good might be distributed. It is discussed below for which settings this can
occur.
26 1. PUBLIC PROVISION OF SCARCE RESOURCES
pi∗L(eL)
pi∗H(eL)
1
Q
2Q− 1
eLeˆL e
B
L e
1
L
eH
Figure 1.1: Sketch of Consumption Probabilities in Dependence of eL for Q >
1
2
Figure 1.1 illustrates the dependence of consumption probabilities on the in-
come of the L-type for Q > 1
2
. The proof of the proposition reveals that if
W ′(t) ≥ 0 and eL decreases, then W ′(t) increases. When decreasing eL and start-
ing at eL = eH there exist up to three critical values eˆL < e
B
L < e
1
L of eL that
indicate a change in the shape of the function pi∗L(eL). For eL = eH both types
consume the good with probability Q. If eL decreases up to some e
1
L, pi
∗
L strictly
decreases while pi∗H strictly increases. e
1
L is such that t1 is the root ofW ′(t). Here,
the optimal consumption share of the H-type is 1 and the one of the L-type is
2Q−1. A further decrease in eL to eBL does not impact on the consumption shares.
This represents the interval of incomes on which W ′(t) is positive for t < t1 and
negative for t > t1. If eL is lower than some e
B
L , the feasibility constraint for the
good is not binding any more and resources are withheld to increase redistribu-
tion. If eL falls below some eˆL, consumption probability of an L-type is zero and
transfers are maximal. This is the case if eL is such that t = tM is the unique root
of W ′(t). The critical value eBL exists independent of h(·). Whether e1L and eˆL
exist depends on h(·). They particularly exist if h′(e)→∞ for e→ −∞ because
then W ′(tM) ≥ 0 holds if eL is small enough.
For Q ≤ 1
2
the feasibility constraint with respect to the indivisible good is
binding and the dependence of consumption shares on eL is such that at eL = eH
all consume the good with equal probability Q. For decreasing eL, pi
∗
L is strictly
decreasing and pi∗H is strictly increasing. This holds up to a critical eˆL. For all
eL < eˆL consumption probability of the L-type is zero and for the H-type it is
2Q. Optimal transfers are then maximal.
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Varying the Degree of Inequality Aversion. In the following I study the in-
fluence of the curvature of the welfare function W (·) on solutions of the utilitarian
problem. I measure inequality aversion by the relative curvature ρW (v) := −W ′′(v)W ′(v)
of the welfare function (Atkinson, 1973). The higher ρW (v), the larger the degree
of inequality aversion. The following proposition shows that the higher the degree
of inequality aversion, the (weakly) lower the share of L-types consuming the indi-
visible good and the (weakly) higher transfers are. Thereby, increasing inequality
aversion results in increasing the gap in consumption probabilities to increase
redistribution rather than decreasing the gap in consumption probabilities.
Proposition 1.6 (Dependence on ρ). Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . Consider two
welfare functions Wx and Wy with ρWx(v) > ρWy(v) for all v ∈ R. Let pi∗L(W )
denote the optimal share of L-types consuming the good in dependence of the
welfare function W . Then, pi∗L(Wx) ≤ pi∗L(Wy).
Proof. See appendix.
The main idea of the proof is to show that if ρWx(v) > ρWy(v) for all v ∈ R and
W ′y(·) is positive for some transfer t, then W ′x(·) is positive at t as well. Since the
domain [0, tM ] of admissible transfers is independent of the welfare function, by
Proposition 1.4, t∗(Wx) is then at least as high as t∗(Wy), and therefore pi∗L(Wx) ≤
pi∗L(Wy).
The monotonic impact of the degree of inequality aversion on optimal con-
sumption shares makes it interesting to study the extreme ends of inequality
aversion. This is a social planner that is not inequality averse with objective func-
tion W0 = vL + vH and a Rawlsian planner with objective function WR = vL.
These objective functions are not included in the set of admissible objective func-
tions yet. However, to find optimal solutions for the utilitarian problem they can
be treated in the same way.
First, consider a Rawlsian planner with objective function WR = vL. By the
very same argumentation as seen for Propositions 1.3 and 1.4, piRL = piL(t
R) is part
of the unique solution to the utilitarian problem if tR maximizes WR(t) = vL(t).
tR is then the unique tR ∈ [0, tM ] such that W ′R(t) = v′L(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≤ tR.
Second, consider a social planner that is not inequality averse with objective
function W = vL + vH . Again, by the same argumentation seen for Propositions
1.3 and 1.4, pi0L = piL(t
0) is part of a solution to the utilitarian problem if t0
maximizes W0(t) = vL(t). tR is then the unique t0 ∈ [0, tM ] such that W ′0(t) =
v′L(t) + v
′
H(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≤ t0. However, there might exist further solutions
to the utilitarian problem. This is because in contrast to the cases considered
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so far, the incentive constraint for the H-type is not necessarily binding. The
reason is that a shift of consumption probability from the H-type to the L-type is
welfare neutral. Therefore, if there is an incentive compatible assignment such that
income levels are equalized and resources of the indivisible good are exhausted,
the assignment maximizes welfare. This holds even if both incentive constraints
are slack. Therefore, pi0L and t
0 represent the consumption share and transfer of
the optimal solution to the utilitarian problem for which the incentive constraint
of the H-type is binding.13 In the following, when referring to the optimal solution
of a social planner that is inequality averse, it is meant to be the unique optimal
solution for which the incentive constraint for the H-type is binding.
By the same argumentation as seen in Proposition 1.6, the consumption prob-
abilities for any welfare function W (·) are always between piRL and pi0L.
Corollary 1.2. Fix θ, Q, and eL < eH . Let pi
0
L and pi
R
L be the optimal shares of L-
types consuming the indivisible good for a planner that is not inequality averse and
for a Rawlsian planner, respectively. For the optimal consumption share pi∗L(W )
where W (·) is any welfare function it holds that piRL ≤ pi∗L(W ) ≤ pi0L.
In the following, the social planner that is not inequality averse is discussed
in further detail since it gives some interesting insights about solutions for other
objective functions. First, consider the case of Q ≤ 1
2
. This implies that all
resources of the good are assigned to the agents. Then, the optimal solution of the
utilitarian problem is to smooth income levels as much as possible. This is because
the social planner does not care about differences in consumption shares but only
about differences in income. Therefore, if there is an admissible assignment with a
transfer t = t˜ from the H-type to the L-type such that income levels are equalized,
this assignment is a solution to the utilitarian problem.14 If equalizing incomes
is not admissible, the social planner chooses the transfers as large as possible, i.e.
t∗ = tM . Particularly, if e˜L is the lowest income of the L-type such that there exists
an admissible assignment that equalizes incomes, optimal transfers are maximal,
13Out of the set of all solutions it is the one that serves the L-type with the highest consump-
tion probability. To see this, consider any second-best assignment such that the H-Type is not
binding. Since the assignment has to be incentive compatible, piL ≤ piH and tL ≤ tH holds. Now
shift the probability of consuming the indivisible good from the H-type to the L-type without
influencing welfare just up to the point where the H-type is binding. This resulting assignment
is then second-best as well. In particular, this also implies that whenever there is an optimal
assignment such that the incentive constraint for the H-type is not binding, there exists also an
optimal assignment such that it is binding.
14Technically, the social planner aims to maximizeW0(t) = vL(t)+vH(t) = 2piL(t)θ+h(eL+
t) +h(eH + t) on [0, tM ]. Furthermore, W ′0(t) = h′(eL + t)−h′(eH − t). This term is zero if and
only if eL + t = eH − t.
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i.e. t∗ = tM , if and only if eL ≤ e˜L. In combination with Proposition 1.6 the
following corollary holds.
Corollary 1.3. Fix θ and eH . Suppose Q ≤ 12 . Let e˜L be such that e˜L + tM =
eH − tM . Then, for any welfare function W (·), t∗ = tM and pi∗L(eL) = 0 are
optimal for all eL ≤ e˜L.
If the L-type’s income is larger than e˜L it is admissible to equalize incomes.
However, positive transfers from the H-type to the L-type come along with differ-
ences in consumption shares. Any social planner that is strictly inequality averse
cares not only about equalizing incomes but also about inequalities in the utilities
of the types. The corollary indicates that to further smooth utilities of the types
an inequality averse planner rather increases transfers to t > t˜ than to reduce the
difference in consumption probabilities. Then, the ex-post income of the L-type
is larger than the one for the H-type. The H-type would prefer to sell some share
of piH to the L-type which implies that the second-best solution is not Pareto-
efficient. However, the Pareto-improvement cannot be performed in an incentive
compatible way since then the H-type prefers to mime the L-type.
For Q > 1
2
, even if it is admissible to equalize incomes, it may not be optimal
for a social planner that is not inequality averse to do so. This is because on
the one hand, the social planner aims to equalize incomes. On the other hand, to
generate revenues for redistribution from the H-type to the L-type, the probability
of consuming the indivisible good needs to be higher for the H-type than for
the L-type. The larger the difference in consumption probability, the higher the
realizable transfer. Depending on the setting, a transfer that equalizes incomes
might only be admissible if resources Q are not exhausted. This, however, is
on the cost of efficiency. Therefore, there are two conflicting desires: equalizing
incomes and exhausting Q which leads to the optimal transfer being smaller than
the one where incomes are equalized.15
Varying the Consumption Benefit θ. Varying the valuation θ for the indi-
visible good impacts on the analysis in two ways. On the one hand, it has an
effect on the first derivative of W(t) and with it on the optimal transfer. On the
other hand, it impacts on piL(t) that results from the binding incentive constraint
for the H-type. An increase in θ, ceteris paribus, makes it easier to extract money
from the H-type. For any fixed transfer t, an increase in θ therefore leads to an
15For details, let e˜L be such that for the maximal admissible transfer t = tM income levels
are just equalized. It then holds that W ′(tM , e˜L) < 0 because W ′(tM ) = v′L(t) + v′H(t) =
−h′(eH + tM )− h′(eH − tM ) < 0 for eL = e˜L. Therefore, some t∗ < tM is optimal.
30 1. PUBLIC PROVISION OF SCARCE RESOURCES
increase in piL(t). Furthermore, the maximal transfer t = tM admissible increases
when θ increases. This is in contrast to varying the L-type’s income or the degree
of inequality aversion since the incentive constraint for the H-type is independent
of these two parameters.
The following proposition shows that if the consumption benefit θ increases,
the optimal consumption share pi∗L of the L-type becomes arbitrarily close to
Q. Therefore, the larger the benefit from consuming the good, the smaller the
differences in consumption probabilities eventually are.
Proposition 1.7 (Dependence on θ). Fix any Q and eL < eH . Let pi
∗
L(θ)
denote the optimal consumption probability of the L-type in dependence of the
consumption benefit θ. Then, pi∗L(θ)→ Q for θ →∞.
Proof. See appendix.
The proof is based on the idea to show the proposition for a Rawlsian planner.
For a Rawlsian planner pi∗L(θ) is (weakly) increasing in θ and converges to Q
for θ becoming arbitrarily large. Since the optimal pi∗L(W ) for any other welfare
function is larger than pi∗L(WR) and lower than Q, the convergence result holds
as well for arbitrary welfare functions. It is here more convenient to consider
a Rawlsian planner than any other welfare function because for the Rawlsian
planner the first derivative of W(t) is independent of θ. When searching for the
optimal transfer t∗, θ therefore only impacts on the interval [0, tM ] on which to
search for the optimal transfers.
1.5.4 Comparison to Classical Approaches
Proposition 1.1 implies that the matching market approach Pareto-dominates the
market price approach if the difference in income levels is small enough. The
discussion of the comparative statics of the solution to the utilitarian problem
reveals that the matching market approach is arbitrarily close to the utilitarian
solution if the L-type’s income approaches the H-type’s income. The analysis of
the solution to the utilitarian problem reveals that in general none of the classical
approaches presented in Section 1.4 are optimal from a welfare maximizing per-
spective. The following intuition furthermore explains why both approaches are
not ex-ante Pareto-efficient.
First, consider the market price approach where the good is sold for a market
clearing price and revenues are redistributed. For Q < 1
2
a share 2Q of the H-
types buys the good and revenues are redistributed to all not buying the good.
1.5. WELFARE MAXIMIZING ASSIGNMENT 31
Due to the concavity of h(·) this is, for instance, dominated by selling a lottery
with winning probability 2Q to all H-types and redistributing the revenues to
the L-type. For Q > 1
2
, by the same argument welfare increases when offering
the participation in lotteries for the good instead of selling the good for a market
clearing price. Only for Q = 1
2
and income differences being large enough, a
utilitarian planner might sell a lottery with winning probability of one to the
H-types and redistribute the generated revenues to the L-types.
Second, consider the matching market approach that conducts a symmetric
lottery for the goods and does not involve transfers. This is not optimal since
the L-type has an incentive to sell at least a marginal consumption share to the
H-type such that expected utilities of both types increase. This is because the
compensation the L-type is willing to accept for a marginal loss in consumption
probability is lower than the willingness to pay of the H-type for a marginal in-
crease in consumption probability. It holds despite the L-type might not be willing
to sell a (full) good that he received to the H-type.
The use of random assignment without monetary transfers in many real-world
applications suggests that these assignments have some attractive features a clas-
sical welfare maximizing approach cannot reflect. In our setting conducting a
symmetric lottery for the good is the only assignment that fully reflects the de-
sire of income independent access. Once endowments are private information,
it implies that no redistribution from the high income types to the low income
types can be enforced. Notably, the first-best assignment of the utilitarian prob-
lem incorporates an income independent consumption of the good as well. The
reason is that a social planner who is inequality averse cares about equalization
of incomes as well as equality in consumption shares. Information asymmetries
then lead to a distortion in the second-best assignment. A preference for income-
independent access conflicts with a preference for redistribution. Although in a
private information setting randomly assigning the good is admissible, solutions
of the utilitarian problem sacrifice income independent consumption as faced in
first-best in order to increase revenues for redistribution.
Nevertheless, comparing consumption shares of the optimal assignment with
consumption shares of the market price approach, the optimal assignment may
exhibit less distortion in consumption probabilities than the market price approach
does. For Q ≤ 1
2
, using the market price approach implies that none of the agents
with low income consumes the indivisible good. For the L-type’s income eL or
the benefit parameter θ being large enough, however, the welfare maximizing
assignment involves a positive consumption share for the low income types. For
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Q > 1
2
, using the market price approach implies that a share 2Q − 1 of the L-
types consumes the good. Again, by the same argument, there are parameter
ranges such that the optimal assignment exhibits less distortion. However, since
the optimal assignment may not exhaust resource if income differences are large
enough, the optimal assignment might even assign less of the good to the L-types
than the market price approach does in order to increase redistribution.
1.5.5 Availability of Income Information
For the preceding analysis of the utilitarian problem, the participation constraint
could be neglected: any assignment that maximizes welfare within the set of all
feasible and incentive compatible assignments is individual rational for both types
as well. The participation constraint is of interest if the social planner is informed
about endowments. Then, the incentive compatibility constraints are replaced by
the participation constraints
piLθ + h(eL − tL) ≥ h(eL) and piHθ + h(eH − tH) ≥ h(eH) (1.15)
In such a setting it is straight forward to argue that the feasibility constraints
are both binding since the planner does not need to care about incentives to
report the true type. Furthermore, transfers do not depend on randomization
since dissolving any uncertainty in randomization has only a positive effect on
welfare and no potentially negative effect on any constraint.
Remember that the first-best assignment is such that both types consume
the indivisible good with probability Q and the optimal transfer t˜ is such that
both have ex-post the same wealth level, i.e. eL + t˜ = eH − t˜. If the first-best
assignment does not violate the individual rationality constraint it is therefore
optimal. If it violates the incentive constraint the social planner faces a trade-
off between equalizing income and equalizing consumption shares. The following
discussion shows that for a welfare maximizing social planner equalizing income
has priority since the optimal assignment involves transfers that are as close as
possible to equalizing incomes. The curvature of the welfare function will not play
any role for the optimal assignment.
To describe the optimal assignment in this setting first note that the par-
ticipation constraint for the H-type is binding as long as first-best cannot be
implemented. This is because if first-best cannot be implemented, for any opti-
mal assignment either the ex-post income of the H-type is larger than the one
for the L-type or the consumption probability of the H-type is larger than the
one for the L-type. Then either income or consumption probability can be shifted
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from the H-type to the L-type without violating individual rationality. Therefore,
pi∗Hθ + h(eH − t∗) = h(eH) in optimum. With pi∗L = 2Q− pi∗H it implies that
pi∗L = piL(t
∗) = 2Q− 1
θ
[h(eH)− h(eH − t∗)].
Let tM be the maximum transfers implementable, i.e., tM is such that h(eH) =
min{2Q, 1}θ + h(eH − tM). The maximization problem then reduces to finding
t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] such that it maximizes
W(t) = W (h(eH)) +W (piL(t)θ + h(eL + t)).
The first derivative is
W ′(t) = W ′(piL(t)θ + h(eL + t))[h′(eL + t)− h′(eH − t)].
It is straight forward to see that W ′(0) > 0 and W ′(t) is strictly decreasing in
t. Furthermore, W ′(t) = 0 if and only if eL + t = eH − t. Let t˜ be such that
eL + t˜ = eH − t˜. For the optimal transfer t∗ it therefore holds t∗ = t˜ if t˜ ≤ tM and
t∗ = tM otherwise. Therefore, within the set of feasible and individually rational
assignment, the welfare maximizing one is the one that includes a transfer t∗ that is
the closest to equalizing incomes. If transfers are such that incomes are equalized,
the corresponding share pi∗L of L-types is Q, if first-best can be implemented. In all
other cases pi∗L is such that the participation constraint of the H-type is binding.
In particular, if the optimal transfer t∗ is such that incomes are not equalized, the
consumption share of the L-type is minimal and therefore either zero (if Q ≤ 1
2
))
or 2Q − 1 (if Q > 1
2
). The intuition behind for the priority of redistribution is
that whenever the ex-post income of the L-type is lower than the H-type, it is a
Pareto-improvement that the L-type sells a small part of pL to the H-type. The
following proposition summarizes the analysis above.
Proposition 1.8. Fix any θ and eL < eH . Let t˜ be defined by eL + t˜ = eH − t˜
and tM be defined by h(eH − tM)− h(eH) = min{2Q, 1}θ. Furthermore,
piL(t) = 2Q− 1
θ
[h(eH)− h(eH − t)].
The assignment (pi∗L, pi
∗
H ,−t∗, t∗) that maximizes welfare within the set of feasible
and individually rational assignments is such that
• t˜ ≤ tM implies t∗ = t˜, piL = min{piL(t), Q}, and pi∗H = 2Q− pi∗L
• t˜ > tM implies t∗ = tM , piL = max{2Q− 1, 0}, and pi∗H = min{2Q, 1}.
Proof. The proof is implied by the preceding discussion.
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1.6 Conclusion
In the literature dealing with the assignment of resources it is standard practice
to assume that agents have preferences that are linear in income. An agent’s
willingness to pay then fully reflects his benefit of consuming the good. In many
economic environments, however, preferences of agents exhibit wealth effects. In
particular, increasing wealth may increase the willingness to pay. The willingness
to pay then does not any more perfectly reflect the benefit the agents derive from
consuming the good. Consequences for a social planner caring for welfare maxi-
mization might therefore crucially depend on assumptions about wealth effects.
This paper analyses the provision of an indivisible good of limited availability
when agents’ preferences regarding money are strictly concave. Therefore, not
only the benefit of consumption but also an agent’s income has an impact on the
willingness to pay. I concentrate on a setting where agents differ in their income
but not in the benefit they derive from consuming the good. Randomly assigning
the good then might dominate selling the good for a market clearing price. How-
ever, none of them is optimal from a welfare maximizing perspective. Any solution
to the utilitarian problem involves selling probability shares of the indivisible good
and redistributing the revenues. Consumption probabilities of agents depend on
their income and are distorted compared to first-best where both types receive
the indivisible good with the same probability. The optimal assignment may not
distribute all resources of the good in order to increase revenues for redistribution.
The model explains on grounds of efficiency that in certain settings, randomly
assigning a good without using transfers should be preferred to selling the good
for a market clearing price. It is particularly relevant for markets where the
benefit from consuming the good is high which is presumably the case for scarce
medical resources like organs or places at good schools and universities. However,
any welfare maximizing solution in a private information setting implies that
consumption probabilities of the indivisible good depend on income. Whenever
income independent access to the good is desired, the welfare maximizing approach
never fully reflects this desire. Nevertheless, the welfare maximizing assignment
might admit a greater number of low income types for the consumption of the
good than the assignment implied by a market clearing price approach.
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1.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1
I consider the cases Q ≤ GH and Q > GH separately.
Q ≤ GH : The market clearing price tMP is such that
θ + h(eH − tMP ) = h(eH + Q
1−QtMP ).
I first show that independent of eL, the H-type prefers the random assignment
over the assignment resulting from the setting the market clearing price. The
equation defining tMP implies that (eH +
Q
1−QtMP ) − (eH − tMP ) = 11−QtMP is
the willingness to pay for receiving the good with probability one when facing a
wealth level of eH +
Q
1−QtMP . Due to the strict concavity of h(·), the willingness
to pay at this wealth level for receiving the indivisible good with probability Q is
then larger than Q 1
1−QtMP . Therefore,
Qθ + h(eH) > h(eH +
Q
1−QtMP ).
This implies that the H-type prefers the random assignment over the good being
sold for a market clearing price. Therefore, the H-type is always better off with
the random assignment.
The L-type’s valuation of the random assignment is Qθ+h(eL), for the market
clearing price it is h(eL +
Q
1−QtMP ). If eL converges to eH , the valuations of
both assignments converge to the valuations of the H-type. Since the H-type
strictly prefers the random assignment over the market clearing price assignment,
whenever eL is large enough, the L-type prefers it as well.
Q > GH : Here, the market clearing price tMP is such that
θ + h(eL − tMP ) = h(eL + Q
1−QtMP ).
With exactly the same argument as for Q ≤ G and the H-type, the L-type always
prefers the lottery to paying the market clearing price for the good. It remains to
show that for eL large enough, the H-type prefers the lottery as well. Analogously
to above, eL converging to eH results in the valuations of the H-type of the two
assignment procedures approaching the valuations of the L-type. Since the L-type
always strictly prefers the random assignment over the market clearing price, the
H-type prefers it as well whenever eL is close enough to eH .
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Proof of Lemma 1.1
It is to show that if (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L(r), t
∗
H(r)) solves the utilitarian problem, then t
∗
L(r)
and t∗H(r) are both independent of r. This is shown in two steps. First, I show
that t∗L(r) is independent of r, then I show that t
∗
H(r) is independent of r. Since it
should be clear from the context, in the following I omit the asterisk ∗ for denoting
a solution of the utilitarian problem.
1. tL(r) = tL ∈ R: In the following I show that if the optimal transfer tL(r)
depends on r it can be replaced by a constant transfer without violating the
feasibility and incentive compatibility constraint such that the L-type is strictly
better off under the new assignment while the H-type is indifferent. The new
assignment is then individually rational as well because the original one was. This
contradicts the assumption that tL(r) is part of the optimal solution. Therefore,
tL(r) cannot depend on r.
Suppose that tL(r) depends on r. It therefore can be expressed as tL(r) =
tL + (r) with tL ∈ R and
∫
(r)dν(r) = 0. Let kH > 0 be the unique solution of
the equation
θpiL +
∫
h(eH − tL − (r))dν(r) = θpiL + h(eH − tL − kH).
kH is thus chosen such that the H-type is indifferent between the assignments
(piL, tL(r)) and (piL, tL − kH) and can be interpreted as the willingness to pay of
the H-type to avoid the lottery in the assignment of the L-type. It remains to
show that replacing the assignment (piL, tL(r)) of the L-type by (piL, tL − kH) is
feasible, incentive compatible and a strict welfare improvement.
First, it is feasible since the budget of the new assignment is even lower than
the budget of the old assignment. Second, it is incentive compatible: For the
H-type the value of both assignments is the same. Therefore, if he preferred his
assignment to the one of the L-type before, he still does so. For the L-type, the
value of the new assignment increases. This is because h′′′ > 0 implies decreasing
absolute risk aversion and therefore, the L-type is willing to pay even more than kH
to avoid the lottery in tL(r). Therefore, the L-type strictly prefers (piL, tL−kH) to
(piL, tL(r)) and thereby also strictly prefers it to (piH , tH). This furthermore implies
that the L-type is strictly better off under the new assignment while the H-type
is indifferent. Therefore, replacing (piL, tL(r)) by (piL, tL − kH) is an admissible
welfare improvement.
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2. tH(r) = tH ∈ R: In analogy to the first part of the proof, assume that tH(r)
depends on r. The proof is then completed if this implies that tH(r) cannot be
optimal since there exists an admissible assignment that is welfare improving.
If tH(r) depends on r it can be expressed by tH(r) = tH +(r) with tH ∈ R and∫
(r)dν(r) = 0. Replacing tH(r) in the assignment of the H-type by tH strictly
improves the value of this assignment to him. Therefore, he strictly prefers his
assignment to the one of the L-type. This allows to define x > 0 as the unique
solution of the equation
θpiL + h(eH − tL + x) = θpiH + h(eH − tH − x) (1.16)
Consider now the two assignments (piL, tL−x) and (piH , tH+x). These assignments
are feasible since the budget is the same as it was for the initial assignment. In
the following, I furthermore argue that assignments are incentive compatible and
increase total welfare. I distinguish two cases.
Case 1: piL ≤ piH. Rearranging equation (1.16) yields
h(eH − tL + x)− h(eH − tH − x) = θpiH − θpiL > 0.
Due to the strict concavity of h(·), holds that
h(eL − tL + x)− h(eL − tH − x) > θpiH − θpiL > 0.
Therefore, the H-type is indifferent among the assignments (piL, tL − x) and
(piH , tH + x), while the L-type strictly prefers the (piL, tL − x). This implies
incentive compatibility. In the following I argue that both types are better off
with the new assignment such that it increases welfare and furthermore satisfies
the incentive compatibility constraint because the original assignment did. For
the L-type it is directly implied by x > 0 that he is strictly better off by the
assignment (piL, tL− x) compared to (piL, tL). To see that the H-type is better off
as well, note that the incentive compatibility constraint of the H-type is binding
in this case. This is because if it is not binding, a marginal shift in consumption
probability from the H-type to the L-type keeps the sum of valuations constant
but reduces the gap of the L-type’s and the H-type’s valuations.16 Therefore,
the original assignment has a value of piLθ + h(eH − tL) to the H-type. The new
assignment serves him a value of at least piLθ+ h(eH − tL + x) which implies that
he is strictly better off.
16piL ≤ piH implies that pi∗H > 0 because otherwise no resources are distributed which cannot
be optimal. The detailed argument for why the incentive constraint of the H-type is binding is
the same as used in the proof of Lemma 1.2.
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Case 2: piL > piH. Rearranging equation (1.16) yields
h(eH − tH − x)− h(eH − tL + x) = θpiL − θpiH > 0.
Due to the strict concavity of h(·), it holds that
h(eL − tH − x)− h(eL − tL + x) > θpiH − θpiL > 0.
Therefore, a new assignment where the H-type receives (piL, tL − x) and the L-
type receives (piH , tH + x) is incentive compatible. To show that this is also a
welfare improvement, first note that the L-type originally faces a value of piLθ +
h(eL − tL). His new assignment has a value to him that is strictly higher than
piLθ + h(eL − tL + x). Therefore, he is better off and the utility gain is at least
h(eL− tL+x)−h(eL− tL). The H-type originally faced a value of piHθ+
∫
h(eH−
tH−(r))dν(r). The value of the new assignment is as high as piHθ+h(eH−tH−x).
Therefore, the (potential) loss he faces is at most h(eH − tH) − h(eH − tH − x).
It is to show that the minimum gain exceeds the maximum loss, i.e., h(eL −
tL + x) − h(eL − tL) > h(eH − tH) − h(eH − tH − x). By concavity of h(·) and
the differences in incomes being x on both sides of the inequality, it is sufficient
to show that eH − tH > eL − tL + x. Equation (1.16) which defines x implies
eH − tH > eH − tL + x and this is larger than eL − tL + x. Therefore, the new
assignment makes the L-type strictly better off and the sum of utilities for both
types increases which implies that it is a welfare improvement. It remains to show
that the new assignment is also individually rational. It is individually rational
for the L-type since he is better off by the new assignment than he was before. If
piL + h(eL − tL) ≥ h(eL) holds, it also holds that piL + h(eL − tL) ≥ h(eH) due to
the strict concavity of h(·). Therefore, the new assignment is individually rational
for the H-type as well.
Note that this analysis also implies that piL > piH is never optimal.
Proof of Lemma 1.2
I first proof the characteristics of optimal assignments and then show that the
participation constraint can be neglected.
Part 1. The second part proof of Lemma 1.1 implies that for any optimal so-
lution it has to hold that pi∗L ≤ pi∗H because otherwise there is an admissible
assignment where the H-type receives a consumption probability of pi∗L and the
L-type a consumption probability of pi∗H that yields higher welfare. Furthermore,
if pi∗L ≤ pi∗H , incentive compatibility implies t∗L ≤ t∗H . Incentive compatibility
combined with eL < eH furthermore implies that v
∗
L < v
∗
H .
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Part 2. Let (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L, t
∗
H) be a solution to the utilitarian problem. Suppose
the incentive compatibility constraint for the H-type is not binding. By Part
1 of the lemma, pi∗L ≤ pi∗H holds. pi∗H > 0 holds because otherwise all transfers
have to be zero and consumption probabilities have to be zero which contradicts
the assumption that the H-type strictly prefers her assignment to the one of the
L-type. Furthermore, pi∗L ≤ pi∗H and Q < 1 implies that pi∗L < 1. Now shift
some consumption probability of pi∗H from the H-type to the L-type. Since the
incentive compatibility constraint of the H-type is slack, this can be performed
in an incentive compatible way. The L-type’s utility increases. Therefore, the
new assignment is individually rational for the L-type as well. It is therefore also
individually rational for the H since the H-type likes his assignment at least as
much as the one of the L-type: if piL +h(eL− tL) ≥ h(eL) holds, it also holds that
piL+h(eL−tL) ≥ h(eH) due to the strict concavity of h(·). The value vL+vH is not
affected by the shift but the inequality in valuation decreases. Since the welfare
function is strictly concave, total gains are strictly positive which contradicts
the assumption that (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L, t
∗
H) is an optimal assignment within the set of
admissible assignments.
Part 3. Let (pi∗L, pi
∗
H , t
∗
L, t
∗
H) be a solution to the utilitarian problem. Assume
Part 3 of the lemma does not hold such that t∗L + t
∗
H > 0. The Lemma is proved
if there exists an admissible assignment that yields higher welfare. By Part 2, the
incentive compatibility constraint for the H-type is binding. If it is binding for
the L-type as well, it has to hold that
h(eH − t∗L)− h(eH − t∗H) = h(eL − t∗L)− h(eL − t∗H) = θ(pi∗H − pi∗L).
Since h(·) is strictly concave it implies that t∗L = t∗H . Then it is admissible to
reduce both payments to zero which is a Pareto-improvement and contradicts the
assumption of t∗L and t
∗
H being part of an optimal assignment. If the constraint for
the L-type is not binding, t∗H can be decreased without violating any constraint.
This is a Pareto-improvement which again contradicts the assumption that t∗L and
t∗H are part of an optimal assignment.
Part 4. Assume that for any Q < 1 the feasibility constraint with respect to
the indivisible good is not binding. Now assume that for any solution of the
utilitarian problem pi∗H < 1 holds. Since pi
∗
L ≤ pi∗H the consumption utility of both
types can be raised by some ∆ > 0 such that pi∗H + ∆ ≤ 1 and pi∗L +pi∗H + 2∆ ≤ Q.
The resulting assignment is still admissible since both types value the gain of
both assignments in the same way. This contradicts the assumption of pi∗H < 1
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and therefore pi∗H = 1 has to hold if the feasibility constraint with respect to the
indivisible good is not binding.
Participation Constraint. Consider any assignment that maximizes welfare
within the set of feasible and incentive compatible assignments. All results on op-
timal assignments derived so far hold as well if there is no participation constraint.
By the other results of this Lemma that are proved above, the assignment of the
L-type is such that transfers from the H-type are larger or equal to zero and his
consumption probability of the good is larger or equal to zero as well. Therefore,
his participation constraint is satisfied. Since H-types like their assignments at
least as much as the one of the L-types, his participation constrained is satisfied
as well.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
To show Proposition 1.3, I consider the first and second derivatives W ′(t) and
W ′′(t). I will show that W ′(t) is strictly decreasing for all t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] and that
W ′(0) > 0. This then implies that W(t) has a unique maximizer t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] and
that t∗ is such that W ′(t) ≥ 0 if and only if t ≤ t∗.
First consider the case that more than only H-types can be served, i.e., Q > GH .
Based on this analysis the case for Q ≤ GH will be straight forward. According
to equation (1.10),
W(t) = W (piL(t)θ + h(eL + t)) +W (piL(t)θ + h(eH + t)).
The explicit expression for piL(t) depends on whether t ∈ [0, t1] or t ∈ (t1, tM ]
(see discussion preceding Proposition 1.4 and particularly equations (1.13) and
(1.14)). At t = t1 there is a kink in W(t) and a point of discontinuity in W ′(t).
To show that W ′(t) is strictly decreasing on [0, tM ] I show that on each domain
it holds that W ′(t) is strictly decreasing in t, and that at t = t1, W ′(t) decreases
as well.
W ′(t) is strictly decreasing on [0, t1] and on (t1, tM]. Using vL(t) = piL(t)θ+
h(eL + t) and vH(t) = piL(t)θ+ h(eH + t), the first and second derivatives of W(t)
on each domain are
W ′(t) = W ′(vL(t))v′L(t) +W ′(vH(t))v′H(t)
W ′′(t) = W ′′(vL(t))(v′L(t))2+W ′(vL(t))v′′L(t)+W ′′(vH(t))(v′H(t))2+W ′(vH(t))v′′H(t)
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In the following I show that W ′′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [0, t1] and W ′′(t) < 0 for all
t ∈ (t1, tM ]. For this, it is sufficient to show that v′′H(t) ≤ 0 on each domain. This
is because, first, it implies that v′′L(t) ≤ 0 as well. This is a consequence of the
assumption that h′′′ > 0: for h′′′ > 0, it holds that h′′(eL + t) < h′′(eH + t), and
therefore, v′′L(t) = pi
′′
L(t)θ + h
′′(eL + t) < pi′′L(t)θ + h
′′(eH + t) = vH(t). Second,
it holds that W ′′(vL(t))(v′L(t))
2 < 0, W ′′(vH(t))(v′H(t))
2 < 0, W ′(vL(t)) > 0, and
W ′(vH(t)) > 0. Therefore, if v′′H(t) ≤ 0 on both domains, each summand of the
equation for W ′′(t) is smaller than zero. This implies that W ′′(t) < 0 on both
domains.
t ∈ [0, t1]: For t ∈ [0, t1] it holds that
piL(t) = piL(t) = Q−
1
2θ
(h(eH + t)− h(eH − t))
Therefore,
v′′H(t) = pi
′′
L(t)θ + h
′′(eH + t) (1.17)
= − 1
2θ
θ[h′′(eH + t)− h′′(eH − t)] + h′′(eH + t) (1.18)
=
1
2
[h′′(eH + t) + h′′(eH − t)] (1.19)
Since h′′ < 0, for all t ∈ [0, t1] it holds that v′′H(t) < 0.
t ∈ (t1, tM ]: For t ∈ (t1, tM ] it holds that
piL(t) = piL(t) = 1− 1
θ
(h(eH + t)− h(eH − t))
It implies
v′′H(t) = pi
′′
L(t)θ + h
′′(eH + t) (1.20)
= −1
θ
θ[h′′(eH + t)− h′′(eH − t)] + h′′(eH + t) (1.21)
= h′′(eH − t). (1.22)
Therefore, v′′H(t) < 0 by the assumption h
′′ < 0.
W ′(t) is strictly decreasing on [0, tM]. To evaluate the information received
from considering the restricted domains, I now go back to considering the char-
acteristics of W(t) on the whole domain of [0, tM ]. Since piL(t) is continuous on
[0, tM ], W(t) is continuous [0, tM ] as well. Furthermore, W ′(t) is continuous and
strictly decreasing on t ∈ [0, t1] and it is continuous and strictly decreasing on
t ∈ (t1, tM ]. To show that W ′(t) is strictly monotonically decreasing on the whole
domain [0, tM ] it is to show that limt↗t1W ′(t) > limt↘t1W ′(t).
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lim
t↗t1
W ′(t)− lim
t↘t1
W ′(t) = W ′(vL(t1))[pi′L(t1) + h′(eL + t1)]
+ W ′(vH(t1))[pi′L(t1) + h
′(eH + t1)]
− W ′(vL(t1))[pi′L(t1) + h′(eL + t1)]
− W ′(vH(t1))[pi′L(t1) + h′(eH + t1)]
= [W ′(vL(t1)) +W ′(vH(t1))][pi′L(t1)− pi′L(t1)]
The equations use the continuity of piL(t) at t = t1. The sign of W
′(vL(t1)) +
W ′(vH(t1)) is positive, so it remains to show that the sign of pi′L(t1) − pi′L(t1) is
positive as well. This directly follows by considering the equations for pi′L(t1) and
pi′L(t1):
pi′L(t1) = −
1
2θ
[h′(eH + t) + h′(eH − t)]
pi′L(t1) = −
1
θ
[h′(eH + t) + h′(eH − t)]
Therefore, pi′L(t1) > pi
′
L(t1) which shows that limt↗t1W ′(t) > limt↘t1W ′(t).
W ′(0) > 0 holds. For the first derivative of vH(t) it holds that v′H(0) = pi′L(0)θ+
h′(eH) = h′(eH) > 0. Furthermore
v′L(t) = pi
′
L(t)θ + h
′(eL + t) > v′H(t) = pi
′
L(t)θ + h
′(eH + t).
Then, W ′(0) = W ′(vL(0))v′L(0) + W ′(vH(0))v′H(0) > 0 since each summand is
strictly larger than zero.
Case Q ≤ GH. Considering Q ≤ GH simplifies the analysis since piL(t) = Q −
1
2θ
(h(eH + t)− h(eH − t)) for all t ∈ [0, tM ]. This corresponds to the equation for
piL(t) on [0, t1] if Q > GH . Therefore it holds that W ′(0) > 0 and W ′ is strictly
monotonically decreasing on [0, tM ].
Proof of Proposition 1.5
To show that pi∗L(eL) is increasing in eL it is sufficient to show that the corre-
sponding transfers t∗(eL) are decreasing in eL. The maximal transfer tM that can
be demanded from each H-type does not depend on eL. Therefore, the domain of
transfers on which to search the optimal transfers is constant in eL. Let WeL(t)
indicate the objective function to maximize if the L-type’s income is eL. By
Proposition 1.4, for any eL, t
∗(eL) is the unique t∗ ∈ [0, tM ] such that W ′eL(t) ≥ 0
1.7. APPENDIX 43
if and only if t ≤ t∗. I first show that W ′eL(t) ≥ 0 implies that for e′L < eL,
W ′e′L(t) > 0 holds.
Suppose that for any t ∈ [0, tM ], W ′eL(t) ≥ 0. It holds that
W ′eL(t) = W ′eL(vL(t))v′L(t) +W ′eL(vH(t))v′H(t)
with vL(t) = θpiL(t)+h(eL+ t) and vH(t) = θpiL(t)+h(eH + t). Since W
′
eL
> 0 and
v′L(t) > v
′
H(t) it has to hold that v
′
L(t) > 0 whenever W ′eL(t) ≥ 0. Furthermore
note that piL(t) is independent of eL since it is defined by the binding incentive
constraint of the H-type. Now consider how W ′eL(t) changes when lowering the
income of the L-type from eL to e
′
L. It implies that vL(t) decreases and there-
fore W ′(vL(t)) increases. Furthermore, v′L(t) increases since h
′(eL + t) increases.
W ′(vH(t))v′H(t) does not depend on eL. v
′
L(t) > 0 implies that W ′eL(t) increases
for decreasing eL and W ′e′L(t) > 0 holds for e
′
L < eL. This completes the first part
of the proof: for eL, the optimal transfer satisfies W ′eL(t∗(eL)) ≥ 0. For some e′L
it then holds as well that W ′e′L(t
∗(eL)) ≥ 0. Therefore, if t∗(eL) is optimal for eL,
the transfer t∗(e′L) that is optimal for e
′
L < eL is at least as large as t
∗(eL).
For eL → eH , W ′eL(t) converges to W ′eH (t) = 2W ′(vH(t))v′H(t). It holds that
W ′(vH(t)) ≥ 0 for any transfers and furthermore v′H(t) = 12(h′(eH + t)− h′(eH −
t)) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, tM ] with v′H(t) = 0 if and only if t = 0. Therefore, t∗ = 0 is
optimal which implies pi∗L = pi
∗
H = Q.
Note that optimal transfers t∗(eL) are not necessarily strictly increasing in eL.
However, the proposition shows that they are strictly increasing whenever t∗(eL) 6∈
{t1, tM}. This is because for Q > 12 , W ′(t) is not continuous at t = t1. Thereby,
the conversion of signs might occur at t = t1 and small variations of eL do not
have an impact on it. Furthermore, once t∗ = tM is optimal for some eL it is also
optimal for all e′L < eL.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Consider Wx and Wy such that ρWx(v) > ρWy(v) for all v ∈ R. This particularly
implies that W
′
x(v)
W ′y(v)
is strictly monotonically decreasing in v. To see this, consider
the first derivative with respect to v of W
′
x(v)
W ′y(v)
:
d
dv
W ′x(v)
W ′y(v)
=
W ′′x (v)W
′
y(v)−W ′′y (v)W ′x(v)
(W ′y(v))2
Since ρWx(v) > ρWy(v) is equivalent to W
′′
x (v)W
′
y(v) < W
′′
y (v)W
′
x(v) the expression
above is smaller than zero and therefore W
′
x(v)
W ′y(v)
is strictly monotonically decreasing
in v. This will be used to show that pi∗L(Wx) ≤ pi∗L(Wy).
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Showing pi∗L(Wx) ≤ pi∗L(Wy) is equivalent to showing that for the corresponding
optimal transfers t∗(Wx) ≥ t∗(Wy) holds. Since it is known that W ′(t) is strictly
monotonically decreasing in t it is sufficient to show that whenever W ′y(t) ≥ 0,
it holds that W ′x(t) > 0. Then, if t∗ is optimal for Wy the optimal transfer is at
least as large as t∗ for Wx. It holds that
W ′y(t) ≥ 0 ⇔ W ′y(vL(t))v′L(t) +W ′y(vH(t))v′H(t) ≥ 0 (1.23)
⇔ v′H(t) ≥ −
W ′y(vL(t))v
′
L(t)
W ′y(vH(t))
(1.24)
Now have a closer look at W ′x(t). Using the above boundary for v′H(t) it holds
that
W ′x(t) = W ′x(vL(t))v′L(t) +W ′x(vH(t))v′H(t) (1.25)
≥ W ′x(vL(t))v′L(t)−
W ′x(vH(t))W
′
y(vL(t))v
′
L(t)
W ′y(vH(t))
(1.26)
Therefore,W ′x(t) > 0 can be shown by showing that the last term of the inequality
above is lager than zero. Indeed,
W ′x(vL(t))v
′
L(t)−
W ′x(vH(t))W
′
y(vL(t))v
′
L(t)
W ′y(vH(t))
> 0 (1.27)
⇔ W ′x(vL(t))W ′y(vH(t)) > W ′x(vH(t))W ′y(vL(t)) (1.28)
⇔ W
′
x(vL(t))
W ′y(vL(t))
>
W ′x(vH(t))
W ′y(vH(t))
(1.29)
The last part directly follows by W
′
x(v)
W ′y(v)
being strictly monotonically decreasing in
v. This proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
I show that the proposition holds if the social planner is a Rawlsian planner
that aims to maximize the utility of the low income types. Since for any welfare
function piRL is a lower bound for the L-types’ optimal consumption probability pi
∗
L
and Q is an upper bound, considering a Rawlsian planner is sufficient.
For a Rawlsian planner, it holds that W ′R(t) = v′L(t) = θpi′L(t) + h′(eL + t).
piL(t) is implied by the incentive constraint of the H-type according to equations
(1.11), (1.13), or (1.14) that are discussed in the preceding Proposition 1.4. Which
equation is to be used depends on Q and t. In any case it can be easily seen that
θpi′L(t) is independent of θ which implies thatW ′R(t) is independent of θ. Therefore,
varying θ does not impact on W ′R(t) but only impacts on the domain on which
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to find the maximizer of W ′R(t) since tM depends on θ. The proof now proceeds
as follows. I first show that tM(θ) → ∞ for θ → ∞ and that, for Q > GH ,
t1(θ)→∞ where t1 is defined by equation (1.12) as the kink in W(t). Second, I
show that W ′R(t) < 0 for some t ∈ R+. This implies that there exists some θ such
that t∗R < tM(θ) is the maximizer ofWR(t). SinceW ′R(t) is independent of θ, t∗R is
then the optimal transfer for all θ′ > θ. Since t1(θ) also converges to infinity for θ
becoming arbitrarily large, it holds that pi∗L(t
∗) = Q− 1
2θ
(h(eH + t
∗
R)−h(eH − t∗R))
whenever θ is large enough. Since t∗R is constant for θ
′ > θ, it therefore holds that
pi∗L(t
∗)→ Q for θ →∞.
1. It is to show that tM(θ) → ∞ for θ → ∞ and W ′(t) < 0 for some t ∈ R+.
tM is uniquely defined by
min{2Q, 1}θ = h(eH + tM)− h(eH − tM).
Since the right hand side is strictly increasing in t, tM(θ) strictly increases in θ.
tM(θ) also becomes arbitrarily large, since for any tM there exists some θ such
that the equation above is satisfied. For Q > GH , t1 is uniquely defined by
(1−Q)2θ = h(eH + t1)− h(eH − t1).
Therefore, the same argument as used for tM shows that t1(θ)→∞ for θ →∞.
2. To show that W ′R(t) < 0 for some t ∈ R+, explicitly consider the first
derivative for the case that either Q ≤ GH or t ∈ [0, t1] and show that is negative
for some t (it is sufficient to consider this case since t1 becomes arbitrarily large).
It holds that
W ′R(t) = −
1
2
[h′(eH + t) + h′(eH − t)] + h′(eL + t).
Since h′(·) is strictly decreasing and bounded below by zero, there exist K > k > 0
such that for t large enough h′(eL + t) − 12h′(eH + t) < 12k and h′(eH − t) > K.
This implies that W ′R(t) < 12k− 12K < 0 for t being large enough. This completes
the proof.

chapter 2
CONSTRAINTS ON MATCHING MARKETS BASED ON
MORAL CONCERNS
Abstract
Monetary transfers are banned or heavily restricted in many markets.
These restrictions are often motivated by moral concerns. However, it is
not obvious whether the observed restrictions on monetary transfers are the
appropriate market design answer to these concerns. Instead of exogenously
restricting monetary transfers on a market for indivisible objects, we intro-
duce a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives and study its market de-
sign implications. The desideratum we consider is discrimination-freeness,
which requires that one’s access to certain resources is independent of one’s
wealth endowment. A key assumption in our model is that wealth impacts
on the agents’ willingness to pay. We show that if discrimination-freeness
is desired monetary transfers cannot be used to Pareto-improve ordinal as-
signment mechanisms that do not involve monetary transfers. Moreover,
we find that implementable social choice functions are discrimination-free
if and only if an agent’s object assignment depends on his ordinal object
ranking only and his money assignment is independent of his preferences. In
situations where money can be used outside a market designer’s control, we
show that externality-freeness is needed: an agent’s object assignment has
to be independent of other agents’ preferences. We discuss applications of
our results in the context of discrimination-freeness including compensation
for kidney donors.
2.1 Introduction
Why worry that we are moving toward a society in which everything is up for sale?
... One [reason] is about inequality ... Where all good things are bought and sold,
having money makes all the difference in the world.
Michael Sandel in “What Money Can’t Buy”1
Various markets ban monetary transfers or heavily regulate them by law. Selling
1Compare Sandel (2012), p.8
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organs or financially compensating organ donors is prohibited almost everywhere
in the world. School and university places are free of charge and must not be
traded for money in many countries. A classical utilitarian welfare perspective
cannot explain the prohibition of transactions when all involved parties would give
their consent. However, anxiety and repugnance towards transactions involving
transfers clearly exist in several markets (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993, Kahneman
et al., 1986, Roth, 2007). As Satz (2010) puts it, “From the egalitarian’s angle
of vision, what underlies noxious markets ... is a prior and unjust distribution of
resources, ... the fairness of the underlying distribution of wealth and income is
extremely relevant to our assessment of markets.”2 Inequality concerns are also
considered as one of the main sources for market disapproval by Sandel (2012).
Intense public debates demonstrate the ambivalent character of using money for
allocating certain types of resources. Price mechanisms allow to promote the
efficiency of an allocation, but since somebody’s willingness or ability to pay might
depend on wealth, it also implies that who gets what depends on wealth.
In this paper, we study market design implications if wealth-independent ac-
cess to goods is a desideratum.3 We develop a formal model for the assignment of
objects and money to agents who are characterized by preferences that are not lin-
ear in money and a wealth level. The assignment is required to be discrimination-
free in the sense that the object an agent is assigned to does not depend on his
wealth endowment. Consider any social choice function that assigns objects only
based on information about rankings and that is at the Pareto-frontier of social
choice functions that do not use transfers. We find that discrimination-free so-
cial choice functions with monetary transfers cannot realize Pareto-improvements
compared to this one. In a private information setting, we find that requiring a so-
cial choice function to be discrimination-free already implies that only an agent’s
object ranking can be used for his object assignment and that his money assign-
ment needs to be independent of his preferences. The only way to incorporate
any information beyond ordinal preferences is to ensure that an agent’s ex-post
wealth is independent of his wealth endowment. This, however, requires that the
market designer can condition the mechanism on the agents’ wealth endowments.
Assigning objects without using transfers can, therefore, be understood as a tool
to satisfy a desire for wealth-independent access to certain goods whenever the
mechanism does not (or cannot) eliminate potential wealth differences in endow-
2Compare Satz (2010), p.5
3Inequality is clearly not the only argument used by opponents of transfers in certain mar-
kets. However, other arguments are not in our focus here. We furthermore do not aim to answer
the question on which markets inequality is desired.
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ments. We show that even stricter restrictions than banning transfers are needed,
if money can be used to improve access to a good outside the market designer’s
control.
Intense discourses about the role of money in various markets reveal the im-
portance of studying motivations behind the desire to ban transfers and their
implications for market design. In the US, there is an ongoing debate about com-
pensations for kidney donors. Proposals range from free markets to regulated
markets to strictly prohibiting any transfers. In Germany, a back and forth in
charging tuition fees at universities was accompanied by intense debates.4 By
introducing discrimination-freeness as a constraint on market design, we formally
capture a desire that underlies the wide-spread reluctance towards transfers in cer-
tain markets. The content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights supports
our conjecture that discrimination-free access is a deeper desire than restricting
transfers: it incorporates both a right to education as well as a right to health and
highlights the importance of discrimination-free access to both.5 Furthermore,
empirical findings suggest that whether a third party considers it unethical to re-
ceive monetary incentives in return for participating in a transaction, depends on
whether, from his financial perspective, he would accept the incentives and take
part in the transaction (Ambuehl, Niederle, and Roth, 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, our’s is the first paper on the provision of indivisible resources that
explicitly models a wealth independent access to goods as a fairness criterion.
Our Analysis. We consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to
agents. Each agent is characterized by a type containing information about his
initial wealth endowment and a utility function that describes how he evaluates
bundles of objects and wealth. A social choice function assigns one object to each
agent and determines monetary transfers.6 It is called discrimination-free, if the
object assignment of an agent does not depend on his wealth endowment. A key
assumption we impose on the agents’ utility functions is that they are not linear in
money. While an agent’s ranking of objects is assumed to be wealth-independent,
his marginal utility of money and his willingness to pay for preferred objects de-
4After a period of having (basically) not charged any fees, from 2006 on universities were
allowed to charge up to 1000 EUR per year. Protests were huge and finally, in 2014, there is no
university left charging fees (see, e.g., The Conversation, 2014).
5See, e.g., articles 25 and 26 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). By General
Comment No. 14 (2000): ”Health facilities, goods and services have to be accessible to everyone
without discrimination [. . .]”.
6Thereby, we concentrate on deterministic social choice functions and therefore do not in-
corporate potential ex-ante improvements via allowing for probabilistic outcomes. We discuss
this later in more detail.
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pend on wealth.7 In particular, if his wealth increases, the amount that is required
to compensate him for a less preferred object increases as well. A high willingness
to pay for an object can thus be due both to a high utility benefit associated
with the object and to high wealth. The assumption of non-linear preferences
is in contrast to many standard mechanism design models and is crucial for our
analysis. This is because two agents wish to trade an object if and only if the
price the owner is willing to accept for giving up the object is lower than the
price the potential buyer is willing to pay for the object. For preferences that are
linear in money, the desire to trade does not depend on wealth and therefore no
discrimination concerns occur.
In a world without money and private information about preferences, a market
designer is restricted to mechanisms such that an agent’s object assignment is
not sensitive to cardinal information about his preferences.8 In our analysis, we
are interested in the implications on the design of social choice functions that
are allowed to use transfers but that are required to be discrimination-free. In
particular, we explore what information about preferences can be exploited for
the assignment of objects and money. Can money be used to Pareto-improve
money-free mechanisms based on ordinal information by trading-off differences in
preference intensities? Can payments be used to elicit private information about
preference intensities? What are necessary and sufficient conditions on social
choice functions to meet discrimination-freeness?
First, we find that social choice functions with wealth-independent transfers
cannot be Pareto-improved on by using transfers without violating discrimination-
freeness. Therefore, by allocating the objects without using transfers and exploit-
ing only information about the agents’ rank order lists, we can already reach the
Pareto-frontier of discrimination-free social choice functions.9 The main driver of
the result is that on the one hand, the amount of money compensating an agent for
a worse object becomes larger if the agent gains wealth, and on the other hand, the
7Therefore, for which objects agents compete, is independent of their wealth. Otherwise,
moral concerns occurring might rather belong to segregation concerns that are not further
considered here. We briefly discuss dropping the assumption of non-constant rankings as an
extension.
8To see this, assume that there are two preference profiles of an agent that both represent
the same ordinal ranking but that serve him different objects. Then, whenever the agent has
preferences according to the profile that serves him the less preferred object, he has an incentive
to misreport.
9This is relevant independent of the information setting. In particular, allocating objects
via a Serial Dictatorship mechanism where one agent after each other selects an object is imple-
mentable in a private information setting and at the Pareto-frontier of discrimination-free social
choice functions. Our results then imply that even if we had full information about preferences,
the mechanism cannot be Pareto-improved in a discrimination-free way.
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money all other agents are willing to pay for an object improvement is bounded.
However, any discrimination-free social choice function with wealth-independent
transfers is not Pareto-efficient within the set of all social choice functions. We
show that discrimination-freeness and Pareto-efficiency are not exclusive, but to
satisfy both, wealth-dependent transfers are needed. To condition transfers on
wealth, however, it is relevant which information the market designer has about
the agents’ wealth.
Second, we consider a setting where types are agents’ private information and
implementability of the social choice function is required.10 We show that a social
choice function is discrimination-free if and only if an agent’s money assignment is
independent of his type and his object assignment depends on his object ranking
only. Money, therefore, can not be used to elicit and exploit information beyond
rankings. Inefficiencies in markets without transfers are obtained as second best
outcomes. Again, wealth effects are crucial: if transfers depend on the types,
we show that there exist preferences such that for high wealth levels, the agent
benefits by focusing on the preferred object, while for low wealth levels, he benefits
by focusing on the monetary difference. This induces incentives to misreport,
since a discrimination-free mechanism must not condition the object assignment
on wealth. The toolkit to allocate objects if transfers are banned, therefore,
corresponds to the one available if discrimination-freeness is desired. A simple
mechanism that is implementable, discrimination-free, and at the Pareto-frontier
of discrimination-free social choice function is the Serial Dictatorship mechanism,
where one agent after the other selects an object.11 We find that if wealth levels are
public information, only a social choice function that fully eliminates an agent’s
potential wealth differences can exploit information beyond his object ranking for
his object and money assignment. Otherwise, to meet discrimination-freeness and
implementability, only information about an agent’s object ranking can be used
for his object assignment and his money assignment must be independent of his
preferences (but might depend on wealth). Examples for preference-independent
but wealth-dependent transfers are goods that are financed via taxes and the
consumption of which does not require any additional fee.
10We call a social choice function implementable if reporting the truth type is a dominant
strategy.
11Serial Dictatorship is not Pareto-efficient within the set of all social choice function when
transfers are allowed. However, this does not contradict the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite The-
orem (Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975) which implies that a strategy-proof social choice func-
tion that reaches all outcomes is Pareto-efficient. We restrict our attention to a discrimination-
free social choice function and, therefore, not all outcomes can be reached.
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Finally, we discuss implications of discrimination-freeness in situations where
money can be used to improve access to goods outside a mechanism. Technically,
we extend our model by taking into account that somebody bribes somebody
else to misreport preferences in line with Schummer (2000b). Externality-freeness
(i.e., an agent’s outcome must not depend on other agents’ preferences) is then
sufficient to ensure the preservation of discrimination-freeness under bribes. For
nonbossy social choice functions (i.e., an agent cannot change another agent’s
outcome without changing his own), externality-freeness is also necessary to en-
sure the preservation of discrimination-freeness under bribes. This is, because
bribing incentives appear as soon as other agents’ preferences play a role for an
agent’s outcome.12 However, if the wealth endowment of an agent who is bribed
increases, the incentive to bribe him eventually disappears such that the object
he receives depends on wealth. Externality-freeness is a severe restriction for the
design of social choice functions. If the number of objects equals the number of
agents, externality-freeness implies that the allocation of objects must not depend
on anyone’s preferences. If more objects than agents are available, externality-
freeness implies wastefulness (i.e., an agent may prefer an unassigned object over
the object he is assigned to). The analysis of bribes can be interpreted more gen-
erally as using money outside a centralized mechanism to influence one’s access to
a good. Applications include co-existing private markets or priority parameters
like living in a school’s neighborhood where paying more for a house can help to
improve one’s priority at the school.
Overall, our results explain the wide-spread use of a matching market approach
to assign objects, whenever discrimination-freeness is desired and differences in
wealth are not fully eliminated. The analysis is relevant for several real-world
applications. In particular, for the question whether or not two persons should
be allowed to trade a good like a kidney, discrimination-freeness requires that the
transaction takes place independent of the wealth of anyone involved.
Related Work. Our work relates to the literature on repugnance on markets,
in particular on the desire of third parties to restrict transfers (e.g., Ambuehl
et al., 2015, Frey and Pommerehne, 1993, Kahneman et al., 1986, Roth, 2007). In
contrast to that literature, we explicitly integrate a concern underlying the desire
to ban transfers into an economic model. Our definition of discrimination-freeness
appears to be in line with what people judge as immoral according to Ambuehl
12This is closely related to Schummer (2000a) and Schummer (2000b). His results imply
that bribe-proofness is equivalent to externality-freeness for a very general class of quasilinear
preferences.
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et al. (2015).13 While we concentrate on the concern of inequality, Ambuehl (2015)
studies the concern of coercion in the context of financial incentives. In contrast
to our work, he studies how incentives affect those whom they target.14
Our research complements the literature on the implications of fairness con-
cerns on allocating resources. Thomson (2011) provides a comprehensive overview
on fair allocation rules. Popular fairness criteria typically refer to how an agent
evaluates his bundle in comparison to another agent’s bundle. For instance, no
envy requires that no agent prefers any other agent’s bundle, equal treatment of
equals requires that no agent prefers any other agent’s bundle whenever the other
agent has the same preferences over bundles. In contrast, discrimination-freeness
is grounded in the analysis of a single individual and refers to the object an agent
is assigned to if his wealth level changes.
Key for our analysis is the non-linearity of preferences. Here, our model differs
from the standard assumption in many economic models where consumers have
quasilinear preferences. There are some works that deal with the impact of non-
linearities in preferences such as budget constraints, risk aversion or wealth effects,
to the provision of indivisible goods (see, e.g., Baisa, 2013, Che et al., 2013, Garratt
and Pycia, 2014, Maskin and Riley, 1984).
Outlook. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.2 we
describe the basic model. In Section 2.3 we introduce discrimination-free social
choice functions. We also discuss implications of discrimination-freeness on effi-
ciency and characterize discrimination-free social choice functions. In Section 2.4
we consider consequences for discrimination-free social choice functions if money
is used outside the mechanism designer’s control. Then we discuss several ex-
tensions (Section 2.5) and applications (Section 2.6). We conclude with Section
2.7.
13In that work, they present a basic model based on survey results assuming that people judge
a transaction as immoral if, from their financial perspective, they would not take part in the
transaction. In their context, our definition of discrimination-freeness then generally speaking
translates to requiring moral approval from anyone’s financial perspective.
14There is a large literature dealing with how incentives impact on the moral behavior of
individuals (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, Mellstro¨m and Jo-
hannesson, 2008, Richard, 1970). In contrast, we are interested in how monetary incentives
impact on who receives what.
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2.2 Model
We consider the problem of assigning a set Ω of k ≥ n distinct and indivisible
objects to a set N of n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent receives exactly one object.15
Payoff Environment. Preferences of each agent i are described by a utility
function ui : Ω × R → R. ui(ω,A) denotes the utility that agent i derives from
owning object ω ∈ Ω and having a total wealth of A ∈ R. We assume that the
agents’ preferences are twice differentiable in wealth. Furthermore, we make the
following assumptions on how wealth affects preferences.
1. Strict and wealth independent object ranking: ui implies a strict and unique
rank order of objects denoted by ri. Formally,
ui(ω,A) 6= ui(ω′, A) ⇔ ω 6= ω′ and,
ui(ω,A) > ui(ω
′, A) ⇒ ui(ω,A′) > ui(ω′, A′) ∀ A′ ∈ R.
2. Monotonicity and strict concavity in wealth:
∂
∂A
ui(ω,A) > 0 and
∂2
∂A2
ui(ω,A) < 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω
3. Unbounded willingness to accept: Let ui be such that object ω is preferred
over ω′. For any m > 0 there exists Ai ∈ R such that
ui(ω,A) > ui(ω
′, A+m) ∀A > Ai
U denotes the set of all utility functions that satisfy the above assumptions. Ac-
cording to the first assumption, wealth does not influence how an agent ranks the
objects.16 The second assumption ensures that each agent has a finite willingness
to pay for any object improvement: for any ui ∈ U , A ∈ R, a, b ∈ Ω where a is pre-
ferred to b there exists a unique M > 0 such that ui(a,A−M) = ui(b, A).17 The
third assumption stated in word means the following: suppose an agent prefers
object ω to object ω′ and he is offered any amount m > 0 for taking ω′ instead
of ω. Then, whenever his wealth is large enough, he refuses this offer and rather
15There is only one copy of each object; however, it is straight forward to include objects
with more copies in this setting and the analysis.
16Technically, the assumption of wealth independent object rankings already follows by the
assumptions of continuity in wealth and strict ranking. However, due to the importance of
unique order rankings, we explicitly state this as an assumption.
17For a formal proof see the proof of Proposition 2.1.
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takes ω. Therefore, the compensation to accept for an object impairment becomes
arbitrarily large for increasing wealth.
Examples for utility functions in U are those that can be described by ui(ω,A) =
vi(ω) + hi(A) where vi : Ω → R and hi : R → R is a twice continuously differen-
tiable function with h′i > 0, limA→∞ h
′
i(A) = 0, and h
′′
i < 0. All results we develop
continue to hold if the set of admissible utility functions is restricted to utility
functions that are of this shape. Note that we allow agents to have negative wealth
and no budget constraints exist. In Section 2.5 we discuss why this assumption
is not critical for our analysis, and explain how many of our results even do not
rely on the assumption that the possible wealth endowments of agents are not
bounded from above.
Each agent is endowed with an initial wealth level ei ∈ R. ti = (ui, ei) ∈ T = U×R
denotes the type of each agent that implies how agent i evaluates bundles of ob-
jects and wealth. T n is the space of all type profiles t = (ti)i∈N and t−i ∈ T n−1 is
the type profile of all agents except agent i.
In our analysis we are interested in shared characteristics of different types.
T (ri) denotes the set of all types that describe the same ordinal ranking ri ∈ R
of objects where R denotes the set of all possible rankings over objects. T (ui)
denotes the set of all types that describe the same utility function ui. T (ei)
denotes the set of all types with equal wealth endowment ei. While all types in
T (ri) agree on the ranking of objects, they might disagree on what any object
improvement is worth. This heterogeneity can have two sources. First, even if ti
and t′i describe the same endowment and the same object ranking, the cardinal
appreciation for the objects might differ according to different utility functions
ui and u
′
i. Second, even if ti and t
′
i describe the same utility function ui = u
′
i,
the willingness to pay for object improvements might differ due to endowment
differences. Furthermore, if two types ti and t
′
i both belong to T (ui) they also
both belong to T (ri) for some object ranking ri. Therefore, T (ui) ⊂ T (ri). If two
types ti and t
′
i in T (ui) disagree on what an object improvement is worth this can
only be due to heterogeneity in wealth levels.
Social Choice Functions. An outcome x = (σ,m) ∈ Ωn × Rn assigns exactly
one object to each agent expressed by σ ∈ Ωn and defines monetary transfers by
m ∈ Rn.18 σi = ω means that object ω is assigned to agent i. mi ∈ R is the
money agent i receives.
18In particular, no agent remains unassigned. The setting can be easily extended by adding
an object ∅ with n copies to Ω where ∅ corresponds to remaining unassigned.
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Each type ti = (ui, ei) uniquely defines preferences over outcomes. In particu-
lar, agent i of type ti = (ui, ei) evaluates his individual outcome (σi,mi) according
to ui(σi, Ai) where Ai = ei+mi is agent i’s ex-post wealth. In contrast to quasilin-
ear preferences, knowing ui is not sufficient to evaluate outcomes but we also need
to know an agent’s wealth endowment because two agents with the same utility
function ui might evaluate outcomes differently due to differences in wealth. On
the other hand, two agents might evaluate outcomes in the same way but their
types differ.
ϕ = (σ,m) denotes a social choice function (or direct mechanism, if types
are private information) that selects for each type profile t ∈ T n an outcome
ϕ(t) = (σ(t),m(t)). ϕi = (σi,mi) is agent i’s assignment. We call σ : T
n → Ωn
the object assignment and m : T n → Rn the money assignment.19 ϕ might
use tie-breaking rules like priorities (e.g., based on districts in school choice) or
lotteries. We assume that those tie-breakers are determined before the mechanism
is conducted and are fixed for each agent independent of the realization of types.
We concentrate on deterministic outcomes instead of lotteries over deterministic
outcomes. This corresponds to taking an ex-post perspective. Therefore, we do
not restrict our attention to anonymous mechanisms since agents might differ
according to priorities or a lottery number. This perspective is more suited to
our analysis because we are interested in whether money can be used to increase
efficiency and not on whether ex-ante efficiency gains can be achieved via lotteries.
Definitions. A social choice function ϕ′ = (σ′,m′) (or an object assignment σ′)
Pareto-dominates ϕ = (σ,m) (or σ) if for all type profiles t ∈ T n all agents are
weakly better off and at least for one t ∈ T n there is one agent who is strictly better
off. σ is a Pareto-efficient object assignment if there is no object assignment σ′
that Pareto-dominates σ. ϕ = (σ,m) is a Pareto-efficient social choice function if
there is no social choice function ϕ′ = (σ′,m′) with the same budget
∑
m′i =
∑
mi
that Pareto-dominates ϕ. Thereby, we allow social choice functions not to be
budget-balanced. For instance, money might be extracted to fund the provision
of resources. For the definition of Pareto-efficiency, we restrict our attention to
Pareto-improvement without extending the budget. If extending the budget was
allowed, a social choice function could be Pareto-improved on just by increasing
each agent’s wealth.
A social choice function ϕ = (σ,m) is implementable if it can be implemented
as a dominant strategy equilibrium of a direct mechanism. By the revelation
19With a slight abuse of notation we denote by σ the assignment that maps profiles to a an
object allocation as well as the allocation itself; the same holds for m.
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principle, for implementability we limit our attention to social choice functions
where truthtelling is a dominant strategy. Truthtelling is a dominant strategy if
and only if ui(σi(ti, t−i), ei + mi(ti, t−i)) ≥ ui(σi(t′i, t−i), ei + mi(t′i, t−i)) for each
agent i and all ti, t
′
i ∈ T and t−i ∈ T n−1. A social choice function ϕ = (σ,m) is
ordinal if it is not sensitive to cardinal information. Formally, ϕ(t) = ϕ(t′) if for
all i it holds that ti, t
′
i ∈ T (ri) for some rank order ri ∈ R. An ordinal object
assignment is defined analogously. In line with Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein
(1981) we call a social choice function ϕ nonbossy if for any agent i, ϕi(ti, t−i) =
ϕi(t
′
i, t−i) implies ϕ(ti, t−i) = ϕ(t
′
i, t−i). Therefore, an agent cannot change another
agent’s outcome without changing his own.20
2.3 Discrimination-Free Social Choice
Functions
In our model we deliberately omit the typical restriction of a matching market that
monetary transfers are not allowed. Instead, we introduce a desideratum that is
used in many discourses as an argument for restricting transfers: discrimination-
freeness with respect to wealth. We call a social choice function discrimination-free
if an agent’s object assignment does not depend on his wealth endowment. Hence,
discrimination-freeness refers to what determines how objects are allocated but
does not a priori impose restrictions on transfers.
Definition 2.1 (Discrimination-Free). A social choice function ϕ = (σ,m) is
discrimination-free (with respect to wealth) if for any agent i, utility function
ui ∈ U , and type profile t−i ∈ T n−1 from the other agents
σi(ti, t−i) = σi(t′i, t−i) for all ti, t
′
i ∈ T (ui).
ϕ discriminates if it is not discrimination-free.
An appealing feature of our definition of discrimination-freeness is that to
judge whether or not this fairness criteria is satisfied it is sufficient to consider
one agent. This allows us to concentrate on deterministic outcomes.21
20Whether or not nonbossiness is a desirable characteristic of a social choice function appears
to be disputable. Thomson (2014), for instance, discusses several interpretations of nonbossiness
and questions their validity. This paper remains agnostic to whether or not nonbossiness should
be required. In the context of Proposition 2.4 we rather discuss implications of imposing it.
21In contrast, classical fairness criteria like envy-freeness or equal treatment of equals make
restrictions on how an agent evaluates another agent’s outcome.
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For quasilinear utilities, preferences over outcomes do not depend on wealth
and therefore discrimination-freeness does not impose restrictions on how a social
choice function depends on preferences. However, since we impose income effects,
discrimination becomes a valid concern. For illustration consider two agents and
two objects and assume that both agents prefer object a to object b. One agent is
willing to pay more to receive object a instead of object b than the other one. The
willingness to pay is driven by preferences over bundles of objects and wealth as
well as by endowments. A discrimination-free social choice function must not take
account of the wealth effect but might regard utility effects. A central question in
our following analysis is to what extent discrimination-free social choice function
can use information about preferences to assign the objects.
2.3.1 Pareto-Efficiency
Free markets allow a transfer of utility via money and therefore offer the oppor-
tunity to realize Pareto-improvements via trades of objects and money. Markets
without transfers provide less opportunities for Pareto-improvements since there
is no divisible good available to transfer utility. In any environment without
transfers, mechanisms that assign objects to agents by only exploiting informa-
tion about the agents’ object rankings are at the Pareto-frontier of all mechanisms
that do not use transfers. However, agents that agree on the object ranking might
disagree on what an object improvement is worth. This is why ordinal mechanisms
without transfers are, in general, not Pareto-efficient. The central question for the
following analysis is whether money can be used to realize Pareto-improvements
compared to a classical money-free matching without violating discrimination-
freeness.
For a simple example, consider two agents i and j and two objects a and b.
Both agents prefer object a over object b. Then, assigning a to i and b to j, for
instance, is not Pareto-dominated by swapping the objects. However, both agents
might be better off when exchanging objects in return for a money transfer. This
is the case whenever agent j’s willingness to pay for a is higher then agent i’s
willingness to accept for giving up a. When increasing agent i’s wealth level,
agent i might not any more be willing to give up the preferred object in turn for
a transfer that agent j is willing to make. This is why we cannot Pareto-improve
an object assignment by admitting transfers, such that the object allocation is
independent of wealth. The following proposition formalizes and generalizes this
insight. It is in contrast to a setting with quasilinear preferences where what
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somebody is willing to pay or to accept in turn for an object exchange does not
depend on wealth.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a discrimination-free social choice function ϕ =
(σ,m) such that its money assignment m does not depend on wealth endowments
(ei)i∈N . Suppose that σ is a Pareto-efficient object assignment. Then, ϕ is not
a Pareto-efficient social choice function. Any social choice function ϕ′ = (σ′,m′)
with
∑
im
′
i =
∑
imi that Pareto-dominates ϕ does discriminate.
Proof. See Appendix.
The main driver of the proposition is in analogy to the simple example above
that the compensation an agent is willing to accept becomes arbitrarily large
for increasing wealth. Then, the amount of money compensating somebody for
receiving a less preferred object under ϕ′ than under ϕ becomes arbitrarily large
when wealth of this agent increases (since transfers do not depend on wealth). On
the other hand, there is a maximal amount of money that each agent is willing
to pay for improving the object assignment of ϕ. This maximal willingness to
pay can be determined independently of the other agent’s wealth (again since
transfers do not depend on wealth). Then, any agent that receives a less preferred
object under ϕ′ compared to ϕ cannot be compensated any more for this object
impairment when being wealthy enough. Therefore, if any ϕ′ Pareto-improves ϕ,
there is at least one agent for whom the object assignment of ϕ′ depends on his
wealth level. This implies that ϕ′ is not discrimination-free. To get an intuition
on why ϕ is not Pareto-efficient consider a type profile where all agents agree
on the ranking. By repeatedly changing the wealth levels of two agents we can
induce a situation where a trade of objects in return for monetary transfers is a
Pareto-improvement.22
Note that the proposition only considers potential Pareto-improvements of so-
cial choice functions that have the same budget. When extending the budget
is allowed, Pareto-improvements without discrimination are straight-forward by
just increasing each agent’s wealth level. Therefore, the case where the budget is
constrained is the interesting one when searching for Pareto-improvements.
Proposition 2.1 implies that by using object assignments that do not use trans-
22Proposition 2.1 requires that transfers of ϕ are independent of wealth. This implies that
some delta in the endowment of an agent implies the same delta in the ex-post wealth level of
this agent. It would be sufficient to require that ϕ preserves the wealth status of an agent in the
sense that an agent’s ex-post wealth is unbounded in dependence of his own wealth but bounded
in dependence of other agents’ endowments. However, we state it in the simplified way to not
distract from the main point.
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fers and that only exploit information on object rankings, the Pareto-frontier of
discrimination-free social choice functions can be reached.
Corollary 2.1. Consider any ordinal object assignment σ. Suppose σ is not
Pareto-dominated by any other ordinal object assignment σ′. Then ϕ(t) = (σ(t), 0)
is at the Pareto-frontier of all budget-balanced and discrimination-free social choice
functions.
A second and direct implication of Proposition 2.1 is that if any social choice
function is Pareto-efficient and discrimination-free the transfers of the social choice
function necessarily depend on wealth. With the following corollary we further-
more show that efficiency and discrimination-freeness are not exclusive.
Corollary 2.2. There is a discrimination-free social choice function ϕ = (σ,m)
that is Pareto-efficient. Any social choice function that is discrimination-free and
Pareto-efficient assigns transfers that depend on wealth.
As an example for a discrimination-free and Pareto-efficient social choice func-
tion consider the following one that performs the assignment in two steps. First,
wealth of each agent i is adjusted according to some wealth level which is inde-
pendent of his initial endowment ei. Second, given this new wealth distribution,
the mechanism assigns objects such that the sum of utilities is maximized. This
allocation is Pareto-efficient. Furthermore, an agent’s object assignment is inde-
pendent of his wealth endowment. The social choice function described is not
necessarily budget balanced. However, if wealth endowments are drawn from a
distribution such that expected total endowment is e, the mechanism above is
budget balanced in expectation if each agent’s wealth is adjusted to 1
N
e.23
On the Information Structure. For Proposition 2.1 we did not impose any
specific information structure about the types of the agents. Social choice func-
tions that are discrimination-free with Pareto-efficient object assignments and
wealth-independent transfers can be implemented in a setting where the mecha-
nism designer has no information about types. The Serial Dictatorship mecha-
nism where one agent after the other selects an object and no transfers are made
is an example for such a social choice function that is implementable in domi-
nant strategies. Therefore, the Pareto-frontier of discrimination-free social choice
23It is furthermore also feasible to construct a mechanism that is Pareto-efficient and ex-post
budget balanced. Such a mechanism can be constructed by allocating objects such that for
some specific wealth endowment no Pareto-improvements are feasible via transfers. Then, for
any other wealth endowment it is possible to redistribute wealth such that this allocation of
objects cannot be Pareto-improved within the budget.
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functions can be reached in a setting of incomplete information. Proposition 2.1
can then be interpreted in the sense that even if we have full information about
types, no Pareto-improvement can be realized. Furthermore, any admission of
ex-post trades leads to discrimination. The Pareto-efficient mechanism presented
in the context of Corollary 2.2, however, depends on the information structure
and requires that the mechanism designer is informed about the agents’ types. In
the following section, we deal with the implications of incomplete information on
the set of implementable social choice function.
2.3.2 Implementability
The previous section focused on the question whether money can be used to
achieve Pareto-improvements compared to a classical matching market without
transfers in a discrimination-free way. In the following we consider a setting
of incomplete information and are interested in whether money can be used to
exploit more information than ordinal rankings to assign the objects to the agents.
Furthermore, we analyze the restrictions that arise for the money assignment. This
is of interest since payments might be used for funding resources or to redistribute
wealth.
We first assume that no information about the type is available (i.e., both
the utilities profile (ui)i∈N and the wealth profile (ei)i∈N are unknown). Later we
assume that the wealth profile (ei)i∈N is known.
Proposition 2.2. Let ϕ = (σ,m) be an implementable social choice function. ϕ
is discrimination-free if and only if for each agent i and t−i ∈ T n−1 fixed,
• σi(ti, t−i) = σi(t′i, t−i) for all ti, t′i ∈ T (ri), and all rankings ri ∈ R, and
• mi(ti, t−i) = mi(t′i, t−i) for all ti, t′i ∈ T .
Proof. See appendix.24
The proposition formalizes that if implementability and discrimination-freeness
are required, an agent’s object assignment cannot be sensitive to cardinal informa-
tion about his preferences and each agent’s money assignment must not depend on
his type. To get an intuition for the proof first note that discrimination-freeness
24The proof presented is more complex than needed for the domain U of utility functions.
However, it reveals that Proposition 2.2 even holds if the domain of utility function is modified
such that every i’s utility function can be described by ui(ω,A) = vi(ω) + h(A) for some
h : R → R with h′ > 0, limA→∞ h′(A) = 0, and h′′ < 0. It furthermore also allows for a
restriction of admissible endowments to some E ⊂ R such that E contains at least two elements.
For this, see also Section 2.5.
62 2. CONSTRAINTS ON MATCHING MARKETS
and implementability of a social choice function imply neither the object assign-
ment nor the money assignment can be conditioned on endowments. Assume that
monetary payments are not type independent such that for two types ti and t
′
i it
holds that mi(ti) < mi(t
′
i). Implementability of the social choice function implies
that there are at most |Ω| = k outcomes that are available to agent i via varying
his report. We can then construct a utility function such that the outcome of ti
is the most preferred one for one wealth level and the outcome of t′i is the most
preferred one for another wealth level. This contradicts discrimination-freeness of
ϕ and therefore agent i’s payments cannot depend on his type. The restriction
on σ that σi must only depend on agent i’s ordinal ranking is a direct implication
of the restrictions on m: since mi is independent of agent i’s type, considering
more information than rank order lists for the object allocation contradicts im-
plementability.
In Proposition 2.1 we saw that object assignments without transfers that are
based on ordinal rankings are already at the Pareto-frontier of discrimination-free
social choice functions. By Proposition 2.2, the toolset to distribute objects is
even restricted to the one that can be used if no transfers are admitted since
only ordinal information about an agent’s preferences can be exploited for his
object assignment. With the Serial Dictatorship mechanism where one agent
after the other selects an object we can then implement a social choice function
at the Pareto-frontier.25 Inefficiencies of such a mechanism without transfers are
obtained as second-best outcomes when requiring discrimination-freeness. In the
context of school choice problems, where students are often ordered according to
a priority structure, two popular ordinal and implementable matchings are the
Deferred-Acceptance-Algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) or the Top
Trading Cycles Mechanisms (see, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). The
latter mentioned is at the Pareto-frontier of transfer-free assignments while the
former is not.
Availability of Wealth Information. Proposition 2.2 deals with a setting
where neither information about utilities nor about wealth endowments is known.
If implementability and discrimination-freeness are desired, only information about
an agent’s object ranking can be exploited by the social choice function for his
outcome.
25Since we concentrate on deterministic matchings, any lotteries that might be needed for
serial dictatorship (or other mechanisms) are assumed to be conducted before the matching
takes place.
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We now assess a setting where wealth information is available while preferences
in the form of utility function over objects and wealth still are unknown. Intu-
itively, this increases the scope for a mechanism designer to use information about
preferences. For instance, she now might, in a first step of the mechanism, adjust
the agents’ wealth levels such that they do not depend on their initial endowment
any more. By the following proposition it turns out, that only if ex-post wealth
of an agent is independent of his initial wealth, an agent’s object assignment can
be based on more information than only the agent’s object ranking. Otherwise,
in accordance to Proposition 2.2, an agent’s object assignment is not sensitive to
cardinal information about his preferences, and each agent’s money assignment is
independent of his preferences (but might depend on wealth).
Proposition 2.3. Let ϕ = (σ,m) be an implementable social choice function.
Wealth endowments (ei)i∈N are public information. Assume that for every agent
i, ui ∈ U and t−i ∈ T n−1 fixed, agent i’s ex-post wealth Ai = ei +mi(ui, ei, t−i) is
not constant in his wealth endowment ei. ϕ is discrimination-free if and only if
for every agent i and t−i fixed
• σi(ti, t−i) = σi(t′i, t−i) for all ti, t′i ∈ T (ri) and all rankings ri ∈ R, and
• mi(ti, t−i) = mi(t′i, t−i) for all ti, t′i ∈ T (ei).
Proof. See Appendix.26
The proof of the proposition uses similar characteristics of preferences as the
proof of Proposition 2.2 does. However, it is more complex compared to Proposi-
tion 2.2 since varying wealth might vary transfers. Suppose that ex-post wealth
of an agent i is not independent of ei and transfers are not constant. Then there
are two wealth levels ei and e
′
i such that the ex-post wealth that is associated
with some object a he can reach by varying his report differs for the two wealth
levels. We can then construct a utility function such that for one of the wealth
levels, the agent prefers object a with the associated transfers, and for the other
wealth level he prefers another object b with the associated transfers that he can
reach by varying his report. This contradicts discrimination-freeness. The con-
struction of such an utility function works by exploiting that the evaluation of
gaining additional money depends on the reference level of wealth .
26In analogy to the proof of Proposition 2.2, the proof reveals that the proposition holds as
well for a modification of the domain U of utility functions. Here, instead of U we can consider
the domain of utility functions that can be expressed via ui(ω,A) = vi(ω) + hi(A) with h
′
i > 0,
limA→∞ h′i(A) = 0, and h
′′
i < 0. For this, see also Section 2.5.
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If wealth information is known to the market designer, the assignment of ob-
jects does not depend on wealth if discrimination-freeness is desired, but transfers
might depend on wealth. An example for this is the collection of income-dependent
taxes to fund the provision of a good that are independent of the actual consump-
tion of the good.
The only exception that allows a discrimination-free mechanism to exploit in-
formation about preferences beyond rankings is if ex-post wealth is made constant
with respect to wealth endowments. Proposition 2.3 implies that if ϕ depends on
more information about an agent’s preferences than only rank order lists, ex-post
wealth of this agent has to be independent of his initial wealth. As an exam-
ple consider the mechanism presented in the context of Corollary 2.2. First, the
mechanism adjusts each agent’s wealth level to any predefined wealth level that
is independent of his initial wealth (possibly the same for all agents). Then, the
mechanism assigns objects and money. In this second step of the mechanisms,
utilities u = (ui)i∈N can play a role. In particular, if we consider the wealth levels
that result after the first step and the preferences of the agents as the new types,
the mechanism in the second step has all the flexibility that mechanisms have
where we do not impose discrimination-freeness.
2.4 Preserving Discrimination-Freeness under
Bribes
Even if objects are assigned to consumers without using transfers, there still might
be ways how wealth influences the assignment if it is possible to influence one’s
outcome outside a market designer’s control. An example are neighborhood pri-
orities in school choice: Moving houses to an area of a preferred school raises the
chances to receive a place at this school. Those being able to afford high house
prices have the choice where to live. This in turn influences the access to schools.
Black (1999) analyzed housing prices and showed that house prices are correlated
with school quality. In the context of organ donations, there are also ways to
use money to gain priority. Steve Jobs, for instance, reportedly obtained his liver
transplantation because he was advised to raise his chances by subscribing to wait-
ing lists in other states than his home state California.27 This approach required
to be rich enough to be able to quickly move to any location. Co-existing private
markets are also examples where being wealthy improves the access to certain
markets. Examples for private markets are private schools or private insurances.
27See, e.g., CNN (2009).
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In what follows we consider a setting similar to the one of Proposition 2.2
where the mechanism designer is not informed about the agents’ types. Agents
can use money outside the mechanism designer’s control by bribing another agent.
With bribing we mean that one agent offers money to another agent for reporting
false preferences. Bribing therefore provides agents the opportunity to use their
money to change parameters of the game. A real-world example of bribes is
that somebody bribes somebody else to agree with donating a kidney. Also, the
examples at the beginning of this section can be interpreted as a special case of
bribing: instead of using money to influence other agents’ reports, the money is
used to influence other parameters that influence the outcome.
We first define bribing in the spirit of Schummer (2000b).
Definition 2.2 (Bribing). Let ϕ = (σ,m) be a social choice function. Agent
i has an incentive to bribe agent j if there is a profile t ∈ T n, a corrupted type
t′j 6= tj ∈ T , and a bribe amount τ ≥ 0 such that
• ui(σi(t′j, t−j), ei +mi(t′j, t−j)− τ) > ui(σi(t), ei +mi(t)) and
• uj(σj(t′j, t−j), ej +mj(t′j, t−j) + τ) > uj(σj(t), ej +mj(t)).
ϕ is bribe-proof if no incentives to bribe exist.
For any agent i and any type profile t ∈ T define σBi (t) ⊂ Ω such that ω ∈ σBi (t)
if and only if ω = σi(t) or ω = σi(t
′) where t′ = (t′i, t−i) ∈ T is a corrupted report
of types if agent i is bribed.
An agent therefore has an incentive to bribe another agent if paying another
agent to state false preferences makes both agents better off. σBi (t) contains all
object assignment of i that might result if agent i is bribed including the object
assignment if no bribes occur. If ϕ is bribe-proof, then σBi (t) contains only σi(t).
We now extend the definition of discrimination-freeness to account for potential
bribes.
Definition 2.3 (Preserving Discrimination-Freeness Under Bribes). Let
ϕ = (σ,m) be a discrimination-free social choice function. ϕ preserves discrimination-
freeness under bribes if and only if for any agent i, ui ∈ U , and t−i ∈ T n−1,
σBi (ti, t−i) = σ
B
i (t
′
i, t−i) for all ti, t
′
i ∈ T (ui).
With preserving discrimination-freeness under bribes we therefore require that
agent i’s set of available object assignments when being potentially bribed does
not depend on his wealth. Note that we here focus on the object assignments of
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an agent if he himself is bribed. This reflects a desire to avoid that a change in an
agent’s wealth influences his decision to accept a bribe that assigns him a worse
object.
In what follows, we are primarily interested in necessary and sufficient con-
ditions such that an implementable and discrimination-free social choice func-
tion preserves discrimination-freeness under bribes. Obviously, a sufficient condi-
tion for preserving discrimination-freeness under bribes is bribe-proofness. With
the following proposition we show that for discrimination-free and implementable
choice functions bribe-proofness is equivalent to externality-freeness. Nonbossi-
ness of the social choice function makes bribe-proofness a necessary condition for
preserving discrimination-freeness under bribes. By externality-freeness we mean
that an agent’s outcome is independent of other agents’ types.
Definition 2.4 (Externality-freeness). A social choice function is externality-
free if for any agent i and any t ∈ T n and t′−i ∈ T n−1,
ϕi(ti, t−i) = ϕi(ti, t′−i).
Proposition 2.4. Consider an implementable and discrimination-free social choice
function ϕ. ϕ is bribe-proof if and only if ϕ is externality-free. Suppose ϕ is non-
bossy. Then, ϕ preserves discrimination-freeness under bribes if and only if ϕ is
externality-free.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result of the equivalence of bribe-proofness and externatility-freeness is
closely related to Schummer (2000a) and Schummer (2000b). His results imply
that for very general class of quasilinear preferences over bundles of objects and
transfers, bribe-proofness implies that an agent’s payoff is independent of other
agents’ reports. His general idea can be transferred straight forward to the utility
domain with non-linear preferences that we consider. Main intuition for the equiv-
alence result is that once an agent can influence another agent’s outcome by his
report, there exist type profiles such that there is an agent that is willing to pay a
certain amount of money to profit from a misreport of another agent. On the other
hand, there is an agent that would be willing to accept this amount to misreport
in favor of the first agent. To construct those types described we exploit that the
social choice function is implementable and discrimination-free and that therefore
one’s payments are independent of one’s type (see Proposition 2.2).28 Bribe-
proofness becomes a necessary condition for preserving discrimination-freeness
28With requiring discrimination-freeness we even further restrict the domain of social choice
functions considered compared to Schummer (2000a) and Schummer (2000b). Since his argu-
2.4. PRESERVING DISCRIMINATION-FREENESS UNDER BRIBES 67
under bribes if whether bribing incentives exist depends on the wealth of the
agents. This is the case if the social choice function is nonbossy. Once a bribing
incentive exists, the bribing incentive vanishes whenever the agent is rich enough
such that the other agents cannot afford any more to bribe this person. Nonbossi-
ness here ensures that the bribe amount that is necessary to bribe is not arbitrarily
small. For social choice functions that are not nonbossy, bribes might be quasi-
free because there might be an agent who is indifferent between two reports, but
his report influences the outcome of another agent.
The examples presented in the beginning of this section on how money might
be used outside a system can be interpreted as a special case of bribes. Param-
eters that influence an outcome (like neighborhood-priority, paying a fee for a
private school or subscribing on multiple waiting lists) can be treated as substi-
tutes for preferences of a second side of the market that can be bribed. Preserving
discrimination-freeness then requires that whether or not there is an incentive to
use money to influence the outcome must not depend on wealth. This can be
ensured by making the outcome independent of corruptible parameters.
On Externality-Free Mechanisms Externality-freeness heavily restricts the
information about preferences a mechanism designer can use to assign objects.
This goes on the cost of efficiency.
To get an intuition for the restrictions consider the problem of assigning goods
without transfers. An agent’s choice set is the set of objects he can achieve given
any report of the other agents. Externality-freeness then is equivalent to the choice
set of each agent being constant.29 Therefore, the choice sets of the agents need
to be disjoint such that each object only appears in one choice set. Designing
externality-free mechanisms is therefore about designing the distinct choice sets
of agents. Independently of the types, n disjoint subsets of Ω need to be build
(e.g. via a lottery) and being assigned to the agents. Then for each agent an
object is chosen out of the subset that was assigned to this particular agent. This
is the only step where type-dependence is allowed. In particular, if there are
exactly as many objects as agents, the allocation is constant, i.e., the allocation is
type-independent. A simple lottery satisfies this condition. If more objects than
agents exist externality-freeness implies wastefulness, i.e., there is a type profile
ments are transferable to our utility domain, the equivalence of bribe-proofness and externality-
freeness can be even shown for implementable social choice function. However, we are primarily
interested in discrimination-freeness and therefore do not further elaborate on this.
29See Schummer (2000a) for a formal description.
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such that an object remains unassigned that is preferred by at least one agent to
his assigned object.
Corollary 2.3. Let ϕ be an implementable and nonbossy social choice function
that is discrimination-free. Assume that more objects than agents are available,
i.e. n < k. If ϕ preserves discrimination-freeness under bribes then ϕ is wasteful.
To see why the corollary holds, first note that n < k implies that for any
type profile t there exists an object ω that remains unassigned. If ω belongs to
nobody’s choice set it remains unassigned for all type profiles, even if somebody
ranks ω first. Therefore, ϕ is wasteful. If ω belongs to the choice set of some agent
i it does not belong to any other agent’s choice set. In particular, if any agent j
other than agent i ranks ω first and all other types remain unchanged, object ω
is still unassigned. This implies that ϕ is wasteful.
Tools to improve the assignment of objects are limited if externality-freeness is
desired. One way to improve an externality-free social choice function is increasing
the choice sets of the agents by increasing the number of objects or the number
of copies. For instance, if each object has at least n copies, each agent can be
provided with a choice set containing all objects and therefore can always receive
his first choice. Another lever of improvement is how to build the choice sets. The
following corollary shows that expected utility of each agent is a concave function
in the number of objects available. Hence, given a uniform distribution of types
with regard to the valuation of objects, highest expected total welfare is obtained
if choice sets of preferably equal size are build. This is because an agent that is
facing a choice set of size j randomly chosen out of a set Ω is facing decreasing
utility gains when increasing the size j of the set.
Corollary 2.4. Assume that the agents are homogeneous in the sense that their
types are drawn from the same distribution. If every agent receives a random
choice set of Ω such that all choice sets are disjoint, the highest expected utility
is achieved in case that the differences in size of the choice sets are minimal.
Furthermore, total expected utility gains are decreasing with an increase in the
number of objects.
Proof. See appendix.
2.5 Discussion and Extensions
In the following we discuss some assumptions of the model and illustrate how the
basic model presented might be extended to address several settings relevant for
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real-world applications. In particular, we will highlight the role of the domain U
for the admissible utility functions and the role of the domain of admissible wealth
levels.
Budget Constraints. Adding budget constraints to our setup implies that the
willingness to pay might exceed the ability to pay. The results derived above then
still hold, except that further restrictions on the admissible social choice function
might be necessary because a social choice function must not assign payments to
an agent that are larger than his wealth. A slight change is needed in Proposition
2.1 because budget constraints do no longer imply that any social choice function
with wealth independent transfers is inefficient, but only implies it for social choice
functions without transfers.30
Type Domain U × R. First, consider potential restrictions of U . Whether
enlarging or further restricting U weakens or strengthens the derived results de-
pends on the character of the analysis. For the results on the Pareto-frontier of
discrimination-free mechanisms in Proposition 2.1, further restrictions of the do-
main of admissible utility functions U only weaken the results. However, when
considering implementable social choice functions, the larger the domain U the
more freedom to construct implementable and discrimination-free social choice
functions. A further restriction of U then strengthens the results. It turns out
that the proofs of Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 do not need the universal char-
acter of U . Therein, the domain U can be restricted to the domain of all utility
functions that can be expressed as ui(ω,A) = vi(ω) +hi(A) where vi : Ω→ R and
hi : R → R is any function being twice continuously differentiable with h′i > 0,
limA→∞ h′i(A) = 0 and h
′′
i < 0.
31 For Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.4 the
domain U can be even further restricted such that all admissible utility function
of all agents entail the same fixed h(·). h(·) can be arbitrarily chosen in line with
the requirements above. Then, all agents value money in the same way but differ
only according to the benefit vi(·) they attach to each object.
Second, consider the domain of wealth types R. Based on the above discussion
about budget constraints, assuming some minimum endowment e ∈ R does not
30Note that considering a model where budget constraints occur but agents have quasilinear
preferences does not imply the same results we conducted. In the presence of budget constraints,
the willingness to pay is independent of wealth while the ability to pay becomes arbitrarily low
if wealth decreases. However, the willingness to accept is independent of wealth. Therefore,
compensations agents might receive do not have any consequences for discrimination-freeness
which is in contrast to the implications of assuming non-linear preferences.
31The condition limA→∞ h′i(A) = 0 is only needed for Proposition 2.1 and can be dropped
for the others.
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impact on the general analysis. Assuming a maximum endowment e ∈ R, impacts
on Proposition 2.1 while it does not impact on the other propositions. The main
step of the proofs for the propositions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 was to construct utility
functions that satisfy certain criteria. In all cases, the construction works when-
ever the domain of the agents’ endowments contains at least two elements. Only if
the wealth domain is restricted to one element, requiring discrimination-freeness
does not restrict the design of social choice functions. Consequences are different
for Proposition 2.1. The result depends on the assumption that for increasing
wealth, the willingness to accept becomes arbitrarily large. Restricting wealth
endowments restricts the willingness to pay and willingness to accept as well.
Then, there are potentially settings such that an agent might be compensated for
a worse object by the other agent independent of his wealth level. In particular,
in a simple setting with two agents and two goods of which both agents prefer the
same, a Pareto-improvement can be performed without violating discrimination-
freeness if independent of the wealth distribution, one agent is always willing to
pay more for the preferred object than the other agent is willing to accept to give
up the preferred object.
Outside Options. In many real-world applications outside options are avail-
able. An example is a co-existing private market like private schools or private
health insurances. We can integrate an outside option into our model via adding
an outcome (ωo,mo) with n copies to Ω. Each agent is free to choose the outcome
(ωo,mo) instead of any other outcome. Hence, we concentrate on social choice
functions that assign for any type profile nothing worse than (ωo,mo) to each
agent.
Adding an outside option mainly implies some further restrictions on imple-
mentable and discrimination-free social choice functions compared to those seen
in Proposition 2.2. First, if ϕ is implementable and discrimination-free each agent
needs to be assigned to an object that is at least as good as the object of the out-
side option ωo. Otherwise agents that are rich enough choose the outside option,
independent of how large mo is. Second, any money assignment of ϕ has to be
greater or equal mo. Otherwise there exists some agent that prefers his outcome
for being rich and the outside option for being poor (see arguments in the proof
of Proposition 2.2). In the context of Proposition 2.3 where wealth information is
available, adjusting wealth to a constant level is not realizable any more if agents
can avoid this redistribution by choosing the outside option.
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Two-sided Market. We consider a one-sided market where only the agents
that receive the objects have preferences and might act strategically. Whenever
providers of the objects are strategic players our notion of discrimination-freeness
can be applied for the other side of the market as well.
Seller and Buyer Model. Suppose that a seller owning an object is willing
to sell the object for a certain price and some buyer is willing to buy it for a
certain price. If the seller’s will-sell-price is lower than the buyer’s will-buy-price
the transaction takes place. Then, discrimination-freeness can be transferred to
whether or not the trade takes place must not depend on wealth of both the seller
and the buyer. Considering a predetermined and fixed price, our specification
of preferences implies that to ensure discrimination-freeness the price has to be
zero. For any fixed price that is not zero there are wealth levels such that the
transaction takes place and for others not.
Non-constant Ranking. A main assumption on the agents’ preferences is that
the ranking of objects is wealth independent. Technically, the assumptions of con-
tinuity and strict preferences over objects imply constant rankings. Relaxing the
assumption of continuity and requiring only continuity from below, ranking of ob-
jects might differ with wealth. For instance, wealthier agents might have another
first choice than poorer agents. When rankings depend on wealth, it is not straight
forward how to define discrimination-freeness. Sticking to our definition implies
that even rankings must not play a role for the object distribution. An alterna-
tive is to treat agents’ preferences as if the ranking was wealth-independent. This
might be a valid approach if payments in the mechanism are small enough such
that constant rankings are a reasonable approximation. However, then concerns
for segregation rather than concerns for discrimination might become relevant.
Assigning Probability Shares. Proposition 2.1 implies that exploiting any
information about preferences beyond object rankings does not yield Pareto-
improvements compared to a money-free social choice function. Since we are
primarily interested in whether money can be used to trade-off cardinalities,
in our analysis we concentrate on deterministic outcomes and therefore take
an ex-post perspective. When allocating objects, assigning probability shares
of objects to the agents might improve ex-ante efficiency since lotteries allow
to exploit cardinal information about preferences. Our model can be extended
to probabilistic outcomes (with some further specifications on how lotteries are
evaluated by the agents). Discrimination-freeness then can be defined as the
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assignment of probability shares for receiving an object beeing independent of
wealth. In analogy to Proposition 2.1, if σ is not ex-ante Pareto-dominated by
any discrimination-free matching σ′ there is no discrimination-free social choice
function with
∑
i∈N mi = 0 that ex-ante Pareto-dominates ϕ = (σ, 0).
32 However,
the resulting social choice function is still not Pareto-efficient within the set of
social choice functions with transfers. Furthermore, only if preferences over lot-
teries are wealth-independent, it is assured that using lotteries to perform ex-ante
Pareto-improvements is not in conflict with discrimination-freeness. To elicit car-
dinal information about preferences for the design of probabilistic assignments,
virtual money might be used (compare, for instance, the Pseudomarket described
in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)). Each agent receives a fixed amount of vir-
tual money that he can split among several objects. Based on this, probability
shares are assigned. Here again, only if preferences over lotteries are wealth-
independent, it is assured that using probabilistic assignments is not in conflict
with discrimination-freeness.
2.6 Applications
The results we obtained in the previous chapters have some interesting appli-
cations in markets where wealth-independent access to resources appears to be
desirable. Our results provide an explanation why in certain markets preference
intensities of agents are not exploited by using transfers. Within real-world appli-
cations that distribute object without transfers, there are indeed examples that
use externality-free mechanisms by not taking preferences into account but sim-
ply using a lottery for distribution. Furthermore, even if money cannot be used
to trade-off preference intensities, there might be other ways to account for pref-
erence intensities. Sandel (2012), for instance, argues that queuing for a good
can be a tool for screening according to preference intensities without using any
transfers.
School Choice. Many cities distribute school places via a centralized assign-
ment procedure without using monetary transfers. The probably most popular
examples, since extensively discussed in the literature on matching markets, are
the school choice procedures in Boston (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth, and Son-
mez, 2006) and New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005). School
places (at least at public schools) are often fully funded by taxes and parents
32Details are available upon request.
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do not have to pay additional fees. Furthermore, schooling up to a certain age
is compulsory in most countries. Such school assignment procedures are then
discrimination-free under the assumption that money cannot be used to influence
any parameters of the procedure. Once, for instance, a private sector co-exists
that charges fees, discrimination occurs. Or, if living in the neighborhood of a
good school is more expensive than living in the neighborhood of a bad school
(Black, 1999), the wealthier might have better access to better schools as well.
Therefore, if discrimination-freeness is a desire, current assignment procedures
may need some revision about whether or not they sufficiently meet this desire.
Kidney Donations. To increase donations from living donors, several models
of incentivizing donors are currently discussed intensively. Our model implies that
a free market for kidneys leads to discrimination (see also discussion on the seller
and buyer model in Section 2.5). Any monetary lump-sum as a compensation
for the donor leads to discrimination. Non-cash incentives, on the other hand,
do not conflict with discrimination-freeness as long as they incentivize a donation
independent on the wealth level of a person. However, not reimbursing cost of
donation might lead to discrimination as well as wealthier people are rather willing
to bear the costs. Gill, Dong, and Gill (2014) show that in the US the wealthier
donate at a higher rate. Another potential source for discrimination in the context
of kidney donations are bribes.
In the case of deceased donations it is current policy in many countries that
the allocation of kidneys out of the cadaver queue to patients does not depend on
subjective preferences intensities of the patients. Kidneys available are distributed
based on exogenous factors such as urgency, region, blood type etc. (priority
based matching) that makes manipulation very difficult. However, as soon as
the report of those exogenous factors can be manipulated, misreports could be
incentivized by bribes. This is not just a theoretical case as a 2013 uncovered
scandal in Germany regarding transplant corruption shows: doctors manipulated
factors that determine priorities for receiving a kidney.33
Health Insurance. Health insurance systems of several countries are examples
for markets with regulated fees and regulated access. Fees often are mainly based
on income characteristics. In several countries, health insurance is compulsory.
Furthermore, the assignment of insurees to insurers is often regulated to avoid
selection by the insurers. In the US, with Medicare there is made an effort to
33See, e.g., BBC (2013).
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ensure discrimination-free insurance for people age 65 or older by making every-
body eligible for Medicare. In Germany, health insurance is compulsory for all
ages, payments are (roughly speaking) a certain percentage of income and peo-
ple can choose the health insurer of their choice since health insurers must not
refuse insurees.34 Fees are therefore independent of preferences and ensure fund-
ing, difference in fees have solely distributive reasons. The assignment of insurees
to insurers is even externality-free since everybody receives his first choice. The
health insurance system in Germany that was in place until 1996 is another ex-
ample for an externality-free mechanism. Until then, insurees were automatically
assigned to an insurer depending on their occuption and therefore their preferences
did not play a role either.
With a co-existing private market discrimination occurs. In Germany, there
are indeed ongoing complaints about a two-tier health care system as people
above a certain income threshold are free to choose a private insurer. If private
insurance does not only mean more comfort but even better health treatment,
it leads to discrimination. An example of a country where basically no private
health insurance market co-exists is Austria.
Childcare. The assignment of childcare places in Germany is an example for a
system that is partly tax-funded but also charges additional income-dependent
fees. Local authorities decide on the concrete market design. Most German
cities installed a system where parents pay an income-dependent fee which is
independent on the specific childcare center chosen. All costs exceeding this fee
are funded by the local authority (i.e. via taxes). The specific assignment to the
childcare centers then is executed separately from the transfers. Some cities use a
decentralized system where parents directly apply at the childcare centers, others
use a centralized assignment where parents can submit preferences. Childcare
centers do not have an incentive to select parents by income as they receive a
lump-sum per child from the local authority. Participation is not mandatory
and therefore parents might decide whether to apply for a childcare place. If
poorer parents send their child to childcare centers while wealthier parents do
not, discrimination might be an issue.
34According to the German social security statutes, the health insurance must not decline
membership (SGB V § 175: ”Ausu¨bung des Wahlrechts: (1) Die Ausu¨bung des Wahlrechts ist
gegenu¨ber der gewa¨hlten Krankenkasse zu erkla¨ren. Diese darf die Mitgliedschaft nicht ablehnen
[...]”).
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of assigning indivisible goods to consumers
under the constraint that access to goods should not depend on wealth. We find
that no information beyond an agent’s object ranking can be used for his object
assignment, whenever the mechanism cannot (or does not) fully eliminate poten-
tial wealth differences in his endowments. Furthermore, ordinal mechanisms that
do not use transfers and that are efficient within the set of mechanisms without
transfers, are already at the Pareto-frontier of discrimination-free social choice
functions. To ensure wealth-independent access to the goods also in cases where
money might be used outside a market designer’s control even further restrictions
are needed such that the object an agent is assigned to must not depend on other
agents’ preferences.
We, therefore, find that a violation of moral concerns is not equivalent to the
presence of money. However, requiring discrimination-freeness restricts to what
extent a mechanism can exploit preference information and with it the use of
transfers. Thereby, our model explains the very restricted use of transfers in cer-
tain markets based on inequality concerns. If there is a use of money outside
the mechanisms to improve the access to resources, even further restrictions are
required to ensure discrimination-freeness. Some currently used mechanisms are
apparently not aligned with discrimination-freeness. Within school choice appli-
cations, for instance, if better schools are rather in more expensive neighborhoods,
living in a rather expensive neighborhood already implies better access to schools.
There are indeed claims for rethinking the current system. The chairman of the
Black Alliance for Educational Option wrote: ”If access to high-performing schools
has to come down to a number, better it be a lottery number than a ZIP code.”35
Even if we cannot (and do not want to) deduce any advice as to whether or not
to ban transfers, our work is a step into understanding the implications of con-
cerns that underlie the desire to restrict markets. Before deciding to put specific
restrictions on markets, a market designer should be aware of grounded desires
and take implications of meeting them into account.
This paper contributes to an understanding of the implications of moral con-
cerns behind a desire to ban monetary transfers. There is a branch of questions
for further research. For instance, we deferred the question on which markets
discrimination-freeness is desired and why. Furthermore, we did not yet con-
sider any trade-offs between discrimination-freeness and efficiency. Knowing more
about how preferences depend on wealth in real world applications, can facilitate
35See New York Times (2011).
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a further differentiation of our results. Even if discrimination is a major con-
cern, there also might be further moral concerns beyond discrimination-freeness.
Slippery-slope effects are often feared in the context of an introduction of mone-
tary transfers, even if they are small and regulated. Another concern mentioned,
is the exploitation of people in a sense that financial distress might make people
unable to decide in their best interest and they might thus regret a decision later.
Zargooshi (2001) surveyed people in Iran who sold their kidney after some years.
A striking 85% percent of the questioned people indicated that they regret the
donation.
2.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
We prove Proposition 2.1 in several steps. First, we argue that there is a maximum
amount that each agent is willing to pay for any improvement in the object he
is assigned to via ϕ. This maximum amount can be chosen independently of the
wealth endowments of other agents. Second, we show that if ϕ′ Pareto-dominates
ϕ and does not exceed the budget of ϕ it discriminates. Finally, we show that ϕ
is not Pareto-efficient.
Maximal Willingness to Pay. Fix any utility profile (ui)i∈N and wealth profile
(ei)i∈N . By assumption, each agent i’s ex-post wealth level Ai(t) = mi(t)+ei does
not depend on the other agents’ wealth levels. We aim to find some M > 0 such
that for every agent i and any two objects a and b with a being preferred to b by
agent i, it holds that
ui(a,Ai −M) ≤ ui(b, Ai). (2.1)
Then, M is such that agent i is not willing to pay more than M for an improvement
from b to a. Since the set of agents and the set of objects is finite, it is sufficient
to show that for any agent i preferring object a over object b we can find M such
that the inequality above holds. M might then depend on i, a and b. We can then
take the maximum over all objects and over all agents to define M independent
of these parameters.
M > 0 such that 2.1 holds can be defined as the willingness to pay of agent
i with wealth Ai for an object improvement from b to a. Formally, define M as
the solution of the equation ui(a,Ai−M) = ui(b, Ai). It remains to show that M
exists and that it is well defined. First note, that if such an M exists, it has to
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be unique since ui(a,m) is strictly increasing in m. To show the existence, we use
that ui(a,Ai) > ui(b, Ai). Since ui(a,m) is strictly increasing in m and strictly
concave in m, it has to hold that ui(a,m) → −∞ for m → −∞. Therefore, for
some M it holds that ui(a,Ai −M) = ui(b, Ai).
ϕ′ discriminates. Consider any social choice function ϕ = (σ,m) such that
m does not depend on wealth and assume that σ Pareto-efficient. It is to show
that if ϕ′ Pareto-dominates ϕ and has the same budget as ϕ has, it discriminates.
To prove this, assume that ϕ′ is discrimination-free. We show that this assump-
tion leads to a contradiction. Select some agent i that received a less preferred
object under ϕ′ than under ϕ for some type profile t = (ti)i∈N . Such an agent
exists because if for all type profiles nobody faced an object impairment under ϕ′
compared to ϕ and furthermore ϕ′ Pareto-dominates ϕ and has the same budget,
then σ′ needs to Pareto-dominate σ. However, σ was selected such that it is not
Pareto-dominated by any σ′.
Now assume that agent i is assigned to a by ϕ and to b by ϕ′. Due to
discrimination-freeness of ϕ and ϕ′ agent i is assigned to those objects for any
wealth endowments ei. Pareto-dominance of ϕ
′ implies that for every wealth en-
dowment ei, agent i has to be compensated for receiving object b instead of a by
a monetary transfer M(ei).
The amount M(ei) that compensates agent i for receiving b instead of a be-
comes arbitrarily large for increasing wealth: if ei increases, his ex-post wealth
Ai = mi(t) + ei becomes arbitrarily large as well since mi(t) does not depend
on ei. Therefore, the willingness to accept for receiving b instead of a becomes
arbitrarily large for increasing wealth.
At the same time, the amount of money that is available to compensate agent
i is bounded above by (n − 1)M when varying agent i’s wealth level. Therefore,
there exists some wealth endowment ei of agent i such that agent i cannot be
compensated any more by the other agents for the object impairment. Then, ϕ′
is not a Pareto-improvement of ϕ which is a contradiction.
ϕ is not Pareto-efficient. To show that ϕ = (σ,m) is not Pareto-efficient,
we have to find a type profile t = (ti)i∈N for which ϕ(t) can be Pareto-improved
without exceeding the budget of ϕ(t). Consider a type profile t = (ti)i∈N such
that all agents have the same ordinal ranking over objects. Furthermore, choose
the endowments ei of each agent small enough such that for some M each agent
is willing to accept at least M in return for an object impairment based on the
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outcome of ϕ. This construction can be performed, for instance, by using a utility
function ui(ω,Ai) = vi(ω) + h(Ai) with h
′ > 0, h′′ < 0 and limAi→∞ h
′(Ai)→ 0.
Now consider the assignment of objects σ(t). Then, select an agent that did
not receive the most preferred object a. Since the transfers of ϕ do not depend
on endowments, increasing the wealth level of agent i does not impact on wealth
levels of the other agents. If agent i’s level is high enough, he is willing to pay at
least M for any object improvement. All other agents are still willing to accept M
for any object impairment. Therefore, there are two agents that are both better
off if they trade objects in turn for money. Since this is a Pareto-improvement ϕ
cannot be Pareto-efficient.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Throughout the proof we concentrate on the outcome of an agent i and fix the
type of the other agents t−i. Therefore we omit t−i in the notation. First, we show
that an agent i’s monetary transfer is independent of his type. Second, we use
this to show that his object assignment only depends on his preferences through
his ordinal ranking.
Dependence of mi on ti. Suppose ϕ is discrimination-free and implementable
and agent i’s payment is not type-independent. Then there exist two types ti =
(ui, ei) and t
′
i = (u
′
i, e
′
i) with mi(ti) < mi(t
′
i). Implementability of ϕ requires that
for the two types ti and t
′
i the objects they are assigned to differ. Implementability
furthermore implies that |ϕ(T )| ≤ k where ϕ(T ) is the set of all outcomes that
agent i can reach by varying his report. This is because any two outcomes in ϕ(T )
need to differ regarding the object they contain. By assumption, ϕ(T ) contains
at least two elements that differ in their money assignment. Let (b,m) be the
assignment in ϕ(T ) with the highest monetary assignment and (a,m′) any other
outcome in ϕ(T ) with m′ < m.
We now aim to construct a utility function u∗i and find two wealth levels e
1
i
and e2i such that agent i’s object assignment differs for reporting t
1
i = (u
∗
i , e
1
i )
and t2i = (u
∗
i , e
2
i ). This then contradicts discrimination-freeness and therefore
completes the proof. We choose u∗i ∈ U , e1i , and e2i such that
• Object a is the most, object b the second most preferred object
• For e1i , (b,m) is preferred over (a,m′)
• For e2i , (a,m′) is preferred to (b,m).
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For any e1i < e
2
i ∈ R, we can construct u∗i , for instance, by u∗i (ω,A) = vi(ω) +
h(A) with any h : R→ R and h′ > 0 and h′′ < 0. vi(a) and vi(b) are chosen such
that vi(a)−vi(b) < h(m+e1i )−h(m′+e1i ) and vi(a)−vi(b) > h(m+e2i )−h(m′+e2i ).
Therefore, for a wealth level of e1i and utility according to u
∗
i agent i prefers
receiving object b in combination with a transfers ofm to all other bundles that can
be reached. An increase in agent i’s wealth level from e1i to some e
2
i results in agent
i not preferring (b,m) anymore to all other bundles in ϕ(T ). Implementability
then implies that the object assignment of agent i depends on his wealth. This is
a contradiction to discrimination-freeness.
Dependence of σi on ti. Consider two types ti and t
′
i that represent the same
object ranking ri, i.e. ti, t
′
i ∈ T (ri). From the first part of the proof we know
that mi(ti) = mi(t
′
i). Implementability of ϕ implies that σi(ti) = σi(t
′
i) because
otherwise either ti or t
′
i would have an incentive to deviate. Therefore, agent i’s
object assignment only depends on his rank order list of objects.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Throughout the proof we concentrate on the outcome of an agent i and fix the
type of the other agents t−i. Therefore we omit t−i in the notation. It is sufficient
to show that mi is independent of ui. Then it follows in analogy to the proof of
Proposition 2.2 that σi is not sensitive to cardinal information of ui.
Assume that ϕ is discrimination-free and implementable and that ex-post
wealth is not constant (see Proposition). We show that assuming that mi is not
independent of ui results in a contradiction. For this, we construct a preference
profile u∗i such that there are two types ti, t
′
i ∈ T (u∗i ) that only differ in their wealth
level but receive different objects. This then contradicts discrimination-freeness
and therefore, mi has to be independent of ui.
Construction of u∗i . If mi is not independent of ui there exists ei, ui and u
′
i
such that mi(ui, ei) < mi(u
′
i, ei). Choose e
′
i such that Ai = ei + mi(ui, ei) 6=
e′i +mi(ui, e
′
i) = A
′
i. Such an e
′
i exists because ex-post wealth is not constant.
In the following it is convenient to consider choice sets of agents given their
wealth endowment. A choice set Cei(U) is the set of all bundles of objects and
ex-post wealth available to an agent i with wealth endowment ei by varying his
report (t−i is still fixed). Formally,
Cei(U) = {(σi(ui, ei),mi(ui, ei) + ei)|ui ∈ U}.
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Implementability of ϕ implies that two different bundles in Cei(U) need to differ in
their object (otherwise ϕ cannot be implementable) and therefore Cei(U) contains
at most k bundles. Furthermore, define a = σi(ui, ei) and b = σi(u
′
i, ei). a 6= b
holds because ϕ is implementable and mi(ui, ei) < mi(u
′
i, ei). Then, for the wealth
endowment ei the bundles (a,Ai) and (b, Ai + x) with x > 0 are in the choice set
Cei(U) of agent i. On the other hand, for e′i the bundles (a,A′i) and (b, A′i + x′)
with some x′ ∈ R are in the choice set Ce′i(U). This is because if only agent i’s
wealth varies, the objects that can be reached by varying the preferences need to
be the same due to discrimination-freeness.
We now aim to construct a utility function u∗i such that the object of the most
preferred bundle in Cei(U) differs from the object of the most preferred bundle in
Ce′i(U) given preferences u∗i . Implementability then implies that ϕ needs to assign
different objects to an agent with preferences u∗i for wealth ei and e
′
i.
To construct u∗i , we first consider x
′ ≤ 0. Then consider any u∗i such that a is
the most preferred object and b the second most preferred object, and (b, Ai + x)
is the most preferred bundle in Cei(U). This is feasible with any utility function of
the shape u∗i (ω,A) = vi(ω)+hi(A) with h
′
i > 0, h
′′
i < 0. Since a is preferred over b
and x′ ≤ 0, it holds that u∗i (a,A′i) > u∗i (b, A′i + x′). Therefore, the most preferred
bundle in Ce′i(U) does not entail object b. This contradicts discrimination-freeness.
Second, consider x′ > 0. Again, consider a utility function of the shape
u∗i (ω,Ai) = vi(ω) + hi(Ai) with h
′
i > 0, h
′′
i < 0. Here, let hi(·) be such that
hi(Ai + x)− hi(Ai) 6= hi(A′i + x′)− hi(A′i). This is feasible since Ai 6= A′i. Choose
vi(ω) such that object a is the most preferred object and object b the second most
preferred one.
Furthermore, for hi(Ai + x)− hi(Ai) < hi(A′i + x′)− hi(A′i) let vi(a) and vi(b)
be such that
hi(Ai + x)− hi(Ai) < vi(a)− vi(b) < hi(A′i + x′)− hi(A′i).
For all other objects that might be entailed in bundles of Cei(U) assume that the
distance in valuation to objects a and b are large enough, such that those bundles
are never preferred bundles in Cei(U) for u∗i . Then, (a,Ai+x) is the most preferred
bundle in Cei(U) but the most preferred bundle in Ce′i(U) does not entail a. This
contradicts discrimination-freeness.
For hi(Ai + x)− hi(Ai) > hi(A′i + x′)− hi(A′i) choose
hi(Ai + x)− hi(Ai) > vi(a)− vi(b) > hi(A′i + x′)− hi(A′i)
Again, for all other objects that might be entailed in bundles of Cei(U) assume
that the distance in valuation to objects a and b are large enough, such that those
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bundles are never preferred bundles in Cei(U) for u∗i . Then, (b, Ai+x) is the most
preferred bundle in Cei(U) but the most preferred bundle in Ce′i(U) does not entail
b. This contradicts discrimination-freeness.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
In the following we assume that ϕ is an implementable and discrimination-free
social choice function.
Bribe-proofness⇔ Externality-freeness: It is straight forward to show that
externality-freeness implies bribe-proofness: If no agent can influence another
agent’s outcome it never pays off to pay somebody else to state other preferences.
Since ϕ is implementable, no agent has an incentive to misreport. This implies
that no bribing incentives exist such that an agent i is bribing himself with τ = 0.
Therefore, ϕ is bribe-proof.
We now show that bribe-proofness implies externality-freeness. To ease nota-
tion we denote for an agent of type ti the strict preferences over outcomes by Pi, the
weak preferences by Ri, and indifferences by Ii. The proof proceeds in two steps.
First, we show that if ϕ is bribe-proof, then for any agent i another agent j’s report
does not influence his utility, i.e., ϕi(tj, t−j)Iiϕi(t′j, t−j). Then, we show that it
implies ϕi(tj, t−j) = ϕi(t′j, t−j). Externality-freeness, i.e., ϕi(ti, t−j) = ϕi(ti, t
′
−j)
then follows by induction. Whenever reports of other agents are fixed in the
following, it is omitted in the notation for better readability.
Bribe-proofness Implies ϕi(tj, t−j)Iiϕi(t′j, t−j). Assume the contrary holds
such that there is some t−j ∈ T n−1 fixed and tj, t′j ∈ T with ϕi(t′j)Piϕi(tj). We
show that this assumption produces a contradiction because we can find a type
profile such that agent i has an incentive to bribe another agent.
Continuity of the preferences in money implies the existence of δ > 0 such that
(σi(t
′
j),mi(t
′
j)− δ)Piϕi(tj) (i would pay δ to change type tj’s report from tj to t′j).
We now consider a utility function u∗j that represents the same ordinal ranking
as uj does and a wealth level e
∗
j such that
(σj(t
′
j),mj(t
′
j) + δ))P
∗
j ϕj(t
∗
j) with t
∗
j = (u
∗
j , e
∗
j)
This construction is feasible since whenever u∗j represents the same ordinal ranking
as uj does, the outcomes for the two utility functions are the same - for any
wealth levels: since ϕ is implementable, reporting type t′j instead of t
∗
j needs to
yield a weakly worse outcome for agent j if agent j has a type t∗j . Since mj must
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not depend on the report (an implication of discrimination-freeness), the object
assignment needs to be weakly worse than the one for reporting t∗j . Then, for
instance, for any u∗j such that u
∗
j(ω,Aj) = vj(ω) + h(Aj) with h
′ > 0 and h′′ < 0
it is feasible to choose vj(·) such that the equation above is satisfied.
By the discussion above, (σi(t
′
j),mi(t
′
j)− δ)Piϕi(tj) holds. While the outcome
for agent j is independent of whether reporting tj or t
∗
j , the outcome for agent i
might be different. Whenever agent i prefers the outcome for a report t∗j compared
to tj, he has an incentive to bribe an agent j that has type tj with any amount
τ < δ (since j is anyway indifferent between reporting tj or t
∗
j). So assume that
the outcome for a report t∗j is weakly worse for agent i compared to a report tj.
Then agent i has an incentive to bribe agent j that has type t∗j with an amount
τ = δ in order to report t′j. Therefore there exists an incentive to bribe which
completes the proof.
ϕi(tj, t−j)Iiϕi(t′j, t−j) Implies ϕi(tj, t−j) = ϕi(t
′
j, t−j). Suppose the contrary: For
any agent i, t−ij ∈ T n−2 fixed, and ti, tj, t′j ∈ T it holds that ϕi(tj, t−j)Iiϕi(t′j, t−j),
but
(a,m1) = ϕi(ti, tj) 6= ϕi(ti, t′j) = (b,m2).
It implies that a 6= b andm1 6= m2 because otherwise, agent i cannot be indifferent.
Without loss of generality assume that m1 > m2. Now consider any agent i with a
type t∗i such that t
∗
i represents the same ordinal ranking as ti does but it holds that
(a,m1)P
∗
i (b,m2). Since ϕ is implementable and discrimination-free, reporting ti
and reporting t∗i need to yield the same outcome for agent i. Therefore,
ϕi(t
∗
i , tj) = (a,m1) and ϕi(t
∗
i , t
′
j) = (b,m2).
Furthermore, the first part of the proof implies that ϕi(t
∗
i , tj)I
∗
i ϕi(t
∗
i , t
′
j) holds
which is a contradiction to the construction of t∗i such that (a,m1) is strictly
preferred over (b,m2).
Nonbossy Social Choice Functions: By the first part of the proposition
externality-freeness is equivalent to bribe-proofness. Furthermore, bribe-proofnees
implies that discrimination-freeness under bribes is preserved. Therefore, it re-
mains to show that if ϕ is nonbossy and preserves discrimination-freeness under
bribes, then ϕ has to be bribe-proof.
Assume that ϕ is implementable and preserves discrimination-freeness under
bribes but is not bribe-proof. Then, there exists t = (ti)i∈N such that an agent
j has an incentive to bribe i 6= j. Since ϕ is nonbossy, the outcome for agent
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i needs to differ when being bribed in order to report t′i instead of ti. Due to
implementability, the object agent i receives for t′i is worse than it is for ti (since
the money assignment is independent of the type). Therefore, σBi (ti, t−i) contains
an object assignment that is worse than the one for a report ti. Furthermore note
that the choice set of agent i, i.e., the set of bundles that agent i can reach by
varying his report, has at most |Ω| = k elements and is therefore finite. Since ϕ is
nonbossy, the number of different outcomes for each agent that can be reached by
a variation of a report of agent i is therefore also finite. Therefore, there is some
M > 0 such that any agent is not willing to pay more than M in order to bribe
agent i independent of agent i’s type.
Now consider a utility function u∗i such that u
∗
i represents the same ordinal
ranking as ui does and two wealth levels e
1
i and e
2
i such that agent i with type
t1i = (u
∗
i , e
1
i ) is willing to accept a bribe of agent j but agent i with type t
1
i =
(u∗i , e
2
i ) is not willing to accept the bribe and is even not willing to accept anything
less than M to change his report. This construction is feasible since ti, t
1
i and t
2
i
yield the same outcome for agent i. Furthermore, outcomes for the other agents
are also independent of whether agent i reports ti, t
1
i , or t
2
i (due to nonbossiness).
Therefore, no agent has an incentive to bribe agent i. σBi (t
1
i , t−i) with t
1
i = (u
∗
i , e
1
i )
contains at least one element that is worse than the object assignment for a report
ti. σ
B
i (t
2
i , t−i) with t
2
i = (u
∗
i , e
2
i ) contains only the object that is assigned for a
report ti. This contradicts preserving discrimination-freeness under bribes which
proves the desired.
Proof of Corollary 2.4
We show the corollary by showing that an agent facing a choice set of size j
randomly chosen out of a set Ω is facing decreasing expected utility gains. For
any agent i let Zj denote the random variable that describes the element with
maximal utility of a randomly chosen subset of Ω of size j. Let E(Zj) denote the
expected utility of Zj for agent i. We have to show that the marginal utility gain
of raising j is decreasing meaning that
E(Zj+1)− E(Zj) ≤ E(Zj)− E(Zj−1).
We order the objects with respect to the valuation of the objects, a1 denotes
the object with the lowest valuation, ak the object with the highest valuation.
We consecutively draw objects out of the set {a1, ..., an}, Yj denotes the random
variable representing the j-th draw. Then we can write the random variable Zj as
Z1 = Y1 and Zj = max{Yj, Zj−1} for j > 1. By using conditional expectation it
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is then sufficient to show that
E[(Zj − Zj−1)1Y1=ai1 ,...,Yj−1=aij−1 ] ≥ E[(Zj+1 − Zj)1Y1=ai1 ,...,Yj−1=aij−1 ]
for any possible sequence of draws ai1 , . . . , aij−1 . However, this just depends on
the value of Zj−1 and therefore it is sufficient to prove this for j = 2. This can be
done by explicit calculation.
chapter 3
QUALITY PROVISION AND REPORTING WHEN HEALTH
CARE SERVICES ARE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL AND
QUALITY SIGNALS IMPERFECT
Abstract
We model competition for a multi-attribute health service where pa-
tients observe attribute quality imprecisely before deciding on a provider.
High quality in one attribute, e.g. medical quality, is more important for
ex-post utility than high quality in the other attribute. Providers can shift
resources to increase expected quality in some attribute. Patients ratio-
nally focus on attributes depending on signal precision and beliefs about
the providers’ resource allocations. When signal precision is such that pa-
tients focus on the less important attribute, any Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium is inefficient. Increasing signal precision can reduce welfare, as
the positive effect of better provider selection is overcompensated by the
negative effect that a shift in patient focusing has on provider quality choice.
We discuss the providers’ strategic reporting incentives and reporting poli-
cies. Under optimal reporting, signals about the important attribute are
always published. However, banning reporting on less important attributes
might be necessary.
3.1 Introduction
Health care services have multiple relevant quality dimensions. When choosing
doctors, hospitals or taking decisions about nursing homes, patients care about
medical quality on the one hand, and may take non-medical quality factors such
as general appeal of the doctor’s office or hospital environment, short waiting
times and interpersonal skills of the staff on the other hand into account. Some
of these dimensions are difficult to observe, measure, evaluate and communicate,
whereas others can be observed and measured with fairly high precision. For
instance, selected mortality rates or Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) rates
provide only an imprecise signal of hospital medical quality.1 Contrary to that,
1Iezzoni (1997) shows that report card rankings may vary profoundly according to the cho-
sen risk adjusters. Thus, if patients do not have information about the risk adjusters used,
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information brochures with pictures of patient rooms and sample dinner menus
provide fairly accurate signals for the hotel attributes of the hospital environment.
In Germany, for instance, the public feedback platform Arztnavigator provides
detailed information of patient feedback on doctor’s practice rooms, waiting times,
and the doctor’s and staff’s friendliness and communication skills.2
In this paper, we address the question of which quality dimensions patients
rationally focus on when the signals they receive about the qualities of the dimen-
sion before deciding on a provider have different precision, and what this focussing
implies for the provision of quality and welfare. In particular, we are concerned
with settings where patients value quality differences in one attribute, e.g. med-
ical quality of the service, more than quality differences in the other attributes,
e.g. the hotel properties of hospitals or nursing homes, but the quality signal in
the more important attribute is less precise.
Interestingly, empirical research indicates that public reporting of clinical qual-
ity scores has a positive but only weak effect on patients’ provider choice.3 One
reason might be that patients are skeptical about the accuracy of these quality
measures. Furthermore, other quality dimensions might play an important role for
the choice of health care providers. Goldman and Romley (2008) analyze the role
of amenities alongside treatment quality measures on hospital choice for Califor-
nian data. They show that various measures of treatment quality of hospitals (e.g.
mortality rates) have only a small effect on patient demand while improvements in
amenities strongly raise demand. Furthermore, patients’ perceptions of reputation
and specialty medical services as well as satisfaction with a prior hospital stay sig-
nificantly affect hospital choice. Among these, satisfaction with a prior stay may
thereby be driven partly by non-medical factors. Fornara, Bonaiuto, and Bonnes
(2006) e.g. show that hospital users’ perceived quality of care improves when
the humanization degree of the hospital environment increases.4 Regarding the
demand response, Dafny and Dranove (2008) report that the effect of health plan
there is significant noise. According to Dranove (2000), Medicare Hospital Compare identifies
only a small percentage of hospitals as having mortality rates significantly above or below the
mean. Thus, although quality reports become increasingly available through e.g. report cards or
public feedback platforms, the signals that patients receive through these about medical quality
are often still fairly imprecise through an inherent difficulty of observing and measuring and
interpreting medical quality accurately.
2See Arztnavigator (2015).
3See e.g. Dranove (2000) and the discussion therein.
4For environmental factors, Arneill and Devlin (2002) conducted a study where they showed
participants slides of doctors’ waiting rooms and then asked what quality of care participants
expected. Arneill and Devlin (2002) find that a significantly higher perceived quality of care
for waiting rooms that are nicely furnished, light, contain artwork and are warm versus waiting
rooms that are dark, have outdated furnishings, contain no artwork or poor quality reproductions
and are cold in appearance.
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report cards on Medicare beneficiaries is driven by responses to patient satisfac-
tion scores, while other more objective quality measures did not affect enrollment
decisions.
An important concern in this context is whether a potentially strong demand
response to non-medical quality attributes such as amenities, interpersonal skills
or perceived high quality environment leads to a suboptimal quality of care. This
would be the case if medical quality is more important to generate patient welfare
than all other dimensions of care - such that quality of care should be high on the
clinical quality dimension -, but health care providers do not provide sufficiently
high quality in the clinical dimension as patient demand is more responsive to
quality differences in other dimensions. However, why should patients respond
more to quality differences in other dimensions than medical quality if medical
quality is the important dimension in terms of their realized utility? Generally,
why would patients focus on an attribute that is less important in terms of con-
sumption utility?
Our starting point is the observation that many quality dimensions can only be
observed imperfectly ex-ante, and that the precision of information about quality
varies across dimensions. In particular, we model provider competition when pa-
tients observe attribute quality of a two-attribute health service only imperfectly.
Providers can allocate given resources across the attributes in order to increase
expected quality in either one or the other attribute. A patient’s utility gain from
an increase in quality in one attribute is larger than in the other attribute, thus
representing the situation where high quality in the medical treatment dimension
is more important for patient welfare than amenities. Patients receive a binary
signal about realized quality in each attribute from each provider before deciding
on a provider.
We first define rational focusing on attributes: A patient focuses on an at-
tribute if a high quality signal in this attribute drives her provider choice. We say
that focusing is strong if this holds for any combination of beliefs that the patient
might have about the underlying resource allocation decisions of the providers,
whereas there is focusing, but not strong, if this holds for beliefs that are sym-
metric across providers. With this definition, we can describe a patient’s focus on
quality attributes depending on the precision of quality signals in the attributes.
We show that equilibria exist in which providers invest in the less important
attribute. This occurs if the quality signal in this attribute is more precise than in
the other attribute to the extent that patients focus on this attribute. Equilibrium
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is unique under strong focusing. If signal precisions are such that patients’ focus is
on the less important attribute, all Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria are inefficient.
Increasing signal precision, e.g. by introducing a signal in the less important
attribute, can reduce welfare. This occurs if the positive effect of better provider
selection due to higher signal precision is overcompensated by the negative effect
that the shift in patient focusing, induced by the change in signal precision, has
on provider quality choice. We derive conditions under which an increase in signal
precision leads to an unambiguous welfare loss.
In the literature on health care reporting, the adverse effect of information that
has been emphasized is providers’ patient selection incentives (Dranove, Kessler,
McClellan, and Satterthwaite, 2003), i.e., turning away the sickest patients be-
cause of providers’ concerns about their ‘ratings’. We point to a further effect
that may result from the increase in information on other quality dimensions
through e.g. public feedback platforms alongside the increased public reporting of
medical quality: If information becomes relatively more precise on less important
attributes, patients may focus on these, with adverse consequences for quality
provision and welfare.
Feng Lu (2012) analyzes the impact of public reporting of some quality mea-
sures on quality in the reported and unreported dimensions. Feng Lu (2012) finds
that after the introduction of public reporting, scores of quality measures improve
along the reported dimensions, but significantly deteriorate along the unreported
dimensions.5 Feng Lu (2012) furthermore finds no evidence that there was a de-
crease in quality-related inputs, suggesting a reallocation of resources. Note that
in our model, public reporting only has an effect on the resource allocation if it
increases the relative precision of quality signals that patients receive in these
attributes, and only if the effect is strong enough to shift patient focus.
Our analysis also allows to derive optimal reporting policies. Reporting in our
framework is the sending of informative but noisy signals about realized quality
with exogenous precision before quality is realized. In order to compare reporting
policies including voluntary reporting, we change the baseline model in the follow-
ing way: Whether patients receive signals (with exogenous precision) in certain
attributes now depends on a strategic reporting decision by providers. We show
5Contrary to that, Werner, Konetzka, and Kruse (2009) find that overall both unreported
and reported care in nursing homes improved following the launch of public reporting. Im-
provements in unreported care were particularly large among facilities with high scores or that
significantly improved on reported measures. Low-scoring facilities experienced no change or
worsening of their unreported quality of care. In our model, the technology is such that ex-
pected qualities in the dimensions are substitutes and not complements.
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that if the more important attribute is not too important, in the unique equi-
librium under strategic reporting providers invest in the less important attribute
and only publish signals in this attribute. Thus, not only resource allocation, but
also reporting might be inefficient. However, if the more important attribute is
sufficiently important, it might also be the case that providers invest in the impor-
tant attribute and only report in the important attribute although there would be
patient focusing on the less important attribute if patients received signals in all
attributes. Mandating full reporting might be then be welfare-reducing. Under
optimal reporting, signals in the important attribute are always published, how-
ever, it might be necessary to control reporting in attribute 2. In particular, a
ban on reporting in attribute 2 might have to be imposed.
3.2 Related Literature
Focusing. We define rational focusing via the precision of signals that patients
receive about attributes in an environment with imperfect quality information. A
patient evaluates signals according to her expected utility for any given beliefs.
We say that she focuses on an attribute if, for given ranges in feasible outcomes,
the difference in the precision of signals is such that the difference between signal
value and expected outcome in this attribute is, compared to the other attribute,
low. Focusing here is thus different from focusing and salience models (Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2013, Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) that assume that there
is an exogenous difference between decision utility and consumption utility. In
Koszegi and Szeidl (2013) e.g., under perfect information, focus weights of at-
tributes in decision utility depend positively on the range of feasible outcomes in
attributes.
Multi-attribute goods. The literature on markets with multi-attribute goods
and quality investment is scarce. Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cun˜at (2012) analyze
monopoly provision of a two-attribute good where quality is imperfectly observ-
able. Contrary to our set-up with exogenous information, they consider active
consumers who choose which information to acquire. Customers are heterogenous
in their valuation for attributes and can assess quality at a cost. The monopolist
can invest in an increase of the probability of high quality in one attribute. A
reduction in the consumers’ costs of acquiring information on the other attribute
may then reduce quality investment: The decrease in costs of assessment shifts
the consumer that is indifferent between assessing one or the other dimension to-
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wards the first attribute, reducing demand and thereby quality investment. The
direct positive welfare effect of reduced assessment costs may then be dominated
by the negative investment effect leading to a reduction in overall consumer wel-
fare. Closest to our work is Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992). In Dranove and
Satterthwaite (1992), competing manufacturers sell goods through retailers where
retail price is random and customers are heterogenous in their valuation for qual-
ity. Customers observe prices and quality only with noise and search retailers
using an optimal sequential search rule. An increase in the precision of the price
observation may then decrease welfare through the indirect effects of a change
in the customers’ search: Prices fall, but quality is reduced as well. If the latter
effect is stronger, increasing precision of the price observation reduces consumer
welfare. In contrast, we model a market with homogeneous consumers that benefit
more from high quality in one attribute than in the other. Instead of searching,
customers receive signals from all providers. We show under what conditions on
signal precision and beliefs the customers’ focus is on the less important attribute
and derive the welfare consequences. Furthermore, we discuss strategic reporting
by providers and optimal reporting policies. While the workings in our model
show some analogy to the logic of the multitasking literature as in Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991), the modelling and conclusions are however different. In
the multitasking literature, effort substitutability implies complementarity of the
optimal (linear) incentive pay for tasks.6 Better information in the sense of a
reduction in the noise of the performance improves the tailoring of incentive pay
and does not have a negative value for the principal. In contrast, we consider a
market for a multi-attribute service where consumers receive noisy signals about
realized quality by competing providers. The key contractual incompleteness in
this market is that attributes cannot be separately priced such that consumers do
not separately evaluate expected quality and utility differences in each attribute
and that consumers cannot commit to ignore signals. Better information in the
sense of increasing signal precision may then decrease welfare, as it is individu-
ally rational for customers to focus too strongly on signals in the less important
attribute.
Health care quality under imperfect information and quality report-
ing. Gravelle and Sivey (2010) analyze competition between hospitals under
6Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011) analyze optimal contracting between a purchaser and a partly
altruistic provider of health services within the multitasking framework where one quality di-
mension is verifiable whereas the second is not. They show that provider altruism with respect
to health benefit can lead to overall complementarity of qualities even if they are substitutes on
the effort cost side such that high powered incentives may be optimal.
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fixed prices where patients receive imperfect signals about quality, which is one-
dimensional. Hospitals have different quality cost functions and can set quality.
Gravelle and Sivey (2010) show that when patients choose the hospital that sends
a higher signal, better information in the sense of a reduction in the variance of
the noise term may reduce quality of both hospitals if quality costs are sufficiently
different.7
Most of the literature on quality information considers reporting in the form
of disclosure of known, realized quality. Sun (2011) analyzes a monopolist’s vol-
untary disclosure for a multiple-attribute good, where the attributes are a vertical
and horizontal quality. When vertical quality is known, horizontal quality might
not be disclosed. This is since a monopolist benefits by disclosure through at-
tracting consumers nearby at the cost of deterring consumers far away. When
vertical quality is low, the benefit outweighs the cost. The higher the quality,
the more likely the consumer is to buy the product without disclosure such that
when quality is high enough, the monopolist tries to cover the entire market at
a high price without disclosure. Board (2009) analyzes disclosure incentives for
a one-dimensional good under competition with heterogeneous firms. If a high-
quality firm discloses, competitors must trade off the increase in competition and
resulting fall in price if they also disclose with the reduction in perceived qual-
ity by consumers, if they do not. Nondisclosure by some high-quality firms thus
generates positive externalities for low-quality firms who may pool with them and
take advantage of raised consumer expectations. Board (2009) shows that the
welfare effects of mandatory disclosure are complex, consumer surplus however
rises if firms are sufficiently close in quality that the overall effect is increased
competition. Contrary to that, we do not model quality disclosure, but reporting
as a decision of publishing signals before quality is realized. Providers voluntarily
never report in all attributes, since reporting in their weak attribute, i.e. the one
they did not invest in, gives them a competitive disadvantage.
Quality reporting as a policy instrument in the context of healthcare is considered
in Glazer and McGuire (2006). Glazer and McGuire (2006) study competition
among health plans under adverse selection and fixed prices. They show that
averaged quality reports, instead of full reports, can remedy adverse selection in-
centives, since averaging quality across dimensions and reporting only the average
enforces pooling in health insurance. Less information in the form of averaged
quality reports thus mitigates the problem of cream-skimming of good patients
7Patient demand is however not consistent with that of rational Bayesian agents, see the
discussion in Shelegia (2012).
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with tailored quality packages. The right weights for quality averaging may then
implement efficient outcomes. Whereas Glazer and McGuire (2006) consider a
common value set-up and fixed prices, Ma and Mak (2014) compare full quality
reporting to average quality reporting under private values and price setting by
a monopolist. Ma and Mak (2014) show that qualities and prices under an im-
posed average quality report generate higher consumer welfare than full quality
report, as it restrains the firm’s price-quality discrimination strategies. In our
model, suppressing quality information in the form of banning reporting in some
dimensions might be optimal since this shifts the patients’ demand towards the
quality dimensions that matter more to generate welfare.
3.3 Model
We consider a two-attribute health service q = (q1, q2) with qi ∈ {h, l} for i = 1, 2
where h stands for high quality and l for standard quality respectively. Two
providers A and B provide the service. The provider compensation is a uniform,
exogenously set fee P > 0 per unit of service provided.8 Quality cannot be con-
tracted on.
Quality is stochastic. Providers can allocate resources in order to achieve high
expected quality in either one or the other attribute.9 In particular, each provider
j ∈ {A,B} has fixed resources which are symmetric across providers, and makes
a resource allocation decision aj ∈ {0, 1}. For any aj ∈ {0, 1} the realization
probabilities for high quality in one attribute are
aj P(q1 = h) P(q2 = h)
1 1− p p
0 p 1− p
with p ∈ (0, 1
2
). Quality levels are realized independently for each attribute. With
this technology, we say provider j invests in attribute 1 (2) if he sets aj = 1
(aj = 0). The lower p, the larger is the probability that high quality is realized in
the attribute a provider invests in.
8Fees cannot be set separately for attributes. The fixed, exogenous fee reflects e.g. regulated
prices or negotiated prices between health plans and providers for the service in their network.
9For a potential split of resources see discussion in section 3.8.
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The assumptions made about how quality realization depends on the resource
allocation incorporates two symmetries: First, a symmetric impact of resource
allocation on quality realization across attributes. This is in order to make at-
tributes perfectly symmetric on the technology side, as our focus is on differences
across attributes on the demand side. Second, the modelling implies symmetry
across high and low quality realization. The second one is mainly used for simpli-
fication. It particularly implies that the probability that high quality is realized
in attribute i if invested in i equals the probability that low quality is realized if
invested in the other attribute. Both symmetries are discussed in detail in section
3.8 where we also argue why giving up those symmetries basically preserves our
results. Variable costs of providing the service are set to 0. Providers maximize
expected profit, which will be equal to maximizing market share since the fee for
the service is fixed.
There is a continuum of patients C in the market with mass 1. Each patient c ∈ C
receives utility u(q) from utilizing a health service with quality q = (q1, q2) that
is additively separable in attributes, i.e. U(q) =
∑2
i=1 ui(qi).
10 We assume that
the utility gain from high quality versus standard quality is higher in the first
attribute than in the second attribute, i.e.
θ ≡ u1(q1 = h)− u1(q1 = l)
u2(q2 = h)− u2(q2 = l) > 1.
Thus, high quality in attribute 1 is more important to generate increases in pa-
tient utility than high quality in attribute 2, in the following we refer to this
property when we say that attribute 1 is the important attribute. In many health
care applications, attribute 1 could be thought of as the medical quality, whereas
attribute 2 is the friendliness and attentiveness of the staff and comfort of the
amenities. Standard quality in the attribute medical quality could then be inter-
preted as the cure of a health problem with a certain probability of adverse side
or medium term effects from the service, whereas high quality is cure of the health
problem with a lower associated probability of adverse side or medium term effects
from the service. We normalize consumption utility of standard quality in both
attribute to zero (u1(q1 = l) = u2(q2 = l) = 0) and high quality in the second
10Thus, patients are homogeneous in their valuation of the health care service. We will discuss
heterogeneous patients in Section 3.8. Note that U(q) can be interpreted as an expected utility
level patients face once q is realized. This reflects a setting where providers with quality level q
but might not serve constantly q but quality levels varying around q with expectation q.
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attribute to 1 (u2(q2 = h) = 1).
11 This implies u1(q1 = h) = θ > 1. Each patient’s
utility from abstaining from utilizing the service is u < 0. The fee P for utilizing
the health care service is paid for by a patient’s health insurance such that u(q)
gives the net utility of consuming the health service for the patient.12
Patients cannot perfectly observe the quality levels qA and qB of provider A and B
respectively. They however receive signals about realized quality in the attributes
from each provider before deciding on a provider. Each patient receives signals
sj = (sj1, s
j
2) ∈ {ll, lh, hl, hh}, j ∈ {A,B}. Attribute signals sji are generated
with error i with i = P(si = h | qi = l) = P(si = l | qi = h) < 12 , we write
 = (1, 2). For better readability we write s
j for the signal a patient c receives
instead of sjc. We furthermore might use s = s
j as long as it is clear from the
context. We do not impose any assumptions on the correlation of signals across
patients, i.e. we allow signals to be independently distributed as well as to be
correlated.13 Note that we do not model aggregation of signals across patients.
One interpretation of the set-up could however be that there is aggregation, e.g.
via a feedback platform, and through the aggregation all patients receive a signal
in attribute i with error i as above. The notion that the signal precisions differ
across attributes could then be driven by the fact that, regarding medical quality,
there are only few reports about actual medical quality being published, whereas
aggregation of patient feedback about amenities, staff and perceived quality leads
to a more precise overall signal for these other attributes.
In our basic model, patients do not observe the providers’ resource allocation de-
cisions. To evaluate signals from providers, each patient has beliefs bj ∈ {0, 1}
about the resource allocation aj, j ∈ {A,B}. Again, we omit c as an index for
each patient. Given any belief, patients update their belief about the quality of
the service from providers according to Bayes’ rule. We denote the expected util-
ity that a patient faces at provider j when she has belief bj about the provider’s
11With this normalization we do not loose any generality since for our analysis we will always
compare two expected utility levels such that only the size of θ will play a role for the provider
selection of the patients and net welfare effects.
12Health insurers here are exogenous to contracting. Alternatively, instead of a health insurer
paying the fee we could assume that the utility of not utilizing the health service is sufficiently
low.
13It therefore includes the case that all patients receive the same signals. This shows that
with the current set-up, we could also write the model as a representative patient that receives
signals generated as above instead of a continuum of patients. We choose the continuum for the
discussion of heterogeneous patients in Section 3.8.
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resource allocation and receives signal sj = (sj1, s
j
2) by Us[s
j|bj, ].14 When re-
ceiving signal sA from provider A and signal sB from provider B a patient then
chooses provider A if
Us[s
A|bA, ] > Us[sB|bB, ]
Ties are broken equally. For  fixed we write (s|b)  (s′|b′) if U [s|b, ] > U [s′|b′, ],
i.e. when observing signal s with underlying belief b a patient faces a higher ex-
pected utility than when observing signal s′ with underlying belief b′.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: Provider A and provider B simultaneously decide on their resource al-
location aA and aB, respectively. Patients do not observe resource allocations.
Stage 2: For each provider the quality level in both attributes is realized.
Stage 3: Each patient receives identically distributed attribute signals sji ∈
{h, l} on qji for all i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {A,B} on realized quality.
Stage 4: Each patient chooses a provider.
Stage 5: Patient utility from utilizing the health service is realized.
Given the set-up, maximizing profits for providers corresponds to maximizing the
probability of being selected as provider. In the following, we analyze perfect
Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in pure strategies and discuss potential mixing strate-
gies in Section 3.8. We require patient beliefs to be consistent with the providers’
resource allocations in equilibrium.
3.4 Focusing on Attributes
A patient receives two signals s, one from each provider. Which provider will the
patient choose? Assume that one of the signals, say from provider A, indicates
standard quality in the first and high quality in the second attribute, i.e. sA = lh.
The signal from provider B indicates high quality in the first and standard qual-
ity in the second attribute, i.e. sB = hl. Whether the signal of high quality in
the first or in the second attribute is decisive for the patient’s provider choice
now does not only depend on θ, the relative ex-post importance of high quality
14In this formulation, the belief does not have to be correct. However, in equilibrium we
require beliefs to be consistent with actions.
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in attribute 1, but also on the relative attribute signal precisions, for any given
beliefs and technology parameter p. Thus, it might well be the case that if sig-
nals are hl for provider B and lh for provider A, the patient chooses provider A.
This particularly implies that she picks provider A whenever provider A’s signal
indicates high quality in the second attribute and provider B’s signal indicates
low quality in the second attribute. Then, the signal of high quality in attribute
2 drives patient choice and we say that the patient focuses on attribute 2. This
is generalized and formalized in the following definition of focusing.
Definition 3.1 (Focusing on Attributes). Fix , p and θ. A patient...
(i) ...focuses on attribute i if for any two signals sj = (sj1, s
j
2) and s
k = (sk1, s
k
2)
with sji = h and s
k
i = l and symmetric beliefs b
j = bk ∈ {0, 1} signal sj
yields higher expected utility, i.e. (sj|bj)  (sk|bk) for all bk = bj ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) ...strongly focuses on attribute i if for any two signals sj = (sj1, s
j
2) and
sk = (sk1, s
k
2) with s
j
i = h and s
k
i = l and any beliefs b
j, bk ∈ {0, 1} signal sj
yields higher expected utility, i.e. (sj|bj)  (sk|bk) for all bk, bj ∈ {0, 1}.
Since (hh|b)  (s|b) for all s 6= hh and (s|b)  (ll|b) for all s 6= ll, the definition
implies that focusing on attribute 1 is equivalent to (hl|b)  (lh|b) for all beliefs
b and focusing on attribute 2 is equivalent to (lh|b)  (hl|b) for all beliefs b. It
analogously holds with any beliefs b and b′ for strong focusing.
Note that for any given p and θ, whether patients that maximize their expected
utility focus on an attribute or not only depends on the signal technology. This
is because the requirements have to hold for all potential (symmetric) beliefs. In
particular, the definition of focusing is not linked to equilibrium beliefs. Patient
focusing is thus a direct property of the signal technology and not of equilibrium
behavior.15
Focusing behavior as defined above is rational in the sense that patients max-
imize their expected utility given beliefs and update according to Bayes’ rule.
Thus, focusing here is different from focusing or salience in the behavioral eco-
nomics literature (Bordalo et al., 2013, Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) where there is
an exogenous wedge between decision utility and consumption utility. Inefficiency
will occur in our model via demand focusing that is nevertheless perfectly rational.
Note that the focusing definition could however easily be adjusted to incorporate
15If patients were able to observe aj we could replace bj and bk by aj and ak in the definition
of focusing. Again, focusing does not depend on the equilibrium action.
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other, potentially non-rational decision rules where patients update differently or
do not maximize expected utility. The focusing definition can also naturally be
applied in more general product market settings.
Focusing on attributes depends on the signal error  = (1, 2), the investment
technology p and the utility weight θ of attribute 1. Intuitively, the smaller the
signal error in one attribute keeping the signal precision in the other attribute
fixed, the more informative the signals are in this attribute and the more likely it
is that there is focusing on this attribute. The utility factor θ > 1 implies that high
quality provided in attribute 1 is more important than high quality provided in
attribute 2. Hence, if signal precision in attribute 1 is not lower than in attribute 2,
patients focus on attribute 1. However, conversely, if signal precision in attribute
2 is higher than in attribute 1, patients might focus on attribute 2 if θ is small
enough. Generally, we can divide the attribute signal error space into focusing
areas for given p and θ. The following lemma describes the separating lines for
the focusing areas.
Lemma 3.1. Fix p and θ > 1. Then there exist continuous and increasing func-
tions f s1 ≤ f 12 ≤ f s2 with f i : [0, 1
2
] → [0, 1
2
], i ∈ {s1, 12, s2}, that divide the
signal error space [0, 1
2
]2 into focusing areas. A patient...
• ...strongly focuses on attribute 2 iff 1 > f s2(2). There is ∗2 < 12 such that
f s2 strictly increases on [0, ∗2] and f
s2(2) =
1
2
for all 2 ≥ ∗2. ∗2 > 0 iff
θ < 1
1−2p .
• ...focuses on attribute 2 iff 1 > f 12(2) and focuses on attribute 1 iff 1 <
f 12(2). f
12 strictly increases in 2. Furthermore, 0 < f
12(0) < f 12(1
2
) = 1
2
.
• ...strongly focuses on attribute 1 iff 1 < f s1. f s1 strictly increases in 2 and
0 < f s1(0) < p < f s1(1
2
) < 1
2
.
For θ → 1 all functions converge to the 45-degree-line . For θ → ∞ the separat-
ing line of strong focusing on attribute 1 converges to p and all other functions
converge to 1
2
.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the separating lines for p = 0.25 and θ = 2. Figure 3.2
illustrates the separating lines for again p = 0.25 but θ = 1.4.
The two figures visualize how the focusing areas change when θ is varied. θ > 1
implies that the area of focusing on attribute 1 is larger than the area of focusing
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Figure 3.1: p = 0.25 and θ = 2 Figure 3.2: p = 0.25 and θ = 1.4
on attribute 2. For large θ (θ > 1
1−2p , which is the case in figure 3.1), attribute 1
is important enough such that the area of strong focusing on attribute 2 vanishes
completely. An area of focusing on attribute 2 exists independent of the magnitude
of θ. However, this area becomes arbitrarily small for θ converging to infinity. For
θ → 1, all separating lines converge to the 45-degree-line.
The lemma shows that for a fixed error in one attribute, lowering the error in
the other attribute makes the signals in this attribute more important and might
shift the focus of a patient towards this attribute. For any θ > 1 and p we can
choose 1 large enough such that lowering 2 results in a shift from focusing on
attribute 1 to focusing on attribute 2. For the equilibrium and welfare analysis,
we will be also interested in the conditions under which there is a shift from strong
focusing on attribute 1 to focusing on attribute 2 when lowering 2. Graphically,
this translates to finding a horizontal line such that this line crosses both the
area of strong focusing on 1 and the area of focusing on 2. In our examples, for
instance, this is the case for 1 = 0.25. The following corollary provides a sufficient
condition on θ to find such an 1.
Corollary 3.1. Fix p and θ > 1. There exist errors 1 such that by varying 2
the patients’ focus shifts from focusing on attribute 1 to focusing on attribute 2.
For θ < θ = 1
1−2p there exist errors 1 such that by varying 2 the patients’
focus shifts from strong focusing on attribute 1 to focusing on attribute 2.
Proof. See appendix.
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Particularly, by the monotonicity of the separating lines, for  = (1, 2) with 1
large enough, patients (strongly) focus on attribute 1 for large 2 and focus on
attribute 2 for small 2. For θ close enough to 1 it is even possible to find 1 such
that lowering 2 results in a shift from strong focusing on attribute 1 to strong
focusing on attribute 2. However, the weaker conditions presented in the corollary
will be sufficient for our further analysis.
3.5 Provider Quality Incentives and Equilibria
On the basis of the patients’ focusing behavior we can analyze the providers’
incentives to allocate their resources between attributes. We say that a strategy
aj of a provider j is dominant if for any patients’ beliefs (bA, bB) and any strategy
a−j of the other provider, the strategy aj is weakly better than any other strategy
and strictly better for at least one combination of beliefs and the other provider’s
strategy. We call aj strictly dominant if it is strictly better for all combinations
of patients’ beliefs (bA, bB) and the other provider’s strategy aB.
In the following we show that once patients focus on an attribute and the
signal error in this attribute is lower than the signal error in the other attribute,
it is a dominant strategy for a provider to invest in this attribute. If focusing is
strong, it is even a strictly dominant strategy to invest in the respective attribute.
Proposition 3.1. Let θ, p and  = (1, 2) be such that patients...
(i) ....(strongly) focus on attribute 2. Then it is a (strictly) dominant strategy
for any provider j to invest in attribute 2, i.e. aj = 0.
(ii) ...(strongly) focus on attribute 1 and 1 < 2. Then it is a (strictly) dominant
strategy for any provider j to invest in attribute 1, i.e. aj = 1.
Proof. See appendix.
The main idea of the proof is that for fixed beliefs of patients the resource allo-
cation of the provider does not influence the expected utility of any patient when
receiving a specific signal. This is because patients cannot observe the investment
but perform the Bayesian updating when receiving the signal based on their be-
lief. What changes when the provider selects a different investment strategy are
the probabilities with which the signals are generated. If patients focus on one
attribute and the signal error in this attribute is lower than in the other attribute,
investing in this attribute generates “better” signals with higher probability than
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any other strategy. While focusing on attribute 2 already implies 2 < 1, we have
to additionally condition on 1 < 2 when considering focusing on attribute 1.
One might wonder what optimal strategies are in case that there is focusing
on attribute 1 but signal errors are such that 1 > 2. Focusing implies that for
any fixed beliefs, hl yields higher expected utility than lh. However, investing in
attribute 1 instead of investing in attribute 2 does not unambiguously produce
better signals with higher probability as it is the case for 1 < 2 such that optimal
provider strategies then depend on signals errors in more detail.16
The proposition implies that for strong focusing on attribute 2 it is a strictly
dominant strategy for the providers to invest in attribute 2, i.e. it is strictly
better for any strategy of the other provider and any combination of patients’
beliefs. However, if focusing is not strong, providers might be indifferent between
different resource allocations. This crucially depends on the beliefs of patients.
For symmetric beliefs about the providers’ resource allocations it is strictly better
for the providers to invest in attribute 2 when patients focus on attribute 2.
However, if patients have asymmetric beliefs, selection of the provider might be
based only on the beliefs, ignoring the signals. Then providers are indifferent
between different resource allocations. This might occur if patients believe that
providerA invested in attribute 1 and providerB in attribute 2 and the parameters
are such that patients choose provider A independent of the signals. For instance,
 = (1, 2) = (
1
2
, 0) and θ > 1
1−2p satisfy (ll|bA = 1)  (hh|bB = 0) from which
follows that patients ignore the signals and always select provider A anyway.
Proposition 3.1 directly implies that if patients focus on one attribute and
the signal error in this attribute is lower than in the other attribute, investing in
this attribute and corresponding beliefs is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Strong
focusing (and 1 < 2 for focusing on attribute 1) implies uniqueness of the respec-
tive symmetric equilibrium. However, if focusing is not strong further equilibria
might exist. Proposition 3.2 shows that the only further equilibria that might
exist are asymmetric equilibria in which patients select the provider solely based
on the beliefs and signals are irrelevant.
Proposition 3.2. Let θ, p and  = (1, 2) be such that patients...
16If a provider invests in attribute 1 instead of 2, on the positive side, signal hl is produced
with a higher probability on the cost of signal lh. On the negative side, signal ll is produced with
a higher probability on the cost of signal hh. The closer (1, 2) to the 45-degree line, the large
the positive and the smaller the negative effect is, since the difference in expected utilities of hl
and lh increases and the differences in probabilities of producing hh compared to ll decreases.
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(i) ...focus on attribute 2. Then (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) = (0, 0) is a PBE. Any
PBE with (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) 6= (0, 0) is asymmetric, i.e. aA 6= aB and
patients select provider A if and only if aA = 1. Strong focusing on attribute
2 implies that the symmetric PBE (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) = (0, 0) is unique.
Equilibrium is furthermore unique if, for a given i, setting −i = 12 implies
strong focusing on attribute i, i.e. either patients strongly focus on attribute
1 once the signal in attribute 2 is uninformative or strongly focus on attribute
2 once the signal in attribute 1 is uninformative.
(ii) ... focus on attribute 1 and 1 < 2. Then (a
A, aB) = (bA, bB) = (1, 1)
is a PBE. Any PBE with (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) 6= (1, 1) is asymmetric, i.e.
aA 6= aB and patients select provider A if and only if aA = 1. Strong focusing
on 1 implies uniqueness of the symmetric PBE (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) = (1, 1).
Proof. See appendix.
For focusing on attribute 2, Proposition 3.2 shows that the equilibrium is not
only unique under strong focusing, but also for signal errors that are such that
there would be strong focusing on one attribute if the error for the other attribute
would be set to 1
2
, i.e. if patients were not to receive an informative signal in this
attribute. This is because, if an asymmetric equilibrium exists, with consistent
beliefs signal ll from the provider with higher a is preferred to signal hh from the
other provider. This continues to hold when e.g. increasing 2. Then, however,
there is a contradiction with strong focusing, where hh is preferred to ll for any
symmetric or asymmetric beliefs. The intuition for 1 is the same.
For the cases where multiple equilibria exist, note that only the symmetric equi-
librium where both providers invest in the attribute that patients focus on is an
equilibrium in dominant strategies of the providers. Therefore, it is robust with
respect to perturbation in the patients’ beliefs as the optimal strategy is inde-
pendent of the beliefs. Furthermore, it is the only equilibrium where signals are
informative for the patients such that they matter for their provider choice. Both
reasonings might serve as a selection criterion for concentrating on symmetric
equilibria.
Corollary 3.2. Fix θ and p and consider  = (1, 2) such that patients focus on
attribute i and i < −i. Then the symmetric equilibrium where both providers in-
vest in attribute i is the only equilibrium in dominant strategies. It is furthermore
the only equilibrium where signals are informative for patients.
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3.6 Welfare and Comparative Statics
We can now discuss the welfare consequences of the patients’ focusing on at-
tributes. Note that in the model, total provider surplus is fixed. For the wel-
fare analysis, we will not consider the distribution of producer surplus between
providers and henceforth concentrate on patient welfare. Thus, we will use the
term welfare synonymous to patient welfare.
Now assume that quality (qA, qB) is realized for provider A and B (and is
unknown by the patients). We denote by Uq[(q
A, qB)|(bA, bB), ] the expected
utility of quality provision of a patient when quality (qA, qB) is realized and
the patient, under beliefs (bA, bB), chooses providers to maximize her expected
utility given signals when signals are generated with errors  = (1, 2). De-
note by W [(aA, aB)|(bA, bB), (1, 2)] welfare if providers’ resource allocations are
a = (aA, aB), patients have beliefs b = (bA, bB), receive quality signals with er-
ror  = (1, 2) and choose providers maximing expected utility given signals and
beliefs. Then
W [(aA, aB)|(bA, bB), (1, 2)] =
∑
qB
∑
qA
P(qA|aA)P(qB|aB)Uq[(qA, qB)|(bA, bB), ]
(3.1)
where P(qj|aj) is the probability that qj is realized for resource allocation aj.17
There are two key drivers of welfare in the market: Firstly, a pure quality as-
pect, i.e. the expected consumption utility without considering signals, which is
determined by the resource allocations. Secondly, a provider selection effect, i.e.
selecting the provider whose quality realizations are high, which works through
signal precision. This last one is important when considering the welfare effect of
changes in signal precision, where a lower error c.p. improves selection based on
true underlying quality. Before analyzing changes in the precision of the signals,
we first look at welfare for a given signal precision.
Lemma 3.2. Fix p and θ. For all  = (1, 2) investing in attribute 1 and corre-
sponding beliefs yields higher welfare than investing in attribute 2 and correspond-
ing beliefs, i.e.
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 2)] > W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 2)].
17Note that our welfare definition directly incorporates optimal demand side behavior given
beliefs. We could of course define Uq[(q
A, qB)|(bA, bB), ] based on patients’ actions more gener-
ally. We write welfare in this way to concentrate the analysis on the welfare effect of different
provider resource allocations and patients beliefs. Note that in the welfare definition above,
patients beliefs do not yet have to be correct, they only have to be correct when comparing
welfare in equilibrium.
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Proof. See appendix.
Thus, independent of , if both providers invest in 1 (and patients have corre-
sponding beliefs), welfare is higher than if both provider invest in 2 (and patients
have corresponding beliefs). For 1 ≤ 2, this is intuitive. For 1 > 2, there are
some opposing effects. While, by investing in 1, providers increase the probability
of quality qj = hl at the cost of qj = lh where hl yields higher utility than lh, for
high 1 and low 2 patients can barely infer information about quality realization
in attribute 1 from signals while they reasonably can for attribute 2. In aggrega-
tion, however, the quality effect dominates the signal precision effect and welfare
is higher when providers invest in attribute 1.
We already know that if  is such that patients strongly focus on attribute 2, in
the unique PBE both providers invest in attribute 2 with corresponding patients
beliefs. Thus, when patients strongly focus on attribute 2, the unique PBE is
inefficient. Under focusing on attribute 2, from Proposition 3.2 any equilibrium
that is not the equilibrium in which both providers choose a = 0 is asymmetric
and provider j is chosen if and only if aj > a−j. I.e., except for the symmetric
equilibrium with investment in attribute 2, in equilibrium a provider is chosen
with probability 1, independently of the signals that the patients receive. Then,
welfare in these equilibria is again lower compared to the situation where both
providers invest in attribute 1 and patients hold the corresponding belief, as qual-
ity provision is partly inefficient, and there is no selection based on signals. This
is summarized in Proposition 3.3 below.
Proposition 3.3. Fix p and θ. If  is such that patients focus on attribute 2, any
PBE is inefficient.
Proof. See appendix.
The interesting question is whether increasing signal precision increases welfare.
For 1 large enough we saw that by increasing the precision in the second attribute
we might move from an equilibrium where both provider invest in attribute 1 to
an equilibrium where both invest in attribute 2. From above, the latter is ineffi-
cient. The welfare effect when increasing signal precision is however not obvious
as there are two effects. On the one hand, increasing signal precision might lead
to a “worse” provision of quality. On the other hand, patients can better select
the providers with high quality realizations. In the following we show that there
exist parameter ranges such that increasing signal precision in attribute 2 for given
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1 unambiguously leads to a reduction in welfare if it induces a shift from both
providers investing in attribute 1 to both providers investing in attribute 2.
Proposition 3.4. Fix θ > θ = 1−p−p
2
1−2p , p and 1. Consider any 2 and 
′
2 such
that patients focus on attribute 2 for  = (1, 
′
2). Then the following holds
W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, ′2)] < W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 2)]
Proof. See appendix.
There is a lower bound on θ which ensures that, even for a maximal improvement
in welfare from increasing signal precision – which would be the case for a change
from 2 =
1
2
to 2 = 0 –, the effect of reducing expected quality in attribute 1
with the shift in investment dominates. Proposition 3.4 implies in particular that
if a change in 2 causes a shift from an equilibrium where both providers invest
in attribute 1 to an equilibrium where both providers invest in attribute 2, there
is an unambiguous welfare loss. This is made precise in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Fix p and θ > θ. Consider  = (1, 2) with 1 < 2 and 
′ =
(1, 
′
2) such that for  patients focus on attribute 1 and for 
′ patients focus on
attribute 2. Then an increase in the signal precision of attribute 2 from 2 to 
′
2
results in a welfare loss in the respective dominant strategy equilibrium.
If, furthermore, θ < θ < θ, consider  = (1, 2) with 1 < 2 and 
′ = (1, ′2)
such that for  patients strongly focus on attribute 1 and for ′ patients focus on
attribute 2. Then an increase in the signal precision of attribute 2 from 2 to 
′
2
results in a welfare loss in equilibrium.
For  = (1, 2) and 
′ = (1, ′2) such that patients focus on attribute 1 for  =
(1, 2) and on attribute 2 for 
′ = (1, ′2) multiple equilibria might exist. Therefore
it is a priori not clear which equilibria are selected and thus whether a reduction
in welfare occurs when lowering 2 to 
′
2. However, as discussed the symmetric
equilibrium stands out as it is the only equilibrium in dominant strategies and
robust with respect to perturbations in the beliefs. When only concentrating
on equilibria in dominant strategies, for any θ > θ the welfare loss occurs when
lowering 2 such that it induces a shift from focusing on attribute 1 to focusing
on attribute 2.
From Corollary 3.1 we know that for θ < θ = 1
1−2p there exist 1 such that for
 = (1,
1
2
) patients strongly focus on attribute 1 and for  = (1, 0) patients focus
on attribute 2. Thus, there exists  and ′ as described above. Furthermore,
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Corollary 2 and Proposition 3.2 showed that in this case the equilibria are unique.
θ > θ ensures that there is a welfare loss.
3.7 Quality Reporting
So far we assumed that patients receive informative signals from each provider for
all attributes. However, it might be a strategic choice of providers to send quality
signals in attributes, e.g. via participation in evaluations and quality reporting,
or establishment of an online feedback platform. From a policy perspective, it
is important to understand which reporting policies induce optimal outcomes.
When is it necessary to require providers to undertake quality reporting in certain
attributes or ban reporting in others? In the following we first discuss strategic
reporting of providers. We then analyze different reporting policies and compare
them to strategic reporting by providers.
Strategic reporting. To incorporate strategic quality reporting by providers,
we change the game in the following way: Whether patients receive signals about
attribute quality now depends on a reporting decision by providers. Each provider
can decide at the time of resource allocation for each attribute whether to send
signals about quality or not.18 We assume that a provider, when deciding about
reporting, again cannot influence the precision of the signals. I.e., when reporting
in attribute 1, the provider sends a signal about this attribute with error 1 and
when reporting in attribute 2 he sends a signal about this attribute with error
2. The reason that he cannot influence the signal precision is again the general
difficulty in observing, measuring and communicating quality in certain attributes.
In terms of hospital quality, think of an external report or a platform where
patients rate experienced quality in a hospital. While medical quality is rather
difficult to evaluate, non-medical quality attributes are fairly easy to rate. Note
that not reporting in attribute i is equivalent to a signal error of 1
2
in attribute i.
Providers simultaneously decide on their resource allocation a and their re-
porting r, i.e. in which attributes they want to report signals. Patients now
might not receive signals in some attribute, but they update their beliefs about
resource allocations depending on whether they receive signals in attributes. To
keep the game simple, we exploit Section 3.5’s results and restrict attention to
18Crucial here is that providers do not know their quality at the time of deciding whether to
take part in reporting. Thus, reporting is not signaling on realized quality.
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strategies19
(a, r) ∈ {(1, s1), (0, s2), (x(), s1s2), (1, none)},
where s1 (s2) stands for reporting only on attribute 1 (2) and s1s2 for reporting in
both. Furthermore, x() ∈ {0, 1} with x() = 0 if  is such that patient focusing
is on attribute 2 and x() = 1 if 1 < 2 (and therefore patient focusing is on
attribute 1 when they receive signals in both attributes). Thus, we consider the
cases that (i) no signals are sent (no reporting) and providers invest in attribute
1, (ii) a provider sends the signal in the attribute that he invested in, but not
in the other attribute (partial reporting), and (iii) signals in both attributes are
sent, and investments are in the attribute that patients focus on when receiving
signals in both attributes, given  (full reporting). Again we concentrate on pure
strategy equilibria.
How do providers strategically report and invest? Assume that  is such that if
signals are sent in both attributes, there is focusing on 2. Now consider the situa-
tion that both providers report in both attributes and invest in attribute 2. Then,
each provider is selected with probability 1
2
. Now assume a provider changes his
reporting to only reporting in attribute 2, and not reporting in attribute 1. Then,
this provider is selected with probability higher than 1
2
when playing against the
provider who is reporting in both attributes. This is because, since investments
are in attribute 2, the provider reporting in both attributes sends a low quality
signal in attribute 1 with probability higher than 1
2
, and since the signal is infor-
mative, in these cases the provider not reporting in attribute 1 is selected when
the signal in the other attribute is the same. Thus, not reporting in the ‘weak’
attribute is a profitable deviation. This logic can be generalized to show that
there are no equilibria with reporting in both attributes.
19Thereby we ensure the exclusion of implausible equilibria. For any combination of patient
beliefs when the strategy space is not restricted, i.e. for any combination of reporting and
resource allocation, any of the excluded strategies would be weakly dominated. For this note
that we know from the results in Section 3.5 that receiving a signal only in one attribute i implies
that investing in attribute i weakly dominates investing in the other attribute (keeping the
signal structure constant). With restricting strategies, we can restrict patient beliefs accordingly
and can thereby rule out implausible equilibria where dominated strategies are selected by the
providers. If no signals are reported, a provider’s action has no influence on any information the
patient receive. In this case we assume that providers invest in 1 to avoid a point of discontinuity
when considering receiving no signal in attribute 2 and facing signal errors 1 that are close to
1
2 .
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Lemma 3.3. Fix p and θ and consider  such that patients either focus on attribute
2 or they focus on attribute 1 and 1 < 2. Then, an equilibrium in which both
providers report in both attributes does not exist.
Proof. See appendix.
To determine equilibria, a crucial consideration is how patients choose providers
when one provider sends only a signal in attribute 1 (and invests in attribute 1)
and the other provider sends a signal only in attribute 2 (and invests in attribute
2). Although patients do not observe resource allocations directly, they can update
their beliefs when receiving, respectively not receiving, signals. Then, if (h · |1) 
(·h|0) (i.e. a signal of high quality in attribute 1 and no signal in attribute 2
under belief 1 yields higher expected utility than a high quality signal in attribute
2 and no signal in attribute 1 under belief 0), the provider only sending a signal
in attribute 1 is selected with probability greater than 1
2
. Then both providers
sending a signal only in attribute 2 (with investing in 2) cannot be an equilibrium,
as sending a signal only in attribute 1 is a profitable deviation. It is straightforward
to show that
(h · |1)  (·h|0) ∀  ⇔ θ > θc = 1− p
1− 2p.
This particularly also says that if θ < θc there exist , e.g.  = (1
2
, 0) and some
neighborhood, such that (·h|0)  (h · |1). Note that θ < θc < θ with θ and θ as
defined in the previous sections. We can now describe equilibria under strategic
reporting.
Proposition 3.5. (i) Fix p and θ. For any  such that 1 < 2 (and therefore
patients focus on attribute 1), in the unique PBE providers invest in attribute 1
and report only on attribute 1.
(ii) Fix p and θ > θc. Then there exist errors  such that patients focus on
attribute 2 when receiving signals in both attributes, however in the unique PBE
providers invest in attribute 1 and report only on attribute 1.
(iii) Fix p and θ < θc. Then there exist errors  such that in the unique PBE
providers invest in attribute 2 and report only on attribute 2.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3.5 states that, under strategic reporting, there exist equilibria in
which providers invest in an attribute and only publish quality signals in that
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respective attribute. Thus, it might be the case that not only resource alloca-
tion, but also information provision is inefficient. However, as the second part of
Proposition 3.5 shows, if θ > θc, strategic reporting might even result in providers
voluntarily withholding information in attribute 2 and investing in attribute 1,
although  is such that there would be focusing on 2.
To get an intuition for parts (ii) and (iii) of the proof, consider the extreme
case of 1 =
1
2
, e.g. there is no signal in attribute 1, and 2 = 0, e.g. signals in
attribute 2 are precise. Focusing on 2 when receiving both signals is therefore
satisfied as for symmetric beliefs it always yields higher expected utility when
receiving signal h in attribute 2 than signal l. Since 1 = 0 only two strategies are
relevant: reporting about attribute 2 or not. It is a strictly dominant strategy for
a provider to withhold information about attribute 2 if and only if the expected
utility for the patient is higher if resources are concentrated on attribute 1 but
she receives no signal about the realization, i.e. (1− p)θ+ p, than if resources are
concentrated on attribute 2 and she receives an exact signal about the realization
in attribute 2, i.e. pθ + 1. This holds if and only if θ > θc = 1−p
1−2p . The proof in
the appendix elaborates some more general conditions on  for which the claims
hold. Particularly, it shows that claim (ii) is not only satisfied in a neighborhood
of  = (1
2
, 0) but also once p > 1
3
and  is such that patients focus on attribute 2
and 1 > p. For claim (iii) it is crucial that  is such that (·h|0)  (h · |1).
Comparison of Reporting Policies. Since not reporting in attribute i is
equivalent to a signal error of 1
2
in attribute i, we can use of the previous sections
to determine the welfare of potential outcomes with reporting and thus optimal
outcomes.
Recall that W [a|b, ] denotes expected (patient) welfare if providers’ resource
allocations are a = (aA, aB), patients have belief b = (bA, bB) and receive quality
signals with errors  = (1, 2). Keeping the resource allocation constant and only
improving signal precision by sending a signal, we have, by the simple selection
effect, for any errors (1, 2),
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 2)] >W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 1
2
)],
W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 2)] >W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1
2
, 2)].
Furthermore, it holds that
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 2)] > W [(0, 0)|(0, 0)|(1
2
, 2)],
since here the selection and resource allocation effect go in the same direction.
For a selection and resource allocation effect going in opposite directions we know
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from Proposition 3.4, that if θ > θ and  = (1, 2) is such that patients focus on
attribute 2, signal provision only in attribute 1 (with investing in 1) yields higher
welfare than signal provision in both attributes and investing in 2, i.e.
W [(1, 1), (1, 1), (1,
1
2
)] > W [(0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 2)].
Put together, an equilibrium where both providers invest in attribute 2 and report
only in attribute 2 is welfare dominated by an equilibrium in which providers
invest in attribute 2 but report in both attributes. Whether investing in attribute
1 and reporting only in 1 dominates full reporting and investing in 2 depends on
θ and . From section 3.6 we know that for θ > θ it holds for all . However,
even for θ < θ, as long as θ is not too small, reporting only in attribute 1 and
both providers allocating resources in 1 might still yield higher welfare than full
reporting with investment in attribute 2. In particular, for any given , there
exists θˆ() ≤ θ such that for θ > θˆ(), reporting in 1 and investing in 1 is the
optimal outcome, and for θ < θˆ(), full reporting and investing in 2 is the optimal
outcome.20
With the analysis of equilibria under strategic reporting and the welfare con-
siderations above, we can now compare welfare of different reporting policies. A
reporting policy describes for each attribute whether signal reporting is voluntary,
mandatory or banned. Whenever we call a policy mandatory reporting in attribute
i or banning reporting in attribute i it implies that reporting in the other attribute
is a voluntary decision of the providers.
Proposition 3.6. (i) Fix p and θ. For any  such that 1 < 2 (and therefore
patients focus on attribute 1), mandatory full reporting is optimal and strictly
increases welfare compared to voluntary reporting in both attributes.
(ii) Fix p and θ > θc. Let  be such that patients focus on attribute 2 when
receiving signals in both attributes, and in the unique PBE under voluntary re-
porting in both attributes there is reporting only in attribute 1. Then, voluntary
reporting in both attributes is already optimal. Banning reporting in attribute 2 as
well as mandating reporting in attribute 1 are both optimal. Any policy mandating
reporting in attribute 2 is not optimal.
(iii) Fix p and θ < θc. Let  be such that reporting only in attribute 2 is
the unique PBE under strategic reporting. For θ > θˆ(), mandating reporting in
20Consider any  and θ. If reporting in 1 and investing in 1 and dominates full reporting
and investing in 2, it does as well for any θ′ > θ. If full reporting and investing in 2 dominates
reporting in 1 and investing in 1 it does as well for any θ′ < θ. Since we face the first case for
all θ > θ and the second one for θ close enough to one, we can find such θˆ().
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attribute 1 strictly increases welfare compared to voluntary reporting in both at-
tributes but is not necessarily an optimal policy. Banning reporting in attribute
2 is optimal. For θ < θˆ(), mandating full reporting is optimal while voluntary
reporting as well as banning reporting in attribute 2 are not optimal. Banning re-
porting in attribute 2 might even decrease welfare compared to voluntary reporting
in both attributes.
Proof. See appendix.
Note that, directly implied by the welfare discussion above, reporting in attribute
1 is always part of an optimal reporting policy, even if the signal precision in
attribute 1 is very low. The proposition above shows that different policies might
lead to optimal reporting in equilibrium. For some parameter constellations it is
even not necessary to intervene with a specific policy to reach optimal reporting
as providers might already voluntarily withhold information in attribute 2 when
desirable from a welfare maximizing perspective. This occurs despite focussing on
attribute 2 when patients receive signals in both attributes.
Proposition 3.6 also shows that mandating reporting in 1 might require at the
same time to regulate reporting in attribute 2. Depending on the parameters it
might be necessary to ban signals in attribute 2 or to mandate them.
From our discussion about difficulties in measuring and communicating medical
quality compared to other attributes of a health care service, a particularly rele-
vant case is the situation where the signal is imprecise on attribute 1 but fairly
precise on attribute 2. To emphasize this case, we will summarize the results for
high 1 and low 2 in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. Fix p and θ. Then for all errors  = (1, 2) close enough to
(1
2
, 0), patients focus on attribute 2 and for
(i) θ > θc, voluntary reporting, mandatory reporting in attribute 1 as well as ban-
ning reporting in 2 are optimal policies. Mandatory full reporting is not optimal.
(ii) θ < θ < θc, banning reporting in attribute 2 is necessary and sufficient for
optimal reporting.
(iii) θ < θ, mandatory reporting on attribute 1 as well as mandatory full reporting
are optimal policies, whereas banning reporting on attribute 2 is not.
Thus, considering signals that are very precise in attribute 2 but very imprecise
in attribute 1, for high and low θ mandating reporting in 1 is already optimal.
θ > θc implies for errors close enough to  = (1, 2) providers voluntarily withhold
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information about attribute 2 which corresponds to optimal reporting. For θ <
θ optimal reporting is sending both signals. However, for errors close enough
to  = (1, 2), providers voluntarily also send information in attribute 2 when
information in attribute 1 is mandated. For intermediate θ, i.e. θ < θ < θc, it
is not sufficient to mandate information in attribute 1 to yield optimal reporting.
In this case it is necessary to control signals in attribute 2 by banning them.
For medical services, our results then imply that if the information structure
is such that medical quality signals are imprecise but signals on amenities precise
it depends on how important medical care compared to the other dimensions is
whether or not optimal reporting includes attribute 2. Mandating information
in attribute 1 yields optimal reporting except for some intermediate θ where an
additional ban in attribute 2 is necessary.
3.8 Discussion
In this section, we will discuss the consequences of relaxing several modeling as-
sumptions as well as extensions. We will first discuss (i) symmetries in the quality
realization technology and (ii) symmetries across providers before discussing how
to (iii) model the technology for splitting the resources or mixing strategies and
the consequences of (iv) correlation in quality realizations. Finally, we discuss (v)
observability of the providers’ resource allocations for patients and (vi) hetero-
geneity in θ.
Symmetries in quality realization. To keep the model tractable, it incorpo-
rates two symmetries about how the resource allocation impacts the quality real-
ization, (1) a symmetric impact of the resource allocation on quality realization
across attributes and that (2) quality realization probabilities are symmetrically
spread around 1
2
. We will shortly discuss both in the following. Both symmetries
arise from the assumption
P(qj1 = h|aj) = (1− p)aj + p(1− aj) = P(qj2 = h|1− aj).
We do not need the symmetries for our qualitative results - the symmetries rather
shift thresholds but do not change the qualitative claims. In the following we
explain how the symmetries can be removed and the implications of allowing for
asymmetries.
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Symmetric impact of resource allocation on quality realization across
attributes. We assume that for any resource allocation decision aj the prob-
ability that high quality is realized in attribute 1 equals the probability of high
quality realization in attribute 2 if resources are allocated according to 1 − aj,
i.e. P(q1 = h|aj) = P(q2 = h|1 − aj). The parameter p can be interpreted as a
measure of how effective resources in both attributes are for quality realization.
Our assumption therefore reflects a symmetry across the two attribute meaning
that resources have the same impact of quality realization for both attributes.
One way to give up this assumption is to consider different parameters p1, p2 ∈
(0, 1
2
) for the effectiveness of the resource allocation for both attributes, particu-
larly
P(q1 = h|aj) = (1− p1)aj + p1(1− aj)
P(q2 = h|1−aj) = (1− p2)aj + p2(1− aj).
Once p1 is smaller than p2 resources are more effective in attribute 1 than in
attribute 2 on quality realization and the other way around. This additional
asymmetry does not qualitatively change our results but would only add one
additional asymmetry across attributes in addition to signal errors  and relevance
θ to our model. Thus, p1 < p2 would additionally favor investments in attribute
1 while p1 > p2 would favor investments in attribute 2. This produces a shift in
the borders of focusing as well as when investing in one attribute is a dominant
strategy. The smaller the difference between p1 and p2, the closer we come to the
presented results. However, since this source of asymmetry across attributes is
not the focus of our work we do not include it into our basic model while being
aware that technological asymmetries across attributes exist in applications.
Quality realization probabilities symmetrically spread around 1
2
. The
second symmetry behind our assumption on how aj impacts quality realization is
that the probability that high (low) quality in an attribute is realized investing
in i and the probability that high (low) quality is realized investing in the other
attribute add up to one, i.e. P(qi = h|aj) = 1 − P(qi = h|1 − aj). It can be
interpreted as a symmetry across low and high quality realization.
This symmetry can be given up by assuming instead
P(q1 = h|aj) = ajp+ (1− aj)p = P(q2 = h|1− aj) with p < p
Here, the probability 1− p of high quality realization in the attribute a provider
invested in is replaced by p and the probability p of high quality realization in the
attribute the provider did not invest in is replaced by p. Then, resources are still
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equally effective in both attributes (see discussion point above), but probabilities
of high quality realization in one attribute for aj and 1 − aj are not any more
symmetrically spread around 1
2
. Particularly, if both p and p are rather high, the
probability that high quality is realized in one attribute is high independently of
whether the provider invested in the attribute or not (and the probability of low
quality realization is low). For p and p both being rather low, the probability
that high quality is realized in one attribute is low independently of the provider’s
action.
In the following we argue that our qualitative results do not change but only
critical values for θ or  might change. For this, we first consider how the error
space is divided into focusing areas (see Lemma 3.1). For any fixed (p, p) and θ, we
again can describe separating lines by monotonically increasing functions. Again,
an area of focusing on attribute 2 and attribute 1 and an area of strong focusing
on attribute 1 always exist. The area of strong focusing on attribute 2 exists if and
only if θ < 1
p−p . Thus, the general characteristics of the separating lines for the
focusing areas remain the same. The incentives for the providers do not change
and thus, Proposition 3.1 can be formulated in the same way. Particularly, once
patients focus on one attribute and the signal error in this attribute is smaller
than in the other attribute, it is a weakly dominant strategy to invest in this
attribute. Strong focusing implies strict dominance.
Considering welfare implications, what has to be adjusted is the critical value
θ above which the negative welfare effect of a shift in resources from attribute 1
to attribute 2 dominates the positive welfare effects from selection improvements
when increasing signal precision in attribute 2. Particularly, θ =
1−(1−p)2−p
p−p .
Symmetric providers. We consider symmetric providers in the sense that both
face the same signal errors and the same realization probabilities for a resource
allocation decision aj. If we assumed asymmetric provider in the sense that they
might differ in  and p the main drivers of the model are the same. What changes
is that the focusing areas of patients might differ across providers. However, if
for both providers patients (strongly) focus on the same attribute there is no
qualitative difference in the results except that the bounds for the critical θ might
change. If for one provider the patient focuses on one attribute and for the other
provider on the other attribute, only asymmetric equilibria might exist.
Splitting resources and mixing strategies. We let the providers choose
among investing their fixed resources either in attribute 1 or in attribute 2, i.e.
they choose aj ∈ {0, 1}. A natural way to extend the set of strategies is to consider
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divisible resources and allow providers to choose aj ∈ [0, 1]. We then interpret aj
as a share aj of the resources being invested in attribute 1 while the other part is
invested in attribute 2. The implications of allowing for a budget split crucially
depend on how a budget split translates into quality realization probabilities.
Once the probability of high quality realization is concave enough in the share of
resources invested in this attribute, splitting resources is not effective enough for
high quality realizations and the game we considered in our basic model would
basically remain the same. However, there are several other options of how to
interpret a budget split in terms of quality realization probabilities, two of which
we discuss below. In both cases, the multi-attribute character of the good is im-
portant. Furthermore, we show that at least for small θ and errors close enough
to (1, 2) = (
1
2
, 0) our results continue to hold.
Mixing strategies. One way to interpret the budget split is interpreting it as mixing
strategies aj ∈ {0, 1}. Then, quality realization for any aj ∈ [0, 1] can be denoted
as
P(q1q2|aj) = ajP(q1q2|aj = 1) + (1− aj)P(q1q2|aj = 0).
Particularly, realization probabilities for an equal budget split of aj = 1
2
are P(ll) =
P(hh) = p(1−p) and P(hl) = P(lh) = 1
2
−p(1−p). Since furthermore P(q1 = h) =
P(q2 = h) = 12 , for a
j 6∈ {0, 1} quality realization in the attributes is not any more
independent but negatively correlated (see also discussion about correlation).
Now we consider errors  that are close enough to (1
2
, 0). For the extreme case
of  = (1
2
, 0), signals in attribute 1 are uninformative while signals in attribute
2 are precise. However, in contrast to our basic model where quality realization
is always independent in each attribute, a signal of high quality in attribute 2 is
not unambiguously good. Whenever patients believed that a provider mixed, i.e.
aj ∈ (0, 1) a signal h in attribute 2 does not only indicate high quality in attribute
2, but, at the same time indicates that the probability of high quality in attribute
1 is lower than the probability of low quality in attribute 1.
As long as θ is very small, s2 = h yields higher expected utility than s2 = l.
This implies that concentrating resources on 2 is a dominant strategy and our
previous results remain valid. However, if θ is very large, depending on the be-
liefs of patients, s2 = l might yield higher expected utility than s2 = h. Then,
providers have an incentive to concentrate their resources on attribute 1 and it is
not valid any more that for errors close enough to (1
2
, 0), concentrating resources
on attribute 2 is a dominant strategy.
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Budget split with keeping independent realization. An alternative way how a bud-
get split aj ∈ [0, 1] translates into quality realization probabilities is keeping the
independent quality realization across attributes and defining the quality realiza-
tion probability in attribute i as
P (qi = h|aj) = ajP(qi = h|aj = 1) + (1− aj)P(qi = h|aj = 0).
The characteristics of the focusing areas generally remain the same, except that
the areas of focusing on 1 and 2 will slightly shrink. For 1 =
1
2
, f 1(1
2
) decreases
and f 2(1
2
) increases compared to our basic model. Particularly, there will be an
area where patients neither focus on attribute 1 nor on attribute 2. However, the
areas of strong focusing remain exactly the same as before because aj ∈ {0, 1}
will be the extreme cases that define the borders.
What might not remain the same are investment incentives. This is because a
budget split makes a quality realization of hh more likely compared to a concen-
tration of resources on 1 or 2. For aj = 1
2
all possible quality levels are realized
with equal probability. Particularly, the probability that hh (as well as ll) is
realized is 1
4
while it is p(1 − p) for investing in 1 or investing in 2. Thus, the
probabilities for hh and ll increase when splitting the budget while the sum of the
probabilities for hl and lh decrease.
However, as long as the signal errors are close enough to  = (1
2
, 0), it is a
dominant strategy to concentrate resources on attribute 2. This is because putting
more resources on attribute 1 has only marginal effects on signals in attribute 1
while putting more resources on attribute 2 significantly increases the probability
of high quality signals in attribute 2 (when patients’ beliefs are fixed and with it
expected utilities of a specific signal). Thus, our results remain the same at least
for errors close enough to  = (1
2
, 0).
Independent quality realization. We assume that quality is realized indepen-
dently for both attributes. One might think of settings where quality realization in
both attributes is correlated, i.e. the probability that high quality is realized dif-
fers depending on whether high or low quality was realized in the other attribute.
This might be either a positive or negative correlation.
Consider the case of a positive correlation. Focusing can be defined analogously
and for focusing on 2 it still holds that investing in 2 is a dominant strategy and
equilibria are inefficient. The area for focusing on 2 might be even larger than
for independent quality realization. However, whether increasing signal precision
in attribute 2 results in a welfare loss depends on how strong the correlation is.
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For strong correlations, the selection effect might always dominate the investment
effect.
When there is a negative correlation, the mechanisms differ. Again, we can
define focusing on attribute 2 as before. However, a signal hh might yield lower
expected utility than a signal hl. For a low error in attribute 2, a high error in
attribute 1 and a strong negative correlation, a signal hl is an indicator for high
quality in attribute 1, while hh indicates low quality in attribute 1. Those effects
might result in the area of focusing on 2 being smaller than before, particularly,
patients might not always focus for (1, 2) = (
1
2
, 0). However, if it is an equilib-
rium that both providers invest in 2 the welfare loss when varying 2 might be
even larger.
Observable Resource Allocation. In our model, patients have beliefs about
the providers’ resource allocations. In the following, we investigate how our results
change if patients can observe the resource allocation, but still do not observe the
realization of quality and again receives signals about it. The main difference to
the case where the resource allocation is unobservable is that by choosing a par-
ticular a the providers now send additional information. This has the following
effect: Under unobservable provider choice in Proposition 3.1, for a certain belief
of a patient a change in a provider’s action did not change the expected utility of
a signal, but only the probabilities with which the signals are generated. When a
is however observable, a change in a provider’s action also changes the expected
utility of a particular signal.
Then, for parameter constellations where investing in attribute 2 is a strictly dom-
inant strategy under non-observability of provider choice, investing in attribute
1 might be a strictly dominant strategy once resource allocations are observable,
since patients now update with the investment choice and demand shifts more
strongly. If this is the case, the inefficiency from low expected quality in attribute
1 in equilibrium disappears once the resource allocations are observable. Whether
this change occurs depends on the probability e2 = 2(1−p)+p(1− 2) that a low
signal for attribute 2 is generated if the provider invests in attribute 2. For low e2,
i.e. if the probability that a high signal is generated in attribute 2 remains high,
observability of investments does not influence the equilibrium outcome as invest-
ing in attribute 2 remains more profitable. However, for large e2 the equilibrium
might differ.
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Proposition 3.7. (Observable Resource Allocation) Fix θ < 1
1−2p . Let  = (1, 2)
be such that patients strongly focus on attribute 2. Define e2 = 2(1−p)+p(1−2).
If e2 < 1 −
√
1
2
investing in attribute 2 is a strictly dominant strategy such that
the corresponding symmetric PBE is unique.
If e2 >
3−√5
2
investing in attribute 1 is a strictly dominant strategy such that
the corresponding symmetric PBE is unique.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.7 is that if p or 2 are rather large (which
implies that e2 is rather large), investing in attribute 2 does not payoff for the
provider as the probability that only a low signal in attribute 2 is generated is
high. On the other hand, for non-observable resource allocations with given pa-
tients’ beliefs, investing in attribute 2 might be a dominant strategy as for this
only that 2 is small enough is crucial. If e2 is intermediate such that it is not
covered by the bounds presented in the proposition, it depends on the specific
combination of the parameters whether investing in attribute 1 or investing in
attribute 2 is strictly dominant.
From a welfare perspective, observable resource allocations could enhance effi-
ciency in equilibrium as increasing precision in the less important attribute might
not induce the negative resource allocation effect under observable resource allo-
cations. However, it requires that e2 is large enough. Applying it to our leading
example of attribute 2 representing amenities etc., we rather expect a high prob-
ability that investments in this attribute are reflected in the signal, i.e. e2 is low.
Furthermore, it might be difficult for patients to interpret resource allocations
directly.
Assumption of homogeneous θ. We set-up the model to particularly look
at a situation where patients are homogeneous and all have a higher utility from
high quality in one attribute, i.e. where results are not driven by heterogeneous
patient valuations for attributes. However, patients might of course differ in the
utility θ of high quality in the first attribute compared to high quality in the
second attribute.21 For different clinical areas different θ hold. For instance, θ
for patients suffering from cancer should be rather high as clinical factors are
21Note that ex-post differences in θ, i.e. differences that occur after the decision for a provider,
can be considered as being already incorporated in θ when interpreting utilities for each quality
state as expected utilities. Reasons for ex-post heterogeneity includes e.g. differences in quality
perception.
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much more important than amenities. On the other hand, for births θ might be
rather low as generally not many complications are expected. Our results than
can be applied for each health area separately. In areas with a high θ investing in
attribute 1 is an equilibrium while in areas with a low θ investing in attribute 2
might be an equilibrium.
Even within one area θ might differ among patients. Reasons might be differ-
ences in individual preferences or the severity of the individual patient’s health
case. Consider any signal error  = (1, 2) with 2 < 1. This implies that there
is a threshold θ2 such that for θ < θ2 the patients strongly focus on attribute 2.
It is clear that if for each patient c ∈ C, θk < θ2 holds, investing in attribute 2
is a dominant strategy. Analogously, there is a threshold θ1 such that if for each
patient c ∈ C, θk > θ1 holds, investing in attribute 1 is a dominant strategy. Gen-
erally, which effect dominates depends on the distribution of θ in the population.
If the mass of patients whose θ is below (above) the respective critical thresholds
is sufficiently large, then investing in attribute 2 (1) is an equilibrium outcome.
3.9 Conclusion
We model quality competition among health care providers in a market where
health care services have multiple quality attributes and patients observe attribute
quality only imperfectly before deciding on a provider. A patient focuses on a
particular attribute if a high quality signal in this attribute drives her provider
choice. Focusing is strong if this is the case for all combinations of beliefs that
the patient has about the underlying resource allocations of providers. We show
that, even if high quality in one attribute is less important in terms of patient
utility, patients might focus on this attribute such that providers invest in quality
improvement in this attribute. If signal precision is such that patients focus on
this less important attribute, any equilibrium is inefficient. An increase in signal
precision can then lead to a welfare reduction as the positive effect of a better
provider selection from an increase in signal precision might be overcompensated
by the negative effect that a shift in patient focusing has on provider quality choice.
When providers can choose reporting in the form of sending informative signals
strategically, we furthermore show that providers do not report in all attributes
such that not only resource allocations, but also reporting might be inefficient.
In health care, there has been an increase in the availability of information
about provider quality via e.g. quality reporting requirements or public feedback
platforms. For hospital report cards, most empirical literature finds positive but
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small patient reactions to publicized quality information. Our model is fully
consistent with the positive demand effect: if quality reporting reduces signal error
only in the medical attribute, it unambiguously increases welfare if the effect is
strong enough. However, reporting requirements or the increasing availability of
public feedback platforms often also improve the precision of information about
other dimensions. Better overall information about health care providers might
however imply a higher relative precision of information in the less important
quality attributes like the hotel properties of hospitals, with adverse effects on
quality. For overall welfare, the quality reporting policy is crucial. While under
optimal reporting signals in the more important attributes are always published,
banning reporting in less important attributes might be necessary.
3.10 Appendix
Preliminaries
Before turning to the proofs we introduce a notation that will be helpful to calcu-
late the expected utilities Us[s|1, ] and Us[s|0, ] when receiving a signal s, facing
signal errors  and having a belief b = 1 or b = 0.
Quality realizes independently for each attribute. Therefore, we can calculate the
expected utilities separately for each attribute for b ∈ {0, 1}. To calculate and
compare expected utilities the following function will be useful to us.
f(y, z) :=
yz
yz + (1− y)(1− z) for y ∈ [0, 1], z ∈ (0, 1)
The function f(y, z) has the following properties
• f(y, z) = f(z, y) and f(y, z) is increasing in y and in z
• f(y, z) + f(1− y, 1− z) = 1
• f(y, 1 − z) − f(y, z) = f(1 − y, 1 − z) − f(1 − y, z) is decreasing in z and
symmetrically spread around y = 1
2
. For z < 1
2
it is increasing in y ∈ (0, 1
2
)
and decreasing in y ∈ (1
2
, 1), analogously for z > 1
2
it is decreasing in
y ∈ (0, 1
2
) and increasing in y ∈ (1
2
, 1).
To see how the function is related to expected utilities when observing signals
consider any signal si about quality in attribute i, any corresponding signal error
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i and any belief b ∈ {0, 1} the patients might have. The expected utility Usi
when observing si ∈ {l, h} in attribute i then is
Usi [si|b, i] = P(qi = h|si, b)ui(qi = h)
=
P(si|qi = h)P(qi = h|b)
P(si|b) ui(qi = h)
=
P(si|qi = h)P(qi = h|b)
P(si|qi = h)P(qi = h|b) + P(si|qi = l)P(qi = l|b)ui(qi = h)
= f(y(si), z(i))ui(qi = h) with y = P(si|qi = h) and z = P(qi = h|b)
y(si = h) = 1 − i and y(si = l) = i. zi is the probability that high quality is
served in attribute i, therefore z1 = 1− z2 = 1− p if b = 1 and z1 = 1− z2 = p if
b = 0. Thus, whenever patients receive a signal s = s1s2 from any provider and
have a belief b ∈ {0, 1} the expected utility if choosing this provider is as follows.
Us[s1s2|1, ] = f(y(s1), 1− p)θ + f(y(s2), p) with y(si = h) = 1− i = 1− y(si = l)
Us[s1s2|0, ] = f(y(s1), p)θ + f(y(s2), 1− p) with y(si = h) = 1− i = 1− y(si = l)
Proof of Lemma 3.1
To define the separating lines for the areas of focusing, the difference in expected
utilities when observing signal hl with underlying belief b ∈ {0, 1} and signal lh
with underlying belief b′ ∈ {0, 1} is crucial. It will be convenient to use beliefs
about the probability x of high quality realization in attribute 1 instead of beliefs
b about the resource allocation. Then, x = 1− p for b = 1 and x = p for b = 0. In
the following, when we use b we refer to the beliefs b ∈ {0, 1} about the actions of
the providers and when we use x we refer to corresponding beliefs x ∈ {p, 1− p}
about the high quality realization in attribute 1. We define
g(x, x′, 12) = Us[hl, b, 12]− Us[lh, b′, 12] (3.2)
= [f(1−1, x)−f(1, x′)]θ − [f(1−2, 1−x′)−f(2, 1−x)](3.3)
= [f(1−1, x)−f(1, x′)]θ − [f(1−2, x)−f(2, x′)] (3.4)
where f is defined in the preliminaries and the last inequality is implied by the
characteristics of f .
The sign of g is important for the focusing of the patients since (hl|b)  (lh|b)⇔
g(b, b′, 12) > 0 and (lh|b′)  (hl|b) ⇔ g(b, b′, 12) < 0. Equation (3.4) together
with the fact that f(y, z) is strictly increasing in y for z 6= 0 we can deduce that
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g(b, b′, 1, 2) ist strictly decreasing in 1 and strictly increasing in 2. Therefore,
if for (∗1, 
∗
2) a patient (strictly) focuses on attribute 2 he (strictly) focuses on
attribute 2 for all (1, 
∗
2) with 1 > 
∗
1 and (
∗
1, 2) with 2 < 
∗
2 as well. The same
holds for (strict) focusing on attribute 1 with reversed signs.
Definition of the separating lines. We use the function g to describe the
separating lines of the four focusing areas. For a fixed 2 define 
∗
1(x, x
′) as the
unique root of g(x, x′, ·2) if existent and 12 otherwise. If existent, the root is
unique because of the monotonicity characteristics.
• f s2(2) = maxx,x′{∗1(x, x′)|x, x′ ∈ {p, 1− p}}
• f 2(2) = maxx{∗1(x, x)|x ∈ {p, 1− p}}
• f 1(2) = minx{∗1(x, x)|x ∈ {p, 1− p}}
• f s1(2) = minx,x′{∗1(x, x′)|x, x′ ∈ {p, 1− p}}
Once we show that f 2 = f 1 and define f 12 = f 1 = f 2, the focusing behavior as
described in the lemma follows by the definitions of the functions. For this note
that 1 = 0 implies g = θ− [f(1−2), x)−f(2, x′)] > 0 independent of the beliefs.
Characteristics of the separating lines. Since g is continuous and monoton-
ically decreasing in 1 and increasing in 2 the functions f
i are continuous and
increasing in 2. The more specific characteristics are as follows.
Focusing on 1 or 2: For any symmetric beliefs, g can be described by
g(x, x, 12) = [f(1− 1, x)− f(1, x)]θ − [f(1− 2, x)− f(2, x)].
g(b, b, 02) = θ − [f(1− 2, x)− f(2, x)] > 0 and g(b, b, 122) = 0− [f(1− 2, x)−
f(2, x)] ≤ 0. Strict monotonicity of g in 1 therefore implies that there exists a
unique root ∗1(x, x) such that g(x, x, 
∗
12) = 0. Furthermore, since f(1− i, x)−
f(i, x) = f(1 − i, 1 − x) − f(i, 1 − x) the unique root ∗1 of g(b, b, 12) is the
same for b = 0 and b = 1. Thus, we can define f 12 = f 1 = f 2 = ∗1(1 − p, 1 − p).
For 2 =
1
2
we have f 12(1
2
) = 1
2
.
Since θ > 1, for any 2 the function g(x, x, 12) can only be 0 if 1 ≥ 2. Thus,
f 1 = f 2 lies above the 45-degree line and patients focus on 1 for any errors with
1 ≤ 2.
Strong focusing on 2: Consider θ = 1
1−2p . Then, for any beliefs x, x
′ we get
g(x, x′, 1
2
0) = (x − x′) 1
1−2p − 1 ≤ 0 with equality for x = 1 − 2p and x′ = p.
122 3. QUALITY PROVISION AND REPORTING
Therefore, for θ > 1
1−2p there always exist beliefs such that no root exist and
therefore f s2(2) =
1
2
for all 2. No assume θ <
1
1−2p . Particularly, 0 < f
s2(0) < 1
2
.
and f s2(1
2
) = 1
2
. Define ∗2 such that g(1 − p, p, 12∗2) = 0. Then the following
holds: 0 < ∗2 <
1
2
and for all 2 > 
∗
2 no root of g(1− p, p, ·∗2) exists and therefore
f s2(2) =
1
2
for all 2 > 
∗
2.
Strong focusing on 1: For 1 = 0 the function g is always larger than zero (inde-
pendent of the belief and 2). For 1 =
1
2
we have g(p, 1− p, 1
2
2) < 0 independent
of 2. Therefore, the minimum root of g(x, x
′, ·2) is always larger than zero and
smaller than 1
2
which shows 0 < f s1(2) <
1
2
for all 2. For 2 = 0 the function g
has the form
g(x, x′, 12) = [f(1− 1, x)− f(1, x′)]θ − 1.
The smallest root ∗1 occurs for beliefs that minimize g. This is the case for
x = p and x′ = 1 − p. Therefore, f s1(0) = ∗1 with ∗1 being the root of g =
f(1− 1, p)− f(1, 1− p)θ − 1. This shows that f s1(0) < p because for 1 = p it
is still negative. The same argument holds to show that f s1(1
2
) > p.
Remark. Comparable to focusing on 1 or 2 we can more explicitly specify the
separating lines for strong focusing by defining f s2 = ∗1(1− p, p) if the root exists
and f s2 = 1
2
otherwise and f s1 = ∗1(p, 1− p).
For strong focusing on 2 note that we already know that strong focusing on 2
implies that 1 ≤ 2. However, for all 1 ≤ 2, Us[s|1, ] ≤ Us[s|0, ]. This is
because
(s|1)  (s|0) ⇔ [f(1, 1− p)− f(1, p)]θ > f(2, 1− p)− f(2, p). (3.5)
Here, we again exploited the characteristics of f described in the preliminaries.
Therefore, g(x, x′, ) is maximal for x = 1− p and x = p and it is sufficient to find
the root for this combination of beliefs.
For strong focusing on 1 errors can be such that 1 ≤ 2 and for any fixed 2 we
have (s|1)  (s|0) for high 1 and (s|0)  (s|1) for low 1. However, as (3.5) shows
for any 2 fixed such that this ambivalence exists, there is a unique ˆ1 such that for
 = (ˆ1, 2), (hl|1) = (hl|0) which is equivalent to (lh|1) = (lh|0). Furthermore, for
 = (ˆ1, 2) patients focus on 1 because the error in attribute 1 has to be smaller
than the error in attribute 2. Then, for  = (ˆ1, 2) the patient also strongly
focuses on attribute 1 since (hl|1)  (lh|1) = (lh|0) and (hl|0) > (lh|0) = (lh|1).
This implies that f s1(2) lies above ˆ1 and that the line of strong focusing can be
defined as f s1 = ∗1(0, 1).
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Dependence on θ. First, consider θ → 1. Then the function g converges to
g(x, x′, 12) = [f(1− 1, x)− f(1, x′)]− [f(1− 2, 1− x′)− f(2, 1− x)]
For any beliefs x and x′ the function g is zero if and only if 1 = 2 (it can be
easily seen that it holds for x = x′. Analogously, it holds for x = p and x′ = 1− p
as well as for x = 1− p and x′ = p). Thus
(hl|0) = (lh|1) = (hl|1) = (lh|0).
Therefore, for θ → 1 the expected utilities when observing hl or lh are the same
independent of the underlying beliefs and thus all separating functions converge
to
f s2(2) = f
12(2) = f
s1(2) = 2.
Second, consider θ → ∞. For f s2 we have already seen that f s2 = 1
2
for all
θ > 1
1−2p . If x = x
′ and θ is arbitrary high, the function g is always positive
except for the case that 1 =
1
2
. Therefore, f 12 = 1
2
as well. For other beliefs, the
minimum 1 for which the function g with θ → ∞ is zero, is 1 = p. Therefore,
f s1 converges to f s1(1) = p.
Proof of Corollary 3.1
The first part of the corollary is directly implied by the characteristics of the
separating lines discussed in the previous lemma: If 1 is large enough, patients
focus on 2 for 2 = 0. For 2 =
1
2
they anyway focus on 1.
For the second part of the corollary is sufficient to show that for  = (p, 0) and
θ < 1
1−2p the patient focuses on attribute 2. This is sufficient because the Lemma
implies that for  = (p, 1
2
) the patient strongly focuses on attribute 1.
For  = (p, 0) and any belief x we have to show that (lh|x) > (hl|x) for
θ < 1
1−2p . (lh|1) > (hl|1) is equivalent to f(p, 1− p)θ+ 1 < f(1− p, 1− p)θ. This
is equivalent to θ < (1−p)
2+p2
1−2p . As for all p, (1 − p)2 + p2 > 1 it is sufficient to
choose θ < 1
1−2p .
Proof of Proposition 3.1
First, we show that for focusing on attribute i in combination with errors i < −i
and any beliefs and the other provider’s strategy, investing in i is a weakly better
strategy than investing in the other attribute. Second, we show that this implies
weak dominance of investing in i, i.e. with the first part it remains to show that
there is at least one combination of beliefs and the other providers’ strategy such
124 3. QUALITY PROVISION AND REPORTING
that investing i is strictly better than investing in the other attribute. Third, we
show that strong focusing on i and i < −i imply strict dominance, i.e. investing
in attribute i is strictly better for all beliefs and the other provider’s strategy.
Investing in i is weakly better than investing in −i. The main idea is that,
independent of whether the provider invests in attribute 1 or attribute 2, the same
signals are generated. For given beliefs, the expected utility of each possible signal
does not depend on the allocation decision. What does depend on the allocation
decision is the probability of each signal. For focusing on attribute i investing in
i generates ”better signals” (i.e. they yield a higher expected utility for patients)
with higher probability compared to investing in the other attribute.
Focusing on attribute 1 and 1 < 2 : Assume each patient has any belief (b
A, bB)
about the providers’ strategy (possibly not the same for each provider and beliefs
might differ across patients). Let provider B have any strategy (possibly not
known to provider A). We have to show that it is a weakly dominant strategy for
provider A to invest in attribute 1, i.e., aA = 1.
Each patient either receives signal ll, lh, hl or hh from provider A. Independent
of her belief bA about provider A’s resource allocation, focusing on 1 implies
that each patient faces the following ordering of signals with respect to expected
utilities if received from provider A:
(hh|bA)  (hl|bA)  (lh|bA)  (ll|bA).
The expected utility of a patient receiving s from provider A and having belief bA
is
Us[s|bA, ] =
∑
q
u(q)P(q|s, bA, ).
Importantly, the allocation decision of the providers does not influence the ex-
pected utilities that patients with a belief bA are facing when receiving a signal s.
However, the probabilities of the signals depend on the allocation decision of the
provider. For aA = 1 and 1 ≤ 2 the ordering is
P(s = lh|1) < P(s = ll|1) ≤ P(s = hh|1) < P(s = hl|1).
For aA = 0 this ordering is reversed with P(s = lh|0) = P(s = hl|1), P(s =
hh|0) = P(ll|1), P(s = ll|0) = P(s = hh|1) and P(s = hl|0) = P(s = lh|1).
Thus, for choosing aA = 1 instead of aA = 0 some part of the probability of
s = ll is shifted to hh, and from s = lh to s = hl (better signals have more
weight). Therefore, for any allocation strategy of B, provider A is selected by any
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patient with weakly higher probability when choosing aA = 1 instead of aA = 0.
This holds independent of the beliefs b about the allocation decision of A and B.22
Focusing on attribute 2: The approach is the same as above. Note that focusing
on attribute 2 immediately implies that 1 > 2. If patients focus on attribute 2
the signal ordering for any belief bA is the following
(hh|bA)  (lh|bA)  (hl|bA)  (ll|bA).
The signal probabilities for playing aA = 1 have the ordering
P(s = lh|1) < P(s = hh|1) ≤ P(s = ll|1) < P(s = hl|1).
Here we used that 1 > 2 holds. For choosing a
A = 0 the ordering reverses with
P(s = lh|0) = P(s = hl|1), P(s = hh|0) = P(ll|1), P(s = ll|0) = P(s = hh|1)
and P(s = hl|0) = P(s = lh|1). Thus, in this case aA = 0 influences the signal
probabilities such that better signals have higher probabilities.
Focusing implies weak dominance. Take any symmetric belief (bA, bB) = (b, b)
of the patients and any strategy aB of provider B. We assume that parameters
are such that patients focus on 2. It is then sufficient to show that it is strictly
better for A to invest in 2 than to invest in 1.
Assume that B sends a signal sB = hl. If A sends hl as well, A is selected
with probability 1
2
. However, if A sends lh he is selected with probability 1. As
choosing aj = 0 instead of aj = 1 shifts some of the probability of sending hl to
sending lh (see first part of the proof), A can strictly increase his probability of
being selected by choosing aj = 0 instead of aj = 1.
Arguments for focusing on 1 and 1 < 2 are the same.
Strong focusing implies strict dominance. We now show that for strong
focusing on attribute 2 provider A strictly prefers to invest in attribute 2, in-
dependent of the beliefs and the resource allocation of provider B. The same
arguments hold for strong focusing on attribute 1 and 1 < 2.
Assume that patients have any beliefs bA and bB and that provider B has
chosen any aB. Strong focusing implies that provider A is selected when sending
signal ll while B sends hh. B is selected when sending hh while A sends ll. Now
22Note that for focusing on attribute 1 we needed 1 ≤ 2 to conclude that more preferred
signals are generated with higher probability. For 1 > 2 the effect is ambiguous. a = 1 still
makes hl more probable on the cost of lh and leads to an increase in the expected profit of the
provider. However, at the same time, ll is more probable on the cost of hh and therefore leads
to a decrease in expected profit for the provider.
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assume that both send ll or both send hh. We show that the probability that A
is selected is the same in both cases and then show that this is sufficient to show
that A is selected with strictly higher probability for aj = 0 instead of aj = 1.
Consider any beliefs x, x′ ∈ {p, 1 − p} about the quality realization where
x = 1 − p corresponds to a belief b = 1 and x = p corresponds to a belief b = 0
(as discussed in the beginning of the proof of Lemma 3.1).
(ll|x)  (ll|x′) is equivalent to [f(1, x)−f(1, x′)]θ ≥ [f(2, x)−f(2, x′)]. For
(hh|x)  (hh|x′) we just have to replace i by 1 − i. If x = x′, the inequality
is satisfied both for ll and hh. For asymmetric x and x′ the inequality for ll
is equivalent to the one for hh. Therefore, the probability that A is selected if
both providers send the signal hh equals the probability that A is selected if both
providers send the signal ll.
This implies that A is strictly better off when choosing aA = 0 instead of aA =
1: First, assume that A is selected with probability 1 if both send hh or ll.
Assume that B signals hh. By the proof of Proposition 3.1 we know that selecting
aA = 0 instead of aA = 1 shifts probabilities from sending worse signals to better
signals. In particular, from sending ll to sending hh. Since 2 < 1 the amount
of probability shifted is not zero. If A sends ll, B is selected, if A sends hh, A
is selected. Therefore, the shift in probabilities results in strict increase of the
probability to be selected. Now assume that A is selected with probability less
than 1 if both send hh or ll and assume that B signals ll. Then, A is selected
with probability 1 when signaling hh but is selected with probability less then 1
when signaling ll. Here again, the shift in probabilities from ll to hh results in
strict increase of the probability to be selected.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We first show the parts of the proposition that claim that strong focusing on an
attribute implies uniqueness of the PBE. Then we show that any further equilibria
are asymmetric and who is selected in asymmetric equilibria. Finally we discuss
the further conditions for uniqueness.
Strong focusing implies uniqueness. The uniqueness for strong focusing and
corresponding errors is directly implied by the proof of the strict dominance of
Proposition 3.1. For both providers it is - independent of the beliefs and the other
provider’s strategy - strictly better to invest in the attribute the patients strongly
focus on.
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Asymmetric equilibria. Assume that patients focus on attribute 2 and (aA, aB) =
(bA, bB) 6= (0, 0) is an equilibrium. First, the equilibrium is not symmetric, i.e.,
aA 6= aB. This is because for symmetric beliefs investing in attribute 2 is strictly
preferred by any provider to investing in attribute 1 (see above). Second, we want
to show that provider A is selected with probability one if and only if aA > aB.
Assume that aA > aB, i.e. aA = 1 and aB = 0. We want to show that this implies
already (ll|xA)  (hh|xB) which means that provider A is selected independent
of the signal. Assume the contrary, i.e., (hh|aB) yields at least the same expected
utility as (ll|aA). Then provider A has an incentive to deviate by choosing aA = 0
instead of aB = 1: From the proof of Proposition 3.1 we know aA = 0 is weakly
better than aA = 1. If (ll|xA)  (hh|xB) does not hold, it is also strictly better
because if B sends hh and A sends ll, provider B is selected with strictly positive
probability. If A sends hh and B send hh, on the other hand, provider B is never
chosen because bA = 1 and bB = 0. As a shift from aA = 1 to aA = 0 generates
signal hh with higher probability on the cost of sending signal ll and all other
shifts in probabilities are weakly better as well it is strictly dominant for A to
invest in attribute 2. This is a contradiction to the assumption that aA > aB
is the providers’ strategy in equilibrium. Thus, if (aA, aB) = (bA, bB) 6= (0, 0) is
a PBE and aA > aB, provider A is selected with probability one. On the other
hand, if provider A is selected with probability one, aA > aB has to hold.
The part for focusing on attribute 1 follows by the same arguments.
Further conditions for uniqueness. Assume that for  = (1, 2) patients
focus on attribute 2 and strictly focuses on attribute 1 for ′ = (1, 12). Assume
that for  = (1, 2) the equilibrium is not unique. Particularly, this implies that
(ll|1)  (hh|0) which is equivalent to
[f(1, 1− p)− f(1− 1, p)]θ > f(1− 2, 1− p)− f(2, p) = 2f(1− 2, 1− p)− 1.
The right hand side is decreasing in 2, therefore if (ll|xA)  (hh|xB) holds for
 = (1, 2) it holds as well when 2 increases and particularly for 
′ = (1, 12). If
the patient strongly focuses on attribute 1 for ′ = (1, 12) it is a contradiction
because then (hh|0)  (ll|1).
Now assume that ′1 is such that for (
′
1, 2) patients strongly focus on attribute 2.
Now assume that for (1, 2) the equilibrium is not unique. This implies particu-
larly 1 < 
′
1 and that (ll|1)  (hh|0) which is again equivalent to
[f(1, 1− p)− f(1− 1, p)]θ < f(1− 2, 1− p)− f(2, p)
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The left hand side is increasing in 1. Thus, if it holds for any 1, it also holds for
′1 > 1. This contradicts that for (
′
1, 2) the patient strongly focuses on attribute
2 since then (hh|0)  (ll|1).
Proof of Lemma 3.2
We fix any  = (1, 2) and therefore omit it in the following. We will first show
that for given symmetric patients’ beliefs with bA = bB = b about the providers’
resource allocation,
W [(1, aB)|(b, b)] > W [(0, aB)|(b, b)]
for any aB ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., W [(1, 0)|(b, b)] > W [(0, 0)|(b, b)] and W [(1, 1)|(b, b)] >
W [(0, 1)|(b, b)]. From symmetry of W [.] with respect to providers it then follows
that W [(1, 1)|(b, b)] > W [(0, 0)|(b, b)]. Since for any symmetric beliefs patients
make the very same selection of providers based on signals they receive, this then
also implies that W [(1, 1)|(1, 1)] > W [(0, 0)|(0, 0)].
Note that the only variables in
W [(aA, aB)|(b, b)] =
∑
qB
∑
qA
P(qA|aA)P(qB|aB)Uq[qA, qB|b] (3.6)
that depend on the resource allocation decision of provider A are P(qA|aA) for
qA = hl and qA = lh. This is because P(hh|aA) = P(ll|aA) = (1 − p)p for all aA.
Thus, we need to show that
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)[P(hl|1)Uq[hl, qB|b] + P(lh|1)Uq[lh, qB|b]] (3.7)
>
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)[P(hl|0)Uq[hl, qB|b] + P(lh|0)Uq[lh, qB|b]] (3.8)
⇔
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)[(1− p)2Uq[hl, qB|b] + p2Uq[lh, qB|b]] (3.9)
>
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)[p2Uq[hl, qB|b] + (1− p)2Uq[lh, qB|b]] (3.10)
⇔
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)Uq[hl, qB|b] >
∑
qB
P(qB|aB)Uq[lh, qB|b] (3.11)
For qB = lh and qB = hl we have Uq[hl, q
B|b] ≥ Uq[lh, qB|b]. Furthermore,
P(hh|ab) = P(ll|ab) = p(1− p) independent of ab. It thus remains to show that
Uq[hl, hh|b] + Uq[hl, ll|b] > Uq[lh, hh|b] + Uq[lh, ll|b]. (3.12)
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Note that Uq[q
A, qB|b] = u(qA)P(qA|qA, qB, b) + u(qb)(1 − P(qA|qA, qB, b)) where
P(qA|qA, qB, b) is the probability that qA is chosen by the patient if quality levels
qA and qB are realized, patient has belief b and the signal error is . Thus the
previous inequality is equivalent to
(u(hl)− u(hh))P(hl|hl, hh, b) + (u(hl)− u(ll))P(hl|hl, ll, b) (3.13)
> (u(lh)− u(hh))P(lh|lh, hh, b) + (u(lh)− u(ll))P(lh|lh, ll, b) (3.14)
⇔ θP(lh|lh, hh, b)+θP(hl|hl, ll, b) > P(hl|hl, hh, b)+P(lh|lh, ll, b)(3.15)
As b = bA = bB is the belief for both providers,
P(hl|hl, hh, b) = P(ll|ll, lh, b) = 1− P(lh|lh, ll, b) (3.16)
P(hl|hl, ll, b) = P(hh|hh, hl) = 1− P(hl|hl, hh, b) (3.17)
Inserting this into the above inequality reduces the inequality to θ > 1 which
holds by definition of θ in our model.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
It is to show that for focusing on attribute 2, any PBE is inefficient. For strong
focusing, this follows directly by the discussion above. For focusing, first con-
sider the symmetric BNE where both providers invest in attribute 2. Then qual-
ity provision is inefficient by Proposition 3.3. Second, consider any other BNE
(aA, aB) = (bA, bB) with aA > aB. Proposition 3.2 showed that patients then
choose provider A ignoring the signals sent. Thus, expected utility is (1− p)θ+ p
since aA = 1. If both providers invest in attribute 1 and patients have corre-
sponding beliefs, welfare is strictly higher as signals are then valuable to patients
and by selection based on the signals they receive an expected utility higher than
(1− p)θ + p.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
First note that W [a|b, (1, 2)] is decreasing in both 1 and 2 (the more precise
signals the better the patient can select). Therefore, for any 1 fixed it is sufficient
to show the inequality for 2 =
1
2
and ′2 = 0 because this then implies that the
inequality holds for any other 2 and 
′
2.
Denote
∆W10(1) = W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 1
2
)]−W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 0)].
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We first show that ∆W10(
1
2
) > 0 and then show that this implies the inequality
for all other 1.
To show that ∆W10(
1
2
) > 0 holds we explicitly calculate the expected utilities.
For a = (1, 1), 2 =
1
2
and corresponding beliefs the signals are of no value for
patients and therefore
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1
2
,
1
2
)] = (1− p)θ + p.
For a = (0, 0), 2 = 0 and corresponding beliefs b = (0, 0) the patient receives no
signal in the first attribute and a precise signal in the second attribute. Thus, in
the first attribute high quality is realized with probability p while in the second
attribute high quality is realized with probability 1 − p2 (the patient focuses on
attribute 2 and therefore she only picks low quality in the second attribute if both
providers realize low quality). Therefore
W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1
2
, 0)] = pθ + 1− p2.
This implies that ∆W10(
1
2
) > 0 is equivalent to θ > 1−p−p
2
1−2p .
Now we show that for all 1 such that patients focus on attribute 2 for (1, 0),
the welfare difference ∆W10(1) decreases in 1, i.e.
∂
∂1
∆W10(1) < 0. This then
implies that ∆W10(1) > 0 for all 1 such that patients on attribute 2 for (1, 0).
The intuition of ∆W10(1) decreasing in 1 is as follows: An improvement of the
signal quality in the first attribute has a larger effect on expected utility if there
is no signal in the second attribute (2 =
1
2
) compared to a precise signal (2 = 0).
Thus, the welfare difference increases when 1 decreases.
For explicit calculation we calculate the partial derivative of the expected
utilities separately. First, consider W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 12)]. Signals in the second
attribute have no value for the patient. As quality is realized independently for
both attributes the patient’s expected utility in the second attribute is p. For the
first attribute there are four different combinations of quality realization of the two
providers. The patient faces high quality in the first attribute if both providers
realize high quality (occurs with probability (1 − p)2) or if one of the providers
realizes high quality and the other one standard quality (occurs with probability
2(1 − p)p) and the patient chooses correctly the provider with the high quality
realization (which she does with probability (1 − 1)).23 Thus, for the expected
utility the following holds
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 1
2
)] = [2(1− 1)(1− p)p+ (1− p)2]θ + p.
23If A realizes h and B realizes l, A is chosen with probability 12 if both send the same signal
and with probability 1 if A sends h and B sends l. The overall probability that A is chosen is
the 2 121(1− 1) + (1− 1)2 = 1− 1.
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Second, consider W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 0)]. For this we consider all possible realiza-
tions of quality in the second attribute separately. q2 = (h, l) or q2 = (l, h) is
realized with probability 2p(1 − p). In both cases the signal of attribute 1 is ir-
relevant as the patient focuses on attribute 2 and has a precise signal in attribute
2. Thus the expected utility given realizations q2 = (h, l) or q2 = (l, h) is θp + 1
as utility in the first attribute is realized independent of quality in the second
attribute.
If q2 = (h, h) or q2 = (l, l) is realized the selection of the provider is only based
on the signal in the first attribute. If q1 = (h, l) or q1 = (l, h) high quality is
selected with probability (1− 1). For q1 = (h, h) the patient selects high quality
in attribute 1 with probability 1 and for q1 = (l, l) standard quality is selected.
Consolidation of those considerations gives
W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 0)] = 2(1− p)p(θp+ 1) (3.18)
+ (1− p)2(θ(p2 + 2(1− p)p(1− 1)) + 1) (3.19)
+ p2(θ(p2 + 2(1− p)p(1− 1)) (3.20)
where the first term represents expected utility of the patient if q2 = (h, l) or
q2 = (l, h) is realized, the second if q2 = (h, h) is realized and the third if q2 = (l, l)
is realized.
Now we can calculate ∂
∂1
∆W10(1) as
∂
∂1
∆W10(1) = −2(1− p)p+ 2(1− p)3p+ 2(1− p)p3
This is always negative as −2(1− p)p+ 2(1− p)3p+ 2(1− p)p3 < 0 is equivalent
to p− 1 < 0 which always holds. Therefore, we showed that ∆W10(1) decreases
in 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
For the first part, consider  such that patients focus on attribute 2 when they re-
ceive informative signals in both attributes. To show that in equilibrium providers
never disclose information on both attributes, assume to the contrary that an equi-
librium exists with reporting in both attributes by both providers. Both providers
then invest in attribute 2. We show that if one provider deviates by disclosing
information only in attribute 2 and investing in attribute 2, he is selected with a
probability higher than 1
2
. This makes the deviation profitable.
Assume that provider A reports only in attribute 2 while B reports in both
attributes (which implies that for both the belief is investing in attribute 2). A
132 3. QUALITY PROVISION AND REPORTING
either sends signal h or signal l in attribute 2, B either sends ll, hl, lh or hh.
A is selected when signaling h in attribute 2 while B sends lh, ll or hl (the last
two are due to focusing on 2). Furthermore, if A signals l and B signals ll, A is
selected as well. Summing up the probabilities with which the signals are sent,
provider A is selected with probability (1 − e2) − (1 − e2)2e1 + e22(1 − e1) (with
ei = i(1 − p) + (1 − i)p). The term is strictly decreasing in e1. e1 is always
smaller or equal to 1
2
and the term is 1
2
for e1 =
1
2
. Therefore, the probability that
A is selected is larger than 1
2
.24
If  is such that 1 < 2 and it can be shown with the same arguments that
if one provider is reporting only in attribute 1 and investing in attribute 1 and
the other reports in both attributes and invests in attribute 1, the first is selected
with a higher probability than the latter.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
(i) Assume that 1 < 2 and both providers invest in 1 and report only in 1,
patients have corresponding beliefs. We show that none of the providers has an
incentive to deviate.
In the Lemma above we already showed that nobody has an incentive to de-
viate to report in both attributes. Furthermore, reporting only in attribute 2
and investing in attribute 2 is not a profitable deviation. This is because if A
reports and invests in 2 and B reports and invest in 1, B is selected whenever
sending signal h. This is because 1 < 2 and θ > 1. However, he sends h with
probability (1− e1) which is greater than 12 (with ei = i(1− p) + (1− i)p). The
same argument holds, if A does not send any signal and B sends a signal only in
attribute 1. Then, B is selected as well whenever sending h which occurs with a
probability 1
2
. Therefore, there is no profitable deviation if both invest and report
in attribute 1 which shows that this is an equilibrium.
It remains to show that this equilibrium is unique. Assume another equilibrium
exists. If there is one provider that is selected with probability smaller than 1
2
he
has an incentive to deviate by copying the other provider’s strategy. Therefore,
in equilibrium both have to be selected with probability 1
2
. However, at least one
of the providers, say B, necessarily has another strategy than investing in 1 and
reporting in 1 (as we consider an equilibrium different to the one where both invest
in 1 and report in 1). Then, due to the considerations above, A is selected with
24Except for 1 =
1
2 , but then there is no point in deciding about reporting in both attribute
as there is anyway no signal to report in attribute 1.
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probability greater than 1
2
when investing in 1 and reporting in 1 and therefore
has an incentive to deviate. This shows the uniqueness.
(ii) Consider any  such that patients focus on attribute 2 when receiving both
signals. Once θ > θc, (h · |1)  (·h|0) holds (see considerations previous to the
Proposition).
(h · |1)  (·h|0) implies that reporting only in attribute 1 and investing in this
attribute yields a selection probability greater than 1
2
if the other provider reports
only in attribute 2 and invests in 2. The same holds if the other provider does not
report since then the one reporting and investing in 1 is as well always selected
when signaling h in attribute 1. If, furthermore, it holds that if the other provider
reports in both attributes and invests in attribute 2, investing in 1 and reporting
in 1 yields a selection probability greater than 1
2
, we showed that investing and
reporting in 1 is a PBE.
To show that there exists  such that this holds, assume that provider A invests
and reports only in attribute 1, and provider B reports in both attributes and
invests in 2. We want to know for which  the probability that A is selected is
greater than 1
2
.
Note that A is always selected when sending h in attribute 1 and, on the same
time, B either sends ll, hl or lh. For  = (1
2
, 0) provider A is also selected when
B sends hh and A send h in attribute 1. Therefore, for all  close enough to
 = (1
2
, 0) provider A is selected with probability greater than 1
2
. Note that there
are several other  for which this holds. For instance, once 1 > p, provider A
also is selected when sending l in attribute 1 and provider B sends hl or ll. Then,
once p > 1
3
the total probability that A is selected is greater than 1
2
which can be
shown by explicit calculation.
It remains to show that investing and reporting only in 1 is a unique PBE.
The arguments for this are exactly the same we saw in (i) for uniqueness.
(iii) First, we show that if θ < θc we can choose  = (1, 2) such that (·h|0) 
(h · |1). Second, we show that (·h|0)  (h · |1) is sufficient such that reporting only
on attribute 2 and investing in attribute 2 with corresponding beliefs is a PBE.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium then again follows by the same arguments as
seen in (i).
1. Choice of : For (·h|0)  (h · |1) it holds that
(·h|0)  (h · |1)⇔ pθ + f(1− 2, 1− p) > f(1− 1, p)θ + (1− p).
The left hand side is decreasing in 2 and the right hand side is decreasing in 1.
So the error for which the inequality is the easiest to fulfill is  = (1
2
, 0). For this
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error the inequality transfers to θ < 1−p
1−2p . Thus, only if θ <
1−p
1−2p = θ
c there exists
an  = (1, 2) such that (·h|0)  (h·|1). We just showed that at least for  = (12 , 0)
it is the case which implies that there exists a neighborhood of  = (1
2
, 0) such
that it holds for all  in this neighborhood.
2. Investing and reporting only in attribute 2 with corresponding beliefs
form a PBE. Consider  such that (·h|0)  (h · |1) holds and assume that both
providers invest in attribute 2 and report only in attribute 2. Then both providers
are selected with probability 1
2
. In the following we show that for any provider
there is no incentive to deviate.
Assume that provider A deviates by not reporting in 2 but only in 1. If A
discloses information on 1 and B on 2 then by (·h|0)  (h · |1), B wins whenever
generating a signal h in the second attribute the probability of which is larger
than 1
2
since B invests in 2. Therefore, provider A does not have any incentive to
deviate to reporting in 1.
Now assume that provider A deviates by reporting in both signals and investing
in 2. Again, B wins whenever generating signal h in the second attribute - except
for A generating hh. On the other hand, B also is selected when generating
l in the second attribute and A generates ll. Thus, B wins with probability
(1− e2)− (1− e2)2e1 + e22(1− e1). Here ei = i(1− p) + (1− i)p is the probability
that an l signal is generated if the investment is in attribute i. The term decreases
in e1. Inserting e1 =
1
2
then shows that B wins with at least a probability of
(1− e2)− (1− e2)2 12 + e22 12 = 12 . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate.
Finally, assume that provider A deviates by not reporting at all. Then again,
B wins whenever B sends signal h in the second attribute by (·h|0)  (h · |1).
Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof combines the results of Proposition 3.5 and the welfare discussion.
For part (i) note that it is optimal if signals in both attributes are reported (and
with it providers then invest in 1). Voluntary reporting leads to reporting only in
attribute 1.
To discuss parts (ii) and (iii) we only consider signal errors  such that if
receiving both signals, patients focus on attribute 2. Optimal reporting is then
such that it induces that in equilibrium either both providers invest in attribute 1
and report only in attribute 1, or both providers invest in attribute 2 and report
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in both attributes. The first is desired if
W [(1, 1)|(1, 1), (1, 1
2
)] > W [(0, 0)|(0, 0), (1, 2)],
the latter if the reverse holds.
First, consider θ > θc and  such that in the unique PBE there is reporting only
in attribute 1. From Proposition 3.5 we already know that this is the case if 1 is
high enough and 2 is low enough since it holds for  = (
1
2
, 0) (furthermore, it holds
for all  with focusing on 2 as long as 1 > p and p >
1
3
). θ > θc implies θ > θ and
therefore the optimal policy has to induce an equilibrium where both providers
invest in 1 and report only on 1. Thus, voluntary reporting is already optimal,
while any policy mandating reporting in attribute 2 is not optimal. Mandating
reporting only in 1 or banning reporting in 2 yields the same outcome.
Second, consider θ < θc and  such that disclosing only in attribute 2 is the
unique PBE. Again, by the proposition above, this holds if 1 is high enough and
2 is low enough. For θˆ() < θ < θ
c, it is desirable that signals are sent only
in attribute 1. This can be achieved by banning reporting on attribute 2. For
1 high enough and 2 low enough, mandatory reporting in 1 is not an optimal
policy since then providers would additionally report about attribute 2. However,
mandatory reporting in 1 yields higher welfare than voluntary reporting since
voluntary reporting in both attributes leads to reporting only in 2 in equilibrium.
Banning reporting in 2 leads in equilibrium to only reporting in 1, therefore it is
optimal.
For θ < θˆ() it is desirable that information about both attributes is available.
For 1 high enough and 2 low enough, mandating reporting in attribute 1 is
already an optimal policy since providers voluntarily report about attribute 2. In
this case, banning reporting in attribute 2 is not optimal. Banning reporting in 2
might even decrease welfare compared to voluntary reporting in both attributes.
This occurs whenever voluntary reporting yields reporting only in attribute 2 and,
on the same time, reporting only in attribute 1 is associated with lower welfare
than reporting only in attribute 2. This occurs if θ is close enough to 1 because
then, the better selection effect in the second attribute dominates any potentially
better resource allocation effect such that receiving information only on attribute
2 and investment in 2 yields higher welfare than receiving information only about
attribute 1 but providers invest in attribute 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7
Fix p, θ and  as considered in the proposition. We are interested in the winning
probability of provider A if B invests in 1 and A invests in attribute 2 when
investments are observable (i.e. the patient has also the corresponding beliefs). If
the probability of A winning is larger than one half, it is a strict dominant strategy
to invest in attribute 2. If it is smaller than one half it is a strict dominant strategy
to invest in attribute 1.
To assess the winning probabilities we explicitly consider for which signal com-
binations A wins. If B sends a signal with s2 = l and A sends a signal with s2 = h
(which occurs with probability (1 − e2)2) the patient selects provider A as she
strongly focuses on attribute 2. The only other cases where A might win are the
signal combinations (sA, sB) = (hh, lh) and (sA, sB) = (hl, ll) (whether or not A is
selected depends again on the parameters). In all other cases B is selected. This
follows by the fact that if the same signals are generated provider B is selected
and all other remaining signal combinations are implied either by strong focusing
or by B winning for the same signals.
Therefore, provider A is selected at least with probability (1 − e2)2 and at most
with probability (1− e2)2 + 2e21e2(1− e2).
Thus, if (1 − e2)2 > 12 investing in attribute 2 is a strictly dominant strategy
which holds for all e2 < 1−
√
1
2
.
If (1− e2)2 + 2e21e2(1− e2) < 12 investing in attribute 1 is a strictly dominant
strategy which is equivalent to e2 >
3−√5
2
.
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